FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

OCTOBER
1938

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 17 OCTOBER 1938 No. 1

LEGISLATING PEACE

By Allen W. Dulles
and Hamilton Fish Armstrong

THE crisis in Europe may be compromised temporarily. War may not be so imminent as the day-by-day headlines indicate. But with two "unofficial wars" in progress in the world, with men under arms in many of the great European countries, with chancelleries perplexed and anxious, with virulent press campaigns going on between several nations, Americans cannot shut their eyes to the risks of these days or imagine that if the worst comes they will remain unaffected. That they are not unmindful of the risks is evidenced by the effort made in Congress during the past few years to assure peace by legislative means.

As the World War drew into perspective, it left only one clear determination in most American minds: "Never again!" At first the hope which these words implied seemed reasonable enough. No direct danger threatened our shores. If the government were careful to steer clear of entangling alliances, it could avoid becoming involved, the average American thought, in any future troubles that might arise abroad. In 1919–1920, then, we rejected the task of participating in the postwar political reconstruction of Europe and refused to take responsibility for the execution of the peace settlement. We assumed that in some manner the war-wearied European nations would manage to organize themselves for peace, and we hoped that the League of Nations would become effective even without our participation. Secretary Hughes laid what seemed at the time a secure basis for maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Successive Administrations tried to help indirectly by working with the League for disarmament; and our government joined in a solemn declaration renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. Simultaneously, we let our military machine deteriorate as a part of the general

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world relaxation and our desire to economize and pay off the costs of the war.

Then came successive blows. The disarmament efforts proved a dismal failure. Instead of all-round disarmament we saw the opposite. The armed dictatorships which arose, and the democracies which tried to catch up with them, both alike had to mortgage their financial future in the race to arm and faced ever-increasing inflation (so destructive of the middle class — the great reservoir of sobriety and balance). The League of Nations proved inadequate to deal with the heavy tasks laid upon it and the Briand-Kellogg Pact became virtually a dead letter.

The cumulative effect of these developments was to make the American people begin to feel genuinely alarmed. A great war was no longer the remote danger it once had seemed. It had become a very real and very threatening possibility. We were not prepared to do anything very concrete to make it less likely; in fact, it was not easy to see just what we could do, except to carry forward Secretary Hull's vigorous and courageous efforts to create a more normal psychology by restoring world trade to its usual channels. The "Never again" philosophy still was the dominating influence with the American public, and the counsel which it gave was still the same — that the country insulate itself in every way possible from the dangers appearing on several horizons in Europe, Africa and the Far East. The two chief attempts in this direction were the Neutrality Legislation of 1935–1937 and the Ludlow Resolution which was debated in Congress early in 1938.

The Ludlow Resolution can be disposed of summarily. It was based on the theory that if the Constitution were made to require that a popular referendum be held before Congress could declare war, the United States would keep clear of trouble. The idea that it was a feasible proposal or that if adopted it would have the result expected was thoroughly exploded and the plan is not likely to be soon revived.

The Neutrality Legislation falls in a very different category. It was the product not of a brainstorm but of careful and conscientious study by the Department of State and by thoughtful citizens both in and out of Congress.[1]

[1] See Charles Warren's two articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "Troubles of a Neutral," April 1934, and "Safeguards to Neutrality," January 1936. For the historical background, see "Can We Be Neutral?" by Allen W. Dulles and Hamilton Fish Armstrong, published by the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1936.

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The Neutrality Act — or rather, the 1935 predecessor of the present Act — suffered from having been drawn too much with a single situation in view, namely, the war which was impending as a result of Italian pressure on Ethiopia. The earliest public discussion of Neutrality Legislation had aimed at "keeping us out of the last war." The concrete situation now presented was rather different from what had been foreseen. The threatened war in Ethiopia was not one which, in itself, could conceivably involve the United States. However, Europe's attempt to prevent the war threatened to complicate our relations with the states belonging to the League of Nations. Thus mixed motives were behind the support given the legislation finally adopted by Congress on August 24, 1935. Some thought that a legislative straitjacket, if it were tight enough, would serve to keep us out of any war. Others were interested more in the particular war then impending; they wanted to put legislation on the statute books as speedily as possible, so that we could throw our moral and possibly some material help on the side of the League states which were then preparing to bring pressure on Italy in order to keep her out of Ethiopia. In this particular instance the Neutrality Act, though in form applicable to both belligerents, bore down in practice solely on one side — Italy — and hence served as a measure of aid to Ethiopia.

Since the Ethiopian affair, Spain and China have served in succession as proving-grounds of American popular ideas about how to keep out of war and have tested the legislation adopted to give effect to those ideas. The Congress which convenes in January 1939 will have the task of drawing the deductions from these experiences. Already it is evident that there will be formal proposals to amend or even to repeal the 1937 law. Congress can hardly fail to take account of the fact that the 1937 Act has not worked to the satisfaction of many of its sponsors in the Spanish civil war, and that in the Chinese war it has not even been invoked. Further, the so-called "cash and carry" features of the law are due to expire on May 1, 1939. These various factors will force the issue into prominence this coming winter even though Congress were disposed to postpone it.

The wording of the 1937 law provides that it shall enter into effect upon a finding by the President "that there exists a state of war" between two foreign states, or a state of serious civil strife in a foreign state. Certain consequences follow. In particular, the

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trade in arms, the sale of securities of belligerents, and travel by American citizens on belligerent vessels are prohibited. These consequences are mandatory. In addition, under the so-called "cash and carry" provisions of the law the President is given the discretionary right to impose further restrictions on the carrying of goods other than arms, and he may also require that title to goods destined for belligerents shall pass to the foreign purchaser before the goods leave the United States.

This, as students of international law have conclusively pointed out, is not primarily a *neutrality* act. We are not called upon to impose on ourselves these various restrictions in order to comply with the so-called requirements of international law and practice. International law in this field has wisely been modest in its requirements. About all that it demands is that a neutral state shall not allow itself to become a base of direct military operations for the belligerents, and that the governments of neutral states shall not participate in any aid or comfort given to belligerents. As yet there is nothing in international law which calls upon a neutral to prohibit the private trade of its nationals, private financing by its nationals for the benefit of belligerents, or travel by neutrals on belligerent vessels. We do not, therefore, need these self-imposed restrictions in order to meet the requirements of neutrality in international law. In fact, there are certain situations where such restrictions might result, not in our being "unneutral" in the legal sense of the term, but in our failing to be "impartial" — a word and attitude which public opinion mistakenly identifies with the legal position of "neutrality."

The measures which we propose to take under the Act, if they are to be justified at all, must be justified on some other basis than that of a legalistic *neutrality*. In view of the debates in Congress which led to the adoption of the law, we must assume that the legislators considered the Act as a statute to "keep us out of war." It is legislation providing for American isolation rather than for American neutrality.

Now this country may profit by legislation designed to help keep it out of war. For it is a delusion to think that American repugnance to war is really fundamental. In theory we Americans are all opposed to war. We all argue eloquently and with conclusive logic as to the madness and folly of war and we persuade ourselves, as people have been persuaded in each generation, that the next war will be the end of civilization. The facts of the matter

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are, if we would be really candid with ourselves, that we are as prone to get excited to the point of war as almost any people on earth — probably more so than the war-hardened veterans of Europe. We are temperamental and sentimental. We allow our sympathies to become aroused for issues, however remote, and we espouse with a fervent partisanship oppressed races and lost causes which have no direct relationship to our own welfare. These characteristics are not mentioned here for the purpose of criticizing them. Undoubtedly there is much about them that is fine. But they entail dangers which we should be equally frank to recognize.

In this country, furthermore, we enjoy, and we must continue to enjoy, the privileges of a completely free press and freedom of speech. In recognizing the inestimable benefits of these privileges we should equally recognize that we pay a price for them, that dangers are inherent in them. Freedom of speech and the press has been used, and doubtless in the future will be used again, to arouse this country to a point where war may result. In a democratic society such as ours we deceive ourselves if we think that war is generally imposed on the people by the government. That is the usual course in a dictatorship. In a democracy, war is much more likely to be imposed upon the government by an aroused public opinion; the government is more keenly alive to the perils of war than is the man in the street.

We could not change our temperamental outlook if we would. We should not and will not forego a free press and free speech. It is quite proper, however, that in this vital matter of war and peace our government should try through legislation to see that our enthusiasms do not involve its prestige and possibly provoke the use of its armed power except over issues where real national interests are at stake.

It is here that war prevention legislation of the general nature of that enacted in 1937 can play a useful rôle. Given the conditions which inevitably surround modern warfare, it is proper for us to reëxamine in the light of those conditions whether the United States should allow its honor or its prestige to become involved because of accidental damage to American property or the accidental loss of American lives in war zones. A belligerent, even if well-intentioned, has no easy task in distinguishing between alien enemies and alien friends. Modern warfare has both extended the range of war zones and changed the character of the attack. An incident such as the *Panay* bombing is a very

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serious matter; but once that bombing is formally disavowed as an accident and reparation made, is American prestige any longer involved? Tragic as was the loss of the *Lusitania*, should we permit a similar catastrophe in the future to result in a popular call to arms in the United States? Unjustifiable as was the British treatment of American cargoes during the World War, at least under the then existing tenets of international law, should such treatment in a future conflict again lead us to the brink of war? We must try to distinguish between deliberate attacks on American interests and the loss which everyone, whether belligerent or neutral, suffers in the zone of operations in any major modern conflict.

The Neutrality Legislation of 1937 was framed to eliminate in a future war between foreign states some of the various provocative incidents which we encountered during the period 1914 to 1917. It also aimed to prevent the creation of an American economic and financial stake in the victory of one side or the other. In certain instances it may be useful to these ends. For example, Americans are forbidden to travel on belligerent vessels. (An absolute prohibition, with penalties for infringement, is probably unwise; a warning against such travel, and notice that those who neglect it are not to expect governmental help or redress, would seem sufficient.) Further, if the conditions of 1914–1917 were repeated, loans to belligerents would be banned and the government would be able to invoke, and it might be wise to invoke, the "cash and carry" provisions of the Act. This would help to prevent issues arising over trade interference and also reduce somewhat the danger of loss of American lives through belligerent action. If we can keep a reasonable composure, at least until a situation arises where a vital interest of the United States is at stake, we may have cut down some of the potential causes of war.

There is a great deal of homely truth in Miss Dorothy Thompson's humorous remark that "you keep out of war by being sound in the head and light on the feet." The provisions of the Neutrality Law just mentioned may help to keep us "sound in the head." The real difficulty with the law as it stands at present is that it also makes us "heavy footed." In its present form the law shackles in advance those who make our policy. It may force the Executive to take actions which have little or no relation to the preservation of peace. In certain situations, due to the so-

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called mandatory provisions of the Act, it may even operate in quite the opposite direction.

Our ability to keep out of war depends upon more than our ability to control our passions. It may depend upon our ability to help prevent the spread of war to a point where the maintenance of neutrality becomes impossible. Again, we may find war forced upon us by an attack upon what may in all truth be vital interests of the United States. Neutrality legislation which does not permit the Executive to direct policy along lines calculated to protect these vital interests in advance, and help to prevent a war from spreading to the point where we may become involved, is worse than useless — it contains definite dangers. Here is where the Neutrality Law as at present written is open to criticism. Yet it could easily be amended to reduce those dangers and remove that criticism, preserving all its good features and at the same time giving back to the Administration the liberty of action essential to the conduct of foreign policy.

The Neutrality Law obligates the President to declare an arms embargo and to invoke all of the major provisions of the Act, except the "cash and carry" features, whenever he finds that a "state of war exists." Certainly it was the intent of the Congress in passing the law that it should come into effect whenever a *real* state of war arose. However, it was left to the Executive to determine whether or not a state of war existed. In the Chinese situation, this right has been interpreted as authorizing the President to withhold action in the absence of any formal declaration of war by one of the belligerents. Congress has tacitly assented to this interpretation, doubtless because in the Chinese situation the President's decision had the general approval of public opinion. This interpretation of the law, however, leaves us in the uncomfortable position that if either belligerent should for any reason desire to see our Neutrality Law come into effect, it could bring this about by the purely formal act of declaring war. In other words, we really lose control of the conduct of our own foreign policy and leave to other Powers the opportunity of determining what our own course of action should be. This is absurd. It would be a different matter, perhaps, if the law we are discussing were really a law to keep us legally "neutral." But it is an isolationist measure affecting our commercial and financial relationships and broad issues of foreign policy. Under these circum-

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stances there is every reason for us to keep in our own hands the decision as to the wise moment to apply the restrictions.

It is often suggested that to bring the 1937 Act into effect in connection with the war in China would tend to aid Japan, a result which would be considered contrary to our policy and interests. Certainly it would be resented by China, and consequently would render even more difficult than at present the protection of American interests in that country. At the present time, moreover, there is nothing to show that the Act would help to keep us out of war in the Far East. By permitting Japan, in effect, to legislate for us, it would force us to impose on ourselves restrictions possibly detrimental to the very policies which the State Department is endeavoring to carry out.

This unsatisfactory situation is the result of the insistence in Congress on putting mandatory features into the law to bring it automatically into effect in certain circumstances and automatically to terminate its effectiveness in certain other circumstances. However, as it was impossible for the draftsmen of the Act to foresee or define with absolute precision the conditions under which the law ought to come into effect, they perforce had to leave to the President the right to determine when a state of war exists. As a result, they have introduced more uncertainty and confusion than if they had left it to the President to determine both that a state of war exists and also that the interests of the United States and the preservation of peace justify us in assuming the restrictions imposed by the Act, or certain of them.

The war in Spain has brought out another defect in the law. Once a state of war has been found to exist and the law has been invoked, there appears to be no way, short of new legislation, by which its applicability can be revoked so long as that state of war continues, even though in its operation the law may have proven definitely harmful in some important aspect of our international relations.

Even Senator Nye, who was most insistent upon making the law as rigid as possible, became restive when he saw how the American arms embargo actually was working out in Spain, and he endeavored to have the law modified. The Senator and others seemed to feel that the only practical effect of that embargo has been to close our door to possible purchases of arms by the recognized Government of Spain, while its antagonists are kept supplied by certain European governments.

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We have not yet had occasion to test the operation of the Act in a war between two South American countries. But it would be strange if we did not find the results there even more surprising and unfortunate than in the Spanish civil war. We would feel very chagrined if we found that after we had tied our hands with an arms embargo, some European nation — Germany, for example — took advantage of this situation to determine the result of the conflict by supplying arms to one or the other of the belligerents. And might not the operation of the Act be found to conflict with some of the inter-American treaties condemning aggression and providing for consultation in case of a conflict in Latin America?

Secretary of State Hull has correctly pointed out that under our present legislation a proclamation prohibiting the exportation of arms cannot be revoked unless there is a change in the factual situation which caused it to be put into effect. The general international situation may have changed, but the Administration has been left no liberty of action to deal with the altered situation unless the state of war which led to the imposition of the embargo has meanwhile terminated. New belligerents may have come into the picture, the attitude of other neutrals may have altered: our attitude is frozen, unless the President chooses to ask, and can obtain, further legislation from Congress. This is unsatisfactory. Congress may or may not be in session at the moment. Besides, if you intend to change a general law to meet particular occasions why have that general law? To meet this situation the law should promptly be amended to permit the President to revoke any section of the Act which he finds no longer required to promote the peace and security of the United States.

As a matter of fact, the arms embargo has no utility as a general peace measure unless it is imposed not only by the United States but by the other important munition-producing countries as well. As a measure to keep the United States out of war, it entails definite risks; and these are increased if we do not leave the government free to revoke the embargo whenever desirable. There is unlikely to be any practical reason for placing an embargo on arms unless conditions are such as to make it desirable to impose on our trade broad restrictions like those contemplated under the "cash and carry" provisions — which are not mandatory but may be invoked at the discretion of the President.

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Further, the distinction between trade in arms and in the various other sinews of war is sentimental rather than real. Actually, trade in arms is less likely to get us into trouble than trade in other commodities, as the right of belligerents to seize and confiscate arms as absolute contraband is so clear that diplomatic controversy is unlikely to ensue if American arms cargoes are stopped.

The conclusions to which we are led seem to be the following:

The arms embargo and the other mandatory provisions of the Act should, like the "cash and carry" provisions, come into effect only when the President finds both that a state of war exists and that the legislation is necessary "to promote the security or preserve the peace of the United States or to protect the lives of citizens of the United States." This is the finding now required under the "cash and carry" provisions of the Act.

Further, it would be a wise precaution to make the provisions of the Act severable. Then the President could determine whether it was necessary under the above finding of fact to invoke the arms embargo, the restrictions on loans, the restrictions on travel on belligerent vessels, and the "cash and carry" provisions, or any one of them. At the present time only the "cash and carry" provisions are severable and discretionary. The others must be imposed if the President finds that a "state of war" exists.

These various changes involve giving the Executive more discretion than he now enjoys under the Act. We must, therefore, accept at the outset the idea of allowing the Executive liberty of action, within certain limits, to conduct the foreign relations of the United States in periods when other nations are at war just as we accord him that liberty when the world is at peace. There is no alternative to giving him this discretion if we are to have a sensible and constructive foreign policy. As between the risk that the Executive may possibly abuse this discretion and the risks inherent in a policy which ties the Executive with legislative restrictions in the conduct of foreign policy, the former alternative seems distinctly preferable. The Constitutional safeguards which already limit Executive action will remain. When we go beyond these, and try to legislate in advance on details of foreign policy, we run the risk of forcing the country to embark on a course which, in unforeseen and absolutely unforeseeable situations, may lead toward war rather than peace, and handicap rather than help those who are trying to protect our real national interests.

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With such changes, minor in form though substantial in substance, the so-called Neutrality Act might well be given another period of trial. International conditions change so rapidly that any legislation affecting our foreign relations should have constant review; hence the wisdom of the idea already partially introduced into the Act that it should be reviewed after a period of years.

Finally, we must guard against over-confidence in the effectiveness of any Neutrality Law. Peace cannot be assured through mere legislative processes. Few thoughtful students of international problems have expressed any real confidence in the ability of the United States to avoid being drawn into a prolonged war involving the Great Powers, whatever our Neutrality Legislation might be. Congress nevertheless has been distrustful of every move which implies positive coöperation for peace. It has interested itself only in possible means of keeping the fire from our own domain once it has broken out somewhere; it has refused to join in efforts to prevent the outbreak. The reason for this is, of course, the apprehension that we might become involved in dangerous commitments and lose our independence of judgment and of action. Congress also fears that coöperation on our part with other Powers to prevent war might be deemed an unfriendly act, or even an act of war, by some prospective or actual aggressor.

These apprehensions spring from a failure to appreciate the real position of the United States in the world. We are the most powerful single nation. Our position, if expressed clearly and resolutely, and not in platitudes or preachments, must be listened to with respect. Our influence can be incalculable. After the experience of 1917 no Power on earth, unless it deliberately decided to commit hari-kari, will dare to add us to its list of enemies merely because it does not like our international policy. We do not need to take, or to promise to take, joint action with other nations in order to make our influence felt. But we may need, when and if the occasion arises, to take independent yet parallel action. It is not help *for* other nations which would be implied in such parallel action, but the protection of our own ultimate stake in the preservation of peace. Further, one can imagine plenty of occasions when we would be glad to have another nation or group of nations take action paralleling ours in the face of some hostile move against us by a third Power or group of Powers. This has been true in the past.

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The Neutrality Act, if it can be amended in the light of recent experience, may prove helpful in the peaceful conduct of our foreign relations. But it is far from being enough. As a guaranty that we shall be able to keep out of war it is entirely inadequate. Have not the events of the past few years in Europe and the Far East had a sufficiently sobering effect on public opinion to justify our State Department in now instituting further studies (if it has not already done so) to ascertain whether through legislation or otherwise we can better equip ourselves to make a more positive contribution to peace? Admirable as are Secretary Hull's statements on foreign policy, there is no gainsaying that they are viewed with some cynicism abroad. International trouble-makers are trying to convince themselves that the United States will never do more than give lip service to the cause of peace, that it would not be a factor to be reckoned with unless it were directly attacked. They believe that they can count on a passivity which, as history and current observation show, is quite alien to the American temper. The question is, how can we make them aware of this, and do it effectively and in time? If we are to have an influence in the world's decision as to peace or war, a decision in which every living American has a direct stake, we shall need more effective weapons in our hands. There may not now be much time left in which to forge them.

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AFTER THE POPULAR FRONT

By Alexander Werth

ANOTHER Fourteenth of July has gone by. Great military parade in the Champs Elysées in the morning, and a Front Populaire procession between the Bastille and the Place de la Nation in the afternoon. Half a million or more came to see the one; and only very few came to see the other. The Front Populaire procession had lost much of its past vitality and of its popular appeal. Large banners were put up in the Place de la Nation displaying the "Front Populaire oath" of July 14, 1935 — the oath to "defend the Republic, to give bread to the workers, and peace to humanity." The words now had a hollow sound, especially when one remembered the circumstances in which they originally were displayed. On that day in 1935 the Front Populaire procession must have brought 600,000 people together. It represented the immense protest movement then sweeping over France — a reaction of the people of France against the "Sixth of February" and all that this had meant. One could scarcely move from the Bastille to the Place de la Nation, so dense were the crowds. For, apart from the procession itself, the sidewalks were packed with enthusiastic spectators — all the little shopkeepers and artisans of the Faubourg Saint Antoine had crowded into the street to associate themselves with the Front Populaire. In good 1848 style, Cot, Guernut and other Radicals, perched on a taxicab, were waving tricolor flags. And I remember how Daladier made a triumphal reëntry into public life (following his misfortunes of February 1934) by having his photograph taken in the Place de la Bastille, right in front of the large white panel inscribed with the Front Populaire oath.

But on July 14, 1938, there was no Daladier in the Place de la Bastille; and there was even no Léon Blum. At least I did not see him; nor was there anything in the Socialist *Populaire* on the following day to suggest that he had been there. Instead, there was a photograph of some *Jeunesses Socialistes*, and another of a Catalan orchestra that was collecting money for Spanish relief. But no symbolic pictures of Thorez, Blum and Daladier walking arm-in-arm at the head of the procession — the sort of thing we used to see on the great day of promise in July 1935, or during the Front Populaire apotheosis in the Place de la Nation on July

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14, 1936. And in the same Place de la Nation this time the platform was crowded with people — mostly Communist deputies and senators, and representatives of the CGT, and a few unimportant Socialists and Radicals — but it was a dumb show. With their tricolor ribbons across their chests, they looked on rather dismally as the unimpressive procession moved past; and no one said a word. For on the previous day the Committee of the Front Populaire had met; and after a heated discussion it was decided that the Radicals, Socialists and Communists no longer had a common language, and that it would be better for their representatives during the July 14 celebrations to be united in silence, since they could not be united in words. For if they had spoken, the Socialists would have attacked Daladier, and the Communists would have made a retrospective attack on Blum — on his "pause," on his financial policy, and on non-intervention for which they hold him chiefly responsible. And they would have demanded an "extension" of the Front Populaire program — a proposal to which the Radicals would have objected on the ground that it was little use extending the Front Populaire program when even the present program had not yet been fully applied, and, in fact, would not be.

The truth is that, whatever the errors made by Blum and Vincent Auriol and the rest of the Socialists who governed France until June 1937, the fundamental tragedy of the Front Populaire was France's inability to carry out the large social program advocated by the Front Populaire in a time of intensive rearmament. Such a feat may be possible in the United States; but France's reserves of wealth and credit are limited. Since 1931, France had lived from hand to mouth, borrowing here, there and everywhere. When the period of intensive rearmament arrived in 1934–35 the sources of credit had already been severely tapped; and the difficulty of finding the necessary billions increased year after year.

There might have been a way out of the difficulty: the bold adoption of exchange control, and of other methods of totalitarian coercion. Many Socialists felt from the outset that exchange control could alone preserve the Front Populaire. But Blum would not have it. Mainly because London and Washington would not have it. And already in September 1936 he sacrificed the Front Populaire program to the Tripartite Agreement; and this sacrifice became more and more explicit as the months went on. Proclamation of the "pause" in February 1937; the further

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"surrender" to orthodox finance in March 1937; and, three months later, the resignation of the Blum government after the Senate had denied it plenary powers. In fact, Blum was then riding for a fall; and would probably have been enormously embarrassed if the Senate had granted him the plenary powers. For although he had half-promised the Senate not to resort to exchange control, the pressure from the Trade Unions demanding exchange control would have been great had he obtained the plenary powers; and, for international reasons, he would even then have been reluctant to abandon the Tripartite Agreement. He would have been between the devil and the deep sea.

It was also with an eye on the international situation that Blum persuaded the National Council of the Socialist Party to allow him and the other Socialists to enter the Chautemps cabinet of June 1937–January 1938. With Bonnet as Finance Minister, this government was scarcely Front Populaire; but Blum nevertheless desired to maintain the illusion that the Front Populaire still existed as a parliamentary coalition; and the Communists assented. But this close, even if deceptive, association with the Socialists and Communists suited neither Chautemps nor (still less) Bonnet. And although the financial reforms that were carried out by this Chautemps government with the consent of the Socialists clearly marked a reaction against the "purchasing power" policy of 1936 (all that the Socialists secured in return was a semi-nationalization of the railways), Bonnet and Chautemps waited vigilantly for the time when the Front Populaire could be disrupted even in a parliamentary sense. In October 1937, at the Radical Congress at Lille, Bonnet's manœuvre with that in view failed; but Chautemps succeeded when, in the following January, he deliberately broke up his own government by publicly telling the Communists that he did not want their votes — a phrase which obliged the Socialists, "in the name of the Front Populaire," to quit his government.

Events now moved at a faster rhythm. Blum failed in the course of this January crisis to widen the basis of the Front Populaire by forming a "National Government" of "all true Republicans" stretching "from Thorez to Reynaud" — a proposal which was regarded by the Right as an attempt to save the Front Populaire at any price, or at least to maintain the center of gravity in Parliament on the Left (while "normally" this center of gravity had, in the past, invariably shifted to the Right when-

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ever the question arose of forming a National Government). M. Chautemps returned to office at the head of a purely Radical cabinet. If, in overthrowing his own last government a week earlier, he was extremely offensive to the Left, he was now all honey to them; and the paradoxical situation arose in which this new government, with the weakest possible basis in Parliament, secured, on the day of its ministerial declaration, the largest vote of confidence on record — 501 votes to 1. The "one" was the irrepressible Gaston Bergery who seems to have arrived at the philosophical deduction that whoever was Premier would, sooner or later, inevitably prove to be a knave, or a fool, or both.

In announcing the formation of his new government M. Chautemps said that it was "a solid tool." Less than two months later it just went to pieces, without even striking against anything. It happened three days before Hitler's march into Austria; and the reason Chautemps gave for resigning was that he had suggested asking Parliament for plenary powers, but that the Socialists and Communists had received his suggestion badly. Was that the real reason for his resignation? Or was he reluctant (as was unkindly suggested) to face the music of Goering's airplanes droning over Vienna? In any case, when Hitler marched into Austria, France was without a government.

Then came another attempt by Blum to form a National Government — this time one including everybody from the extreme Right to the Communists. Unimpressed by the gravity of the international situation, and saying that Blum was merely trying to save his own prestige — this time as a "National Premier" — they refused to listen to his appeal. Only Paul Reynaud and Kerillis and a few others, deeply concerned over Hitler's "next" move, were ready to follow Blum. But not the others. The opposition between Right and Left was too strong, and the Right felt that the Left were losing ground; so why lend Blum what they regarded as a helping hand even in the name of those higher considerations that had prompted him to appeal to them? And though Kerillis thought it would be useful to have Communists in the Government ("for we must not have the Paris working class, particularly the munitions workers, against us"), Flandin swore that the friendship of Chamberlain's England would be irretrievably lost if a single Communist were admitted.

So Blum's attempt to build up a National Government, which in one of the most critical moments of Europe's history would

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have "impressed the world" and greatly heightened France's international prestige (which at the time of the *Anschluss* had fallen lower than it had ever been before), failed completely. He thereupon — heaven knows why — formed a Front Populaire government under Socialist guidance which was almost the very image of his government of June 1936. It was an anachronism, and Blum himself felt it keenly. But he exposed himself to much jeering by admitting it openly — and by saying that this was not the government France was needing "in the present circumstances," and that it would gladly give way to a National Government as soon as the Opposition were prepared to enter one. But the Opposition, clearly realizing that Blum was doomed, merely jeered — and waited for his inevitable downfall.

It so happened that a wave of strikes — the most serious since 1936 — swept over France during the short existence of this Blum Government. The metallurgical industry came to a standstill, and for over a fortnight not a single airplane was produced in France. Stay-in strikes reappeared on a large scale. Evidently many of the workers were taking advantage of Blum's presence at the head of the government — for clearly Blum was less likely than most other Premiers to use an iron hand with stay-in strikers. On the other hand, the employers, with an eye on the government situation, were as unhelpful and as uncompromising as they could possibly be. It was a tragic time; and one can only be grateful that Germany, finding her new Province rather a handful, did not feel able to take advantage of the mess in France by immediately following up her attack on Austria with one on Czechoslovakia.

Failing resignation, which his followers would have condemned, Blum could do nothing except ask for plenary powers. His plan of financial and economic reconstruction was in itself an important piece of work; even the London *Times* thought it the first constructive program that any government had produced in France since Poincaré. It proposed, among other things, a capital levy, a more or less camouflaged form of exchange control and an extensive easy credit policy. Blum knew, of course, that it would not be accepted by the Senate and he was not even sure whether the Chamber would agree to it; but he thought that France needed to be taught a lesson. She must be told that she had lived far too long from hand to mouth; that "confidence" could, even in the best circumstances, provide, in the long run, only a small proportion of the Treasury's borrowing needs; and that a point

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had been reached where she could continue only on a "semi-war basis." It was no use building up France's economy on the expectation that the expatriated capital (of some 80 billion francs) would return "some time." More drastic measures must be taken to put the country on its feet. If these measures were coercive, rather than liberal, it could not be helped. The Tripartite Agreement might have to be sacrificed. Although Blum did not say so, he almost certainly meant it; for it is hard to see how the Tripartite Agreement could have coexisted, at least in France, with the great inflation of credit Blum was contemplating.

Looking back on it, the scheme is chiefly of academic interest. Blum naturally knew that the Senate would not pass it. Was it necessary to waste a fortnight for the sake of preaching a financial sermon to France? One wonders. In fact, Blum himself wondered. He also wondered whether it was really a suitable time for starting a feud with the Senate. For the truth is that, at least in April 1938, there was no popular feeling in the country against the Senate; none whatsoever, except among some of the Socialists, who, by the way, were furious with the Communists for their failure to join in the *Populaire's* campaign against the Senate. And later, in a speech in June, Blum himself admitted that after the very frigid reception his plenary powers bill had been given by the Chamber (where half the Radicals deserted the government majority and so reduced it to 111 votes from the usual 200 or so), he wished to resign, and not go through the agony of facing the Senate at all; but that his Socialist colleagues, wrongly believing in an anti-Senate sentiment in the country, had almost forced him to get himself overthrown by the Senate. The greater part of public opinion, worried by the *Anschluss* and the French strikes, did not care what the Senate did.

What happened after the fall of Blum is common knowledge. M. Daladier, who had on so many sides been acclaimed as the "savior" — it was funny to think of *le fusilleur* in the rôle of Doumergue! — formed the new government. It was mostly a Radical government, with a few center men like Mandel and Reynaud added. Higher production and national defense were its two slogans. It did not claim to be a Front Populaire Government, though it was polite about the Front Populaire in its Ministerial declaration, and about its past services in "saving democracy." This government also asked for powers to legislate by decree within a given time, and it received them with the greatest

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ease from the Chamber (where the Socialists alone grumbled — which was only natural after their recent humiliations), and from the Senate, which was almost enthusiastic. For clearly the new government marked the end of the Front Populaire, except in a very limited sense — a point with which I shall deal below. There were two other reasons why the Daladier Government was well received, not only by the Senate, but among wide sections of the population. With its promise of more settled conditions in France (which, for three months, it should be remembered, had suffered from acute governmental instability), it was bound to increase France's international weight. Further, almost as soon as it came into office it succeeded in settling the big strikes.

For a short time, about the middle of April, there was a boom on the Bourse. But it did not last long; and, largely under the impression that the Daladier Government was not making the best use of its special powers, confidence in the franc was again severely shaken. The third devaluation in less than two years was hastily decided upon on the fourth of May, less than a month after the cabinet had come into office. M. Daladier explained on the radio that "now at last" France would have a solid monetary basis; and it is true that during the weeks that followed something like a hundred or a hundred and fifty million dollars were repatriated. But was this repatriation caused by a real revival of confidence, or merely by a desire to take profits?

The scope of this article does not permit a discussion of the results of Daladier's financial and economic policy; it is still too early, too, to judge them. He has tried not to take extreme decisions which would produce sharp reactions either on the Left or on the Right. In his decrees under the Special Powers there is no trace of anything like Blum's capital levy proposal; on the other hand, though he has tried to modify the application of the forty-hour-week law he has not acceded to the wishes of the Right to alter the text. His whole policy is largely built on the expectation of a trade revival, and of an increasing return of confidence — a "basis" which Blum condemned as unsound and insufficient. In short, a continuation of the old hand-to-mouth policy consisting of a little inflation here and a little borrowing there in order to cover the Treasury deficit. This policy, with the immense expenditure on rearmament, would justify itself only if there were a genuine trade revival and no sharp rise in the cost of living. In August 1938 the symptoms of such a revival were still insufficient;

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on the other hand, nothing was stopping a rise in the cost of living. No doubt the tourist trade benefited from the low rate of the franc, and Paris shops and hotéls were doing good business, especially at the time of the British royal visit; but the general index of production in June of 84 (1929 = 100) was lower than the 1937 average. This unsatisfactory position had a variety of causes — among them the high cost of living (especially for those large sections of French people, *e.g.* the *fonctionnaires*, with more or less fixed incomes, who had become seriously impoverished as a result of the three successive devaluations), high interest rates, and, above all, perhaps, the constant fear of war, war, war. Take the building trade, the most depressed of the French trades. How many people, in spite of the tax facilities granted to building by the Daladier Government, are going to put money into a long-term investment like houses in the present state of international and financial uncertainty?

Early in June, M. Daladier sent Parliament on holiday until October or November. His principal reason for doing so was to avoid much unpleasantness. The Socialists and Communists were demanding the adoption of old age pensions (a reform firmly promised in March by the Chautemps Government) and an increase in the *fonctionnaires'* pay, which (except for minor allowances) had not been raised since 1936, despite a 50 percent rise in the cost of living. The government, Daladier said, could afford none of this, so long as economic conditions had not improved. Further, the Communists were demanding a discussion on Spain which M. Daladier did not desire either.

And so we have a curious situation in republican France in which the government rules more and more by decree, and in which Parliament had little say in the conduct of foreign policy. It is significant that in spite of the hostility shown in the 1936 election by all the Front Populaire parties towards legislation by decree — a form of legislation associated in their minds with the names of Doumergue and Laval — every single government since 1936 should sooner or later have asked Parliament for plenary powers. And it is also significant that in the last eighteen months there has been only one proper foreign debate at the Chamber — on February 25 and 26, 1938, after the fall of Mr. Eden. There has been none since — not even after the *Anschluss*. This is in curious contrast with England, where foreign affairs are discussed (even if only briefly) almost every time the House of Commons

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meets. Whatever the exact significance of this, parliamentary government in France has certainly undergone an evolution in the last two years. A cynically-minded observer explained this by saying that only at this price could the semblance of the Front Populaire be preserved!

It may be said that, in a parliamentary sense, the Front Populaire — that is, the support nominally given to the Daladier Government by the Socialists and Communists — now exists only as a brake that prevents the center of gravity in Parliament from slipping still farther to the Right than it has already done. As an economic, social and financial movement of reform it has broken down completely; for the Radicals, Socialists and Communists are in disagreement on almost everything. But we can say this: as a great anti-Fascist coalition and popular movement the Front Populaire has served its purpose. If it has not killed "plutocracy" in France, it has killed militant Fascism as it was known in 1934 and 1935. And as an anti-Fascist force, in this limited sense, it remains in reserve. The Fascist elements know this. They know that another Sixth of February is impossible.

Apart from this fact — clearly by no means unimportant — the Front Populaire is dead, and everybody knows it. And this knowledge inevitably gave impetus, within the Socialist Party itself, and also outside it, to a return to pure revolutionary doctrines. The most important development in this respect is the split in the Socialist Party, as a result of which its Revolutionary Left-wing under Marceau Pivert founded the new "Socialist Party of Workers and Peasants." Led by a fanatical schoolmaster, the "Pivertists" are apostles of the class war. They denounce Stalin and the "neo-patriotism" and opportunism of the Communists; they support and foment strikes — even crazy and mischievous strikes — whenever possible; and they demand unilateral disarmament — for instance the reduction of the term of army service from two years to one. Like the Catalan anarchists, they hold that "anti-Fascism is neither a program nor a doctrine." The weakness of their appeal to the masses lies in their foreign policy. The French workers find it difficult to accept unilateral disarmament as a practical policy, or to believe that if the French working class show a good example the German and Italian workers will also rebel against their oppressors. *May*, but not necessarily *will*. The risk is therefore too great. And now, without the weighty label of the Socialist Party attached to

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them, one doubts whether the Pivertists, left entirely to themselves, can make much headway.

II

France is perhaps most sharply divided today on foreign policy. Not that France would not be united on the day of mobilization; it is certain that she would be. But, roughly speaking, there are two schools of thought in France today — what one might call the Daladier school and the Flandin school. In addition, there are various subdivisions of opinion, especially on the issue of Spain — an issue on which Daladier is charged with weakness, and Bonnet even more so.

Now, M. Flandin is a man whom it is difficult to take seriously. He lacks one of the most essential qualities of a successful politician — personality. He is conscious of this defect. But being a vain and ambitious man he seems determined to be "talked about" at almost any price. And especially since February, when he anticipated a revolutionary change in British foreign policy as a result of Mr. Eden's resignation (which he saw coming), he has been advocating a policy of what may roughly be called "retrenchment." Advocating — the verb is perhaps too definite. Now and then he comes out with some bold statement, which creates an uproar; for instance, his recent statement that France would fight only if she were directly attacked, a phrase meaning that she would fight for neither Czechoslovakia, nor Poland, nor even for England and Belgium. But at the end of a few days (during which M. Flandin was discussed at great length in the press) he decided that he had gone too far, and said that he had been misunderstood, and that he never desired France to tear up her treaty with Czechoslovakia.

The whole impression created by M. Flandin's outbursts, followed sooner or later by stories that he has been misunderstood, is one of extraordinary frivolity. The man lacks not only the courage of his convictions; he lacks even the convictions. Doubtless his speeches are calculated to create the legend of an "alternative policy" to the "traditional policy" of France, and to turn M. Flandin into a symbol of certain feelings of resignation and peace-at-any-price that vaguely exist among the most different elements in France — not only among certain elements on the Right (where they are allied with worship of Franco and Mussolini and even Hitler) but even among the more parochially-

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minded elements of rural Socialism and Radicalism. But in actual practice M. Flandin's attempt to attract all the peace-at-any-price elements in France amounts to nothing; that is, it will mean nothing on the day of Mobilization. And it will not even help M. Flandin to become leader of the Opposition in Parliament, which seems to be another of his ambitions; for in Parliament even the Right is by no means unanimous in its approval of M. Flandin. There are strong anti-German traditions among the French Right. And in the past month or two, especially since Mussolini's Genoa speech, many of these people have lost their long-cherished illusions even in the possibility of a New Stresa front — as if the old Stresa front had ever been anything except an Italian manœuvre calculated to bamboozle England and France!

No doubt, there is still a certain *bien-pensant* public in France which, blinded by class sentiment, will never learn anything. These people find their inspiration in the *Action Française*, the *Jour*, and in weeklies like *Candide* and *Gringoire*. They pray for a Franco victory, regard Mussolini as the greatest man in the world, and consider M. Jouhaux as the devil incarnate. "Rather Hitler than the Front Populaire" is an extreme but not fictitious expression of their sentiment.

In speaking of this pro-Fascist and anti-National spirit of the French *bien-pensants*, I can do no better than discuss two significant attacks that have been made on them. Both attacks came not from Socialists or Communists but from Catholics — Catholics who, like Cardinal Verdier, the Archbishop of Paris, represent a profoundly vital reaction against the pro-Fascist Catholicism of certain other but, in the main, probably less important elements of the French clergy, and, above all, against the anti-nationalism of certain people who claim to be the only true nationalists in France.

One of the Catholics of whom I speak is M. Georges Bernanos, whose newly-published "Les Grands Cimetières sous la Lune" is one of the greatest pieces of polemical writing to come out of France in the present century. The other is M. Mauriac, who recently wrote an article in the *Figaro* which created a profound stir on the Right.

Bernanos, as already said, is not a man of the Left. He is not even a "democrat" in any real sense; he is a Catholic with something of a reactionary background. He still calls himself a disciple

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of Drumont, the author of the anti-Semitic "France Juive." He is a royalist and a "traditionalist" — but not a royalist of the Maurras school, even though, in his youth, he belonged to it. His book is the cry of an injured conscience, the cry of French sensibility against the insensitive blindness and the cowardice of the people who claim to represent the French "national" tradition. He denies them that right. Although he avoids the use of words like Fascism, his conclusion is, in fact, that French Fascism is not national, but anti-national.

His starting point is Spain, and his own experiences during his stay in Majorca in the first eight months of the Spanish civil war. He was not prejudiced against the Spanish Right, far from it; his friends were mostly Phalangists, and he even learned of the arrival of the first Italian airplane in Majorca "without displeasure." Then he began to hear of things which, both as a sensitive human being and as a Catholic, opened his eyes. Mass executions — 3,000 in a few months — in a small island, with a peaceful agricultural population who had never had much to do with politics. "Suspects" — however faintly suspect — dragged out of their houses at night and massacred in batches of a dozen. And he comes to the conclusion: "'Purges' are the real objective of this war. The slogan 'Put an end to it,' which vile impostors interpret as meaning 'Deliver the tomb of Christ,' has never signified anything except the systematic extermination of suspect elements." He tells the horrifying story of the mass massacre of prisoners, in the presence of priests — a massacre in which Guy de Traversay, the correspondent of the *Intransigeant*, was one of the victims.[1] The worst period of the terror began with the arrival of an Italian Blackshirt who styled himself General Count Rossi, a giant brute, who "was neither General, nor Count, nor Rossi." And while the executions went on daily, appearances were being saved; the relatives of the victims were not allowed to wear mourning; and no shop was allowed to close.

What most revolted Bernanos's Catholic conscience was the attitude of the Spanish clergy. He speaks with passionate anger of the Archbishop of Palma, whom he saw blessing, with his old hands, the Italian machine guns. The Archbishop would dispatch his priests to attend the mass executions; but never once did he raise the slightest protest against what was happening. He accepted it as a good thing; and when somebody asked him about

[1] The circumstances of his death were never revealed by his own paper.

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it, he replied that the Majorcans were difficult people; only 15 percent of them had gone to Easter Mass last year. And Bernanos puts this question to the Spanish bishops: "You say the people of Spain have lost God. But have you ever given them God to keep?"

Pity and honor — these are the two Christian virtues that in Bernanos's view Fascism lacks. He flings in the faces of the French "nationalists" their loss of these virtues and of any feeling for national dignity. To them, he says, members of a French trade union have become what the "Boches" used to be before. The genuine loyalty and pity felt by the French workers for their Spanish comrades are to the French "nationalists" so many objects of derision. But Franco — he is a great man, for he is "anti-Red." Nor will they allow themselves to be impressed by strategic considerations, by the danger to France coming from an Italian or German occupation of Spain. "If Hitler or Mussolini is not exactly 'one of ours,' don't stress the point; the admission will give the Front Populaire too much pleasure" — a recipe that could well be identified as that of *Gringoire* or *Candide*.

Bernanos's book is extremely significant of a growing rebellion among French Catholics against the international policies of Fascism, against its social theories and against the attempts of the Fascist dictators to make the Church their tool. In the main, the French Catholic Church, and not least Cardinal Verdier, is liberal and tolerant. It endeavors by every means to avoid identifying itself with political reaction. The development of the Catholic Trade Unions and of the Christian Workers' Youth Movement (the J.O.C.) is significant in this respect.

This contrast is one theme of the sensational article published in the *Figaro* by M. Mauriac, to which I have already referred.

M. Mauriac is a very well-known Catholic writer, who, like other Catholics such as M. Maritain and M. Bernanos, was violently attacked by a member of Franco's government, and also by the German radio. At first, he says, he reacted sharply against the mob rule prevailing in Barcelona in August 1936. "But as time went on," he writes, "French Catholics were faced with a grave personal problem, both religious and national: and this was the massive intervention of Italy and Germany, the horrible methods of totalitarian war, which were applied by the military leaders to their own people; and the sufferings of the Basques, guilty of nothing more than non-rebellion. . . . But what disturbed us Catholics even more was the pretension of the

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Spanish Generals to be conducting a holy war, a crusade, and to be the Soldiers of Christ. The crimes committed by a mob after the repression of a military rebellion are certainly horrible; but . . . what the so-called Soldiers of Christ have done is *a different kind of horror*. For the terrible thing, from a Catholic point of view, which Franco has done, is that in the eyes of millions of Spaniards Fascism and Christianity have become identical, and in hating one they must automatically hate the other."

If I have concluded this article — a little irrelevantly, some readers may think — with what are in fact a book review and a long quotation from a newspaper article, it is partly because Bernanos and Mauriac represent an extremely vital and comparatively new development on the French Right; and partly also because they are typical of that live human spirit which exists in France today as much as it ever did.

People will tell you that France is divided into two watertight compartments called the Left and the Right. This may have been true two years ago, when the Front Populaire was a big scare to the bourgeois. It is true no longer. In this country, in spite of party labels, a man is still a man, and not an automaton without brain or sensibility. We still find some rustics who vote Red, listening with secret approval to the defeatism of M. Flandin; and we also find M. Mauriac of the *Figaro* and of the French Academy, and M. Bernanos, a disciple of Drumont, making the most devastating attacks ever made on the French *bien pensants*. How significant is this? Very significant, I should think. For it points to a rebellion against the standardized thinking and standardized feeling which were beginning to develop to an alarming extent even in France between 1934 and the end of 1936.

I cannot help disagreeing with Bernanos on at least one point — that France is divided definitely into two "Fronts" — the Front Populaire and the Front Bien Pensant, or Front National. If the Front Populaire program is not the catechism of the one, neither is *Gringoire* the catechism of the other. My amusing old concierge, M. Thibaud, used to say even during the 1936 election: "Monsieur, je ne suis ni pour la gauche, ni pour la droite; je suis pour la justice." There are millions of Frenchmen like him. And those who will discuss France in terms of political clichés and party labels only, without any reference to men's individual minds and souls, will never understand what it is all about.

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THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY

MODERN DEMOCRACIES. By James Viscount Bryce. New York: Macmillan, 1921, 2 volumes.

By A. Lawrence Lowell

READING "Modern Democracies" a score of years after it was written, one is impressed by how far from the direction then expected the political currents of the world have run. Lord Bryce thought that the new states formed by the disintegration of Austria, by the liberation of subject nationalities from Germany and Russia, and by the extension of self-government through the system of mandates to peoples hitherto ruled despotically or as dependencies of European countries, would greatly increase the number of democracies in the world. He saw clearly the defects of existing popular governments. But he thought that the new ones could learn much from the experience of the old.

To help in this direction he undertook to study the actual working of democracy, and especially the distortions produced by the excessive growth of political parties and by their interference in matters, like local administration, in which they have no proper function. Recognizing that a man who has taken an active part in a political system is disqualified for judging it, he said little about England; but — with wide information gathered on the spot, and rare penetration — he discussed political conditions in France, Switzerland, the United States and the British self-governing dominions. All this he did with singular detachment; for his book is by no means a propaganda for democracy. On the contrary, it is a scientific study of actual conditions in the different countries treated, and an examination of the causes of the imperfections revealed. Incidentally, he considered Switzerland the least defective, largely because the activity of parties there is least extended beyond its appropriate sphere.

Not less interesting, instructive and detached than his description of existing governments were his speculations on the general nature of democracy, its origins and probable future. Here he showed the same open-minded skepticism of generalizations as in his studies of actual systems. He observed that popular govern-

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ment has usually been sought, won and valued, not as a good thing in itself, but on account of grievances endured or benefits desired; and that when the objectives have been attained, the interest in popular government has tended to decline. In some cases, he said, democracy may spring from a theoretical belief in its propriety; but, if so, that faith will show signs of fading when the result is disappointing. He noted the reasons for the loss of interest in forms of government in the Roman Empire, both Eastern and Western, and added: "Who can say that what has happened once may not happen again?" Later, he enlarged upon the same theme in commenting upon the idea that although democracy had spread, and no country that had tried it showed (at that time) signs of forsaking it, we were not entitled to hold that it is the inevitable form of government. "If it be improbable," he wrote, "yet it is not unthinkable that as in many countries impatience with tangible evils substituted democracy for monarchy or oligarchy, a like impatience might some day reverse the process." Referring to the strength of the Conventions of the Constitution in Switzerland, he remarked that it was largely through such means that the complex constitution of the Roman Republic had been worked. Such conventions fare well, he wrote, so long as their moral authority lasts, but in the long run they break down if unduly strained. He added that they had largely lost their force in England.

He recorded visible marks of discouragement with popular governments. "In 1914," he said, "there were signs of decline . . . but nothing to indicate in any country either a wish to abandon democracy or the slightest prospect that anything would be gained thereby. Disappointment is expressed, complaints are made, but no permanent substitute has been suggested." He recited what some of these signs were. Everywhere, he said, one is told that there is less brilliant speaking in legislative bodies than formerly; that the best citizens are less disposed to enter them; that the respect for them has waned; and although, as he judiciously remarked, one discounted all this, the allegation was too general to be passed by. He attributed it to the spirit of democratic equality; to the size of constituencies; and to a loss of personal dignity in legislators. Politics, he observed, had become more of a game. Party discipline had become more strict. Platform speaking had lessened the part played by parliamentary debates, as had the newspapers and the work of political organi-

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zations. In the other parts of administration, he added, democracy showed signs of decay. Local government did not advance, the sphere of the central power was extending — a natural result of changing economic and social conditions. And the larger the mass of citizens becomes, the more they tend to look to the executive, and especially to its head.

He recognized that the desire for self-government is by no means a universal trait in human nature. "When a people," he said, "allow an old-established government like that of the Tsars or the Manchus to be overthrown, it is because they resent its oppressions or despise its incompetence. But this does not mean that they wish to govern themselves. As a rule, that which the mass of any people desires is not to govern itself but to be well governed." To them, free institutions are artificial, regarded with indifference; and he quoted with approval de Tocqueville's remark that the love of equality is stronger than the love of liberty. Fraternity, he noted, had fallen out of sight. "This kind of Idealism has disappeared; it is material benefits that hold that place in the minds of the most recent advocates of change."

In fact, Lord Bryce saw very clearly the defects, the dangers and the uncertain future both of democracy and of the liberty that he loved; and he uttered something like a prophecy when he said: "There are times when under the pressure of some grave national crisis, such as a foreign or even perhaps a civil war, a nation resigns some of its liberties into the hands of the Executive, or adopts new methods of government calculated to strengthen its position in the world."

Democracy certainly has defects enough, some of them inherent, and others flowing from the way it is actually worked. An organization for industry, philanthropy or education managed like any of the large democratic governments would be doomed to fail. Imagine a bank, a factory or a university conducted on the principle of two parties, or a number of groups, one of which (or some combination of groups) directed affairs and strove to retain the control, while the other party (or another combination of groups) sought to take its place. Would not the waste energy, the diversion of power from attaining the institution's main objective to the struggle for its control, reduce the accomplishment far below that of a rival institution where the object of all the members was to agree and, by compromising differences, to make a common effort to achieve its purposes?

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Moreover, while differences of opinion on public questions naturally arise, those which separate the parties in a large democracy do not accord with the natural division either on specific questions or in general tendencies of thought. In the main, these are really quantitative, not depending on whether something or nothing shall be done, but on how far to go in a given direction. Now, in such matters the divergencies of opinion normally follow the biological curve, the larger number of people being found near the center, diminishing toward the extremes, as in Figure 1; whereas in a democracy with two parties the division is as in

FIG. 1 FIG. 2 FIG. 3

Figure 2; and in a system of many independent groups (as in France) the division is like that in Figure 3, the dotted lines representing the actual, but ephemeral, combinations supporting the ministry at any particular time. It may be noted that the Swiss system comes nearer than any other to the biological curve; for although the legislature is elected by parties, and the executive by it, the legislature is not divided into a ruling party and an opposition, while the executive is a committee representing all the principal parties, the object of whose members is to agree.

The chief reason for the division of all large democracies into two or more parties lies in the exigency of elections; for in these unorganized opinion has no strength. When the American Constitution was adopted the view of Rousseau was generally accepted that no people in which parties existed could be truly free. They were called factions and were regarded as pernicious. The Framers did not foresee them; and they devised a method of selecting the President, which the parties when they arose turned quickly into a fifth wheel of the coach. Parties did the same thing more gradually to constitutional monarchs under an effective parliamentary system.

Parties have their evils; and as a friend of mine remarked long ago, the inherent defect of democracy is that it is no one's business to look after the interest of the public. Yet so long as the contending parties oscillate about the center of gravity of public opinion, the system, though irrational, works fairly well. But not

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when the parties are too far apart. Then one of them becomes dominant; the other irreconcilable, and therefore to be crushed, by force if necessary. In such a case the conventions on which democracy is based are undermined, and chief among them the assumption that the divergent aims of parties, though mutually repugnant, are universally tolerable. In other words, parties seeking to supplant one another in control of the state are possible in a democracy so long as all of them agree that rule by a rival is better than disorder, and any legal method of deciding who shall rule better than civil strife. A striking example was the Hayes-Tilden contested election in this country where, amid the complex and irregular reports of the returning boards, the decision on counting the votes was very probably wrong, but where the general sentiment was that any method of determination was preferable to fighting. It is the obvious duty of every government, and especially of the party in power in a democracy, to avoid, if possible, carrying any policy so far as to weaken that sentiment or impair the conviction that the decision of the nation, legally made, ought to be obeyed and is better than strife. For the alternative is autocracy or civil war, and the belief on the part of any large fraction of a people that its government is autocratic tends to make it so.

Before seeking the causes of the recent rise of autocratic governments one must consider the conditions of the countries involved — how far they have been similar and how much they have differed. These countries were not alike in being all victors or all vanquished in the World War; for while Russia and Germany were defeated, Italy and Japan certainly were not. They differed also in their historic, political and cultural traditions. In fact, it would be hard to select any four peoples more unlike in these respects than those just named. Nor were they alike in their aspirations, as we see today in the sharp antagonism between the Communism of Russia and the Fascism of the rest.

On the other hand, there were strong points of resemblance. None of them had enjoyed a successful democracy — and here we are speaking of substance not form, for some of them had more or less ineffective popular institutions. And it is noteworthy that none of them is now wholly autocratic in form or in theory. The *Statuto* of Italy set up a parliamentary system, but it had become too feeble to cope with the prevalent disorders at the time of the Fascist march on Rome. Under the German monarchy the popu-

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larly elected Reichstag, though very influential, had by no means obtained the control of the government, and the Weimar Constitution was still experimental. Japan had not attained a consistent popular régime; Russia never had more than aspirations; while the Austrian and Russian succession states had just escaped from a condition of more or less subjection, and the Balkan countries had not long emerged from the same status. In all of them the conditions were somewhat chaotic, or at least unsettled; the older forms of government having either been destroyed or proved inept for coping with the problems following the war. Moreover, they had all been accustomed to strict subjection to military rule, not only in the army as in former wars, but as regards a large part of the civilians in much of their conduct and as regards all in some parts of their daily life. It is noteworthy that none of the European states that remained neutral — except Spain, where the issue is still in doubt — has shown a disposition to become autocratic in its form of government.

It is interesting to observe that the growth of autocratic rule has been associated with an increased interest in material welfare, a desire for a larger share of the world's goods both between the different elements in the population, and as against other peoples; nor should this be astonishing. Something of the kind has been observed after other great wars. The Napoleonic Wars were followed in France by an era when men turned their attention to amassing wealth. After the Civil War in the United States, the youth thought that having abolished slavery the time was at hand for removing all other human ills; but what actually came was the Tweed Ring in New York — the most barefaced corruption in the history of the country. It came because men were so occupied in restoring their own affairs that they had little time for public matters. This is perfectly normal. I remember in the last year of the World War a friend, who had a gallant son in the fight, saying that the young men had been raised to such a pitch of devotion that they would live on a higher plane than we had ever done; and I fear that I shocked him terribly by replying that this war, like every other, would be followed by an era of materialism. It is natural, because, like any physical strain, a great moral effort produces moral lassitude, in an individual and not less markedly in a people; and with the growth of organizations, of the power of united action for a common end, one may expect material objects to bulk large in national impulses. There

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is no novelty in the remark that the danger in the future lies less in individual than in coöperative selfishness.

Even by the time Lord Bryce wrote, law, instead of being a thing divine or natural in origin, and therefore in essence immutable, had become a matter of conscious human manufacture, and hence to be made for the benefit of the makers. This has reduced the sense of permanence of law, and with it the sense of the rights, the obligations and the institutions which it has created. It has become arbitrary, to be remodeled both from philanthropic and selfish motives, and such an attitude toward it has obviously tended to increase the amount of regulation of human relations everywhere and in all matters. Men in control of legislation feel that they have a mission and an opportunity to enact laws for the benefit of those who need them, of those whose votes they need, and of themselves; and in practice it is difficult to distinguish between these motives even in the minds of the makers. But the result is an enormous increase in the amount of legislation, with a diminution in its moral authority. Not unnaturally, the same attitude has arisen in regard to international law, save that, there being no body authorized to enact it, the result is simply a lessening of respect for it and for the obligations it prescribes. This brings us to the question why the countries where these tendencies are most pronounced should have adopted autocratic forms of government.

The answer is that it was the only form they could adopt. In democracies there can be a peaceful change of the party in power within the framework of the government, because that is what modern democracy means. The loyal party opposition, which assumes the responsibility of ruling when a change of popular opinion occurs, is the great political invention of the last two centuries, and the essential principle of democracy on a large scale. But in countries where such a procedure is unknown, or the changes desired are too great, a shift of the ruling group must involve force — or the fear and threat of it — and therefore more or less autocratic methods. There can be no immediate reversion to a limited government after the conventions of constitutional procedure have been destroyed, for their destruction means rule by force in contrast to rule by general consent.

To put the matter in a different form: The crops have failed, kill the King! Economic distress causes discontent with the government. If a change of the party in power is customary, that

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may be enough to relieve the pressure; if not, a change in the form of the government itself may come. And such a change, being extra-legal, is highly likely to take the form of an autocracy that professes to bring more effective administration and prosperity. The French Revolution soon drifted into that road, and so have other political convulsions. But such a government has two dangers: first, it must, in order to endure, be economically and financially successful; and second it has usually no method of self-perpetuation. It is apt to be too largely based upon confidence in an individual who has nothing corresponding to the divine or customary right of a King, and who is a personality, not an institution. To speak of Russia or Japan in this regard would require a treatise by a scholar familiar with their conditions; but autocratic rule in Germany and Italy is apparently personal, and in the smaller countries where it exists it is subject to changes by intrigue rather than at the dictates of public sentiment.

However this may be, a system so established clearly cannot abide opposition. It must be militant and intolerant, because a changeable popular consent as a criterion of rightfulness has been obliterated. Ultimately all government is based upon the consent of those forces in the state that have power to maintain or change it; and, except for the use of armed force, that means a general consent, not to particular measures, but to the method of determining where that power shall lie, or a consent so nearly general that those who do not agree are for practical purposes impotent. This is the basis of any commonwealth. In a democracy the possibility of change in the persons in power and in the policy to be pursued is essential, for without that it would wholly lose its character. But an autocrat is the State, whose policy is assumed to be approved by the bulk of the people; any opposition must be directed against the State itself, and is therefore treasonable. That opposition must be suppressed; and to prevent its gathering headway all information about public affairs should emanate from the public authorities who know the facts. They choose such parts of the facts as they want popularly known, and by censorship of the press and exclusive control of the radio regulate the distribution of news. In all countries, democratic as well as autocratic, freedom of speech and publication is much restrained in practice during a war which calls for the utmost exertions of the people. In the former this is relaxed as soon as peace returns. But never can it be wholly abandoned by autocratic rulers without peril to

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their existence; and one excuse for its continuance now is that the world is still living under the terror of another general war.

The terror of another war, and the shadow of the one that is past! — for, since the ultimatum to Serbia, moral changes have come over the world. Shrinking from the infliction of suffering and death seems to have decreased in many countries. There has been a wane of belief in religion and in natural rights, a general decline in the sanctity of contract, and therewith of all other obligations, accompanied by a loss of mutual confidence among individuals and in international relations. These were the strands of which the fabric of civilization was woven, and one may well wonder how they will be restored or what will take their place.

The scope of human contacts seems to be contracting, the manifold loyalties of civilization to be compressed. One of the marked differences between the mediæval and modern world has been the great increase in points of contact among men, and each of these, in order to fructify, should give rise to a sentiment of fidelity, not inappropriately termed a loyalty. They relate to one's family, one's friends, one's neighborhood, one's church, one's party, one's nation, one's profession, one's business associates, one's comrades in every adventure, intellectual and philanthropic, and so on indefinitely. Such loyalties sometimes conflict, but less so than one might expect, because a principal aim of modern civilization has been to permit their coexistence; for the peaceful growth of highly complicated societies among men depends upon the strength of many independent loyalties in individuals. This gives the richness of personal, social and moral life.

Now the natural effect of the Great War was to subordinate or suppress some of these loyalties by the intensity of the effort for victory; so that the peace found the world poorer in the range of its loyalties, both in personal and international relations, and left those that remained more intense and more conflicting. Such a condition has not unnaturally fostered a tendency to make governments strive to keep the peace among inharmonious loyalties, and in autocratic countries to make loyalty to the State supreme over all others, which in fact become valued chiefly as they relate thereto. Yet with the growing interdependence of all mankind a multiplicity of loyalties is more important than ever for the world. The effect of war in the limiting of loyalties seems evident. Perhaps the effect of the limiting of loyalties in causing war may become obvious also.

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Interesting questions about the future force themselves insistently on every inquiring mind. That the world will not return to its condition before the war may be assumed; but that does not imply an indefinite continuance of the present state of affairs. How far can we assume that autocratic government is the cause of an aggressive foreign policy, and how far a result of it? Is the rivalry between the "Haves" and the "Have Nots" in international relations genuine, or mainly a cry to interest and quiet peoples suffering from economic distress? What do the nations that have colonies with a lower civilization get out of them? Not revenues! Germany never made a profit out of her colonies, and is not likely to do so if they were returned. Nor, so far as one can see, does it seem probable that Italy will find Abyssinia profitable. Great Britain is getting less and less from India. She never received a direct revenue, but she obtained a market there for her manufactures, and occupation for her educated young men. Both of these are declining. France and England have drawn soldiers from their dependencies — a not too reliable resource. As for access to raw materials, in time of peace a nation can, as a rule, buy them if it can pay for them; and in time of war no nation can procure them that cannot command a military access to them by land or sea.

Is all this shifting of values and of decline in permanent convictions the result of forces that would have come into operation in any case, a change merely hastened by the war and therefore permanent? Or is it a product of the war and hence ephemeral? Or is it in part, and in what part, both? If not wholly permanent, when, how and to what extent will the process be reversed? If permanent, is the world to go back to a less civilized stage, or is there in store a high civilization of some sort, with a different basis for mutual confidence among men? That came in the case of the Roman Empire through a universal government which the world will not at present accept. More likely is a general recognition that the interest of all lies in mutual respect, giving what one would take and accepting what one would give. But before the opportunity for that comes, are we in for a desperate destruction of peoples and institutions, leaving wounds that may never heal? There has been an enormous increase in the effectiveness of modern weapons. Is universal destructiveness the final gift of the physical sciences to man?

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WOULD JAPAN SHUT THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA?

By Nathaniel Peffer

IT IS a year since China and Japan went to war. The accompanying arguments and controversies should have covered exhaustively all the possibilities, contingencies and potentialities in the Far East. Yet there is one argument which has emerged seldom, if at all, into explicit discussion, but which nevertheless has played a large part in forming opinion abroad. Employed quietly by Japan, it tends to reconcile many to the prospect of China's defeat and absorption into the Japanese political and economic system. It needs to be examined.

The argument is briefly this: From the point of view of material interests, it makes little difference to the West whether Japan conquers China or not. So far as there is any difference, a Japanese victory will actually be of material advantage to the West, for Japanese occupation and control of China would mean the more speedy development of China's resources. True, the West will participate in the ensuing profits at one remove. But the profits to be shared will be greater than any conceivable without the help of Japanese "law and order." True, also, American, British and other Western enterprises will be evicted from China as they have been from Manchukuo, and foreign interests will henceforth have to use Japanese concerns as intermediaries. Yet through Japan the West would sell more to China than it does now and it would be able to invest more capital in China than it does now.

For Japan is efficient, technologically advanced, and experienced in industrial and financial organization, whereas China is inexperienced and inefficient. Japan can ensure stable government in China; the Chinese cannot. The industrialization of China thus will be accelerated under Japanese control, whereas under continued Chinese independence it will lag, as it has for decades. The great Chinese market, long a myth, will become a reality. Open Door or no Open Door, without industrialization the Chinese market will remain meager, to be picked at on the edges for scant findings. With industrialization — possible only under Japanese tutelage, in turn possible only under Japanese political control — the purchasing power of the 400,000,000

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Chinese can be expanded and the world will find the commercial outlet it so sorely needs. Western individuals and firms now established in China will suffer, of course. But to British and American industry as a whole, and to British and American factory workers, it matters little whether British and American products are sold to China directly through British or American firms or indirectly through Japanese firms. The banker, industrialist and worker at home benefit either way, so long as the products are sold. And if Japan can stabilize China, organize it and develop it, they will benefit immeasurably more because immeasurably more products will be sold.

The argument is plausible. It sounds hard-headed and practical. It is being presented as plausibly as possible by the unofficial Japanese representatives who are seeking to get credits in London and New York — the credits without which Japan cannot capitalize on victory if she wins, and without which she even may not win. If influential groups in London and New York should be induced to furnish credits to Japan they will do so largely because they find the argument tempting. But though the argument sounds plausible, it is far from being convincing to those who know the Far East at first hand; indeed, to many of these it seems quite fallacious.

Before proceeding further it should be emphasized that the analysis which follows has no reference to the moral issue as to whether Japan ought to win the war or the military issue as to whether she can win the war. Those are questions apart. As a matter of fact, the world has expressed itself fairly clearly on the first; and the second is open to considerable doubt, with or without outside financial help for Japan. Clearly, Japan is much less sure to defeat China than seemed the case a year ago. But for the purpose of this article the question under discussion is only what the effect on Western interests will be if Japan should conquer China.

Two things must be shown if the Japanese argument is to be established as sound: first, that the acceleration of China's industrialization under Japanese control and the resulting increase in China's demand for goods from abroad will be great enough to compensate other countries for the loss of direct access to the China market; second, that Japan will not prevent artificially the equitable diffusion of the benefits arising out of China's industrial development. Unless these two things can be shown, then all ab-

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stract arguments, however valid as economic reasoning, are irrelevant; Western interests are directly imperilled by the possibility that Japan will win the war; and at the best Western countries will, if she does win, trade with China only on Japan's sufferance. And the experience they have had in cases where they have had to trade on Japan's sufferance are definitely not such as to allow them very rosy hopes about China.

One point must be cleared at the outset. If Japan is victorious, Western countries will in any case be debarred from direct commercial intercourse with China. From the day China signs a treaty of submission (if she does), the Open Door will become a myth or an historical vestige. No juridical measures will be required. Tariff schedules will be drafted as necessary to accomplish the purpose. Customs regulations will be drawn to the same end. Supporting import and export rulings will be introduced as necessary. More than these: all the internal pressures, ranging from moral suasion to open and direct threat, will be exercised to interpose barriers between Chinese and foreign trading interests. Credit will be niggardly for Chinese who continue to buy from Europeans or Americans. Chinese currency will be pegged to the Japanese yen, and credit arrangements will be made difficult for other than Japanese. Freight cars with foreign shipments will be mysteriously misdirected and delayed or lost. Foreign shipments in customs houses will be mysteriously damaged or will be found to have violated customs rulings and thus be subjected to penalties. Foreign factories will be submitted to irregular and unceasing inspections, restrictions and penalties. The cumulative effect will be to leave foreign industrial and commercial enterprises already in China no reason to remain and foreign exporters no reason to make an effort to place their goods there.

Analytical reasoning is not needed to demonstrate this. The past provides clear evidence. Japanese rule has now lasted in Manchukuo for seven years. An American business man may be found there by diligent search; but he usually proves to be a transitory phenomenon. The same holds true for Korea. And the first steps already taken by Japan in North China foreshadow a similar future there.

With regard to Manchukuo there is, first, statistical evidence. This must always be accepted with reserve in international trade; for trade statistics cover only the first stage of transactions, and the ultimate benefits resulting from multilateral commerce are

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hard to trace and assess. But the Manchukuo statistics reveal tendencies, and within the reservations stated they seem to be decisive.

In 1930, the year before Japan's conquest, Manchukuo (then Manchuria) took 36 percent of her total imports from Japan; in 1936 she took more than 72 percent from Japan. In 1930 Manchukuo (Manchuria) took 7 percent of her total imports from the United States; in 1936 she took some 3½ percent. In other words, while Japan sold twice as much after six years of occupancy, the United States sold half as much. In 1930 Manchukuo purchased from abroad goods at a total value of $462,000,000 (Manchurian currency); in 1936 the figure was $691,000,000. In the same years her purchases from Japan alone increased from $166,000,000 to $507,000,000. Thus, while total imports increased by $229,000,000, the imports from Japan increased by $340,000,000. In other words, Japan absorbed the *whole gain* from the intensive development of Manchukuo and 50 percent *more besides*. That margin of 50 percent came from the trade that other countries had once had with Manchuria. As a concrete example, in 1930 the United States sold goods worth $32,000,000 (Manchurian currency) to Manchuria; in 1936 it sold goods worth $23,000,000 to Manchukuo. The tendency has been unswerving. From 1935 to 1936, for example, Manchukuo's imports increased by $87,000,000. Of that increase Japan got $73,000,000 and Korea (which is Japan at one remove) got $5,000,000. In the same year the imports of the United States to Manchukuo fell from $25,000,000 to $23,750,000. On any statistical base the results are the same: both absolutely and relatively all countries other than Japan have lost by virtue of Japan's conquest of Manchuria, except in so far as the increase of Japan's trade with Manchukuo has increased Japanese purchases from other countries.

The last point is hard to establish. It is true that the value of Japan's imports from the rest of the world increased from one and a half billion yen in 1930 to more than two and a half billion yen in 1936. But for a number of reasons no conclusions can be drawn therefrom. In the first place, 1930 was a depression year. In 1925, for example, Japan's total imports were almost two and a half billion. If the average of the five years before the depression be taken, the increase in Japan's imports since it absorbed Manchukuo is moderate, considering the fact that Japan is still in the stage of industrialization. In the second place, the years after

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1930 were also the period of Japan's intensive campaign in other markets, which necessitated larger imports of raw materials. And this would have come in any case, for reasons internal to Japan. Depreciated currency, the fall in raw material prices in the world markets, and low wage costs played more of a part in this connection than Japan's aggrandizement on the Asiatic continent. In the third place, a large part of Japan's imports in the years after 1931 consisted of materials for armament, which can hardly be credited to the development of Manchukuo, except in so far as the conquest of Manchuria exacerbated an international conflict in the Far East. In the fourth place, in the years between 1930 and 1936 prices of primary products rose from near the nadir to near normal. In quantity, for example, Japan's purchases of raw cotton increased by only 10 percent between 1931 and 1935. As a matter of fact, Japan imported more cotton in 1927 than it did in 1935. Between 1930 and 1935, imports of iron and oil rose sharply; but armament could account for them also.

The statistical evidence is not final but it is clear. It is supported and illustrated by evidence drawn from the nature of Manchukuo's development. The exclusion of foreign trade and of the opportunity for trade follows almost automatically from a policy of state monopolies and quasi-monopolies. The establishment of the oil monopoly in Manchukuo and the resulting exclusion of British and American oil companies is well known. There have been other measures more basic in their general effect. As early as 1933 it was laid down by the Manchukuo government that "national control will be exerted on important economic activities." This has been given rigorous execution, and by 1937 there was not a single important industry that was not wholly or partly under governmental control. In the words of the "Oriental Economist," the principal Japanese economic periodical, in May 1937: "Since its foundation Manchukuo has followed the policy of planned economy and the major industries have been brought under some sort of State control one by one." And in May of 1937 an industrial control law was passed formalizing "planned economy." Thereby all enterprises were put under government license and the government was empowered "to issue necessary directions regarding the operations of those engaged in the key industries in the light of the public interest and the State control." Books and reports must be submitted for inspection and permits must be obtained when enterprises "want to expand or

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modify their arrangements of production." Thus were unified and made official all the semi-official restrictions in force theretofore.

Since the beginning of the war with China, an attempt has been made to give the impression that the strict control of economy and the consequent exclusion of foreign trade have been relaxed. But no change in ordinance can now affect the basic fact, which is that all except minor enterprises are in the hands of great interlocking trusts, which have so much of state participation in them as to be quasi-political — the South Manchuria Railway, the Showa Steel Works, the Manchuria Coal Mining Company, etc. The chance which foreign business agencies have to break through the circle of companies, state-owned, under semi-official management or officially favored because affiliated with military groups, is virtually nil. The proof lies in the withdrawal of practically every foreign firm from Manchuria (the British-American Tobacco Company almost alone excepted). The barrier to foreign business may be rendered invisible, but it is impenetrable. So while it may be that no final conclusion can be drawn from the case of Manchukuo, the hypothesis can be set up — and supported by considerable evidence — that the benefits of Manchuria's development by Japan have inured thus far only to Japan. In any case, so far as direct relations with Manchuria are concerned, the rest of the world has been excluded.

The non-Japanese world will be excluded in the same way from China if Japan secures political power there. The loss would be far from negligible. China's foreign trade has increased steadily in the last generation. From 1912, the year after the founding of the republic, to 1930, when the combination of war and world depression introduced abnormal factors, it had increased more than two and a half times — from 840,000,000 Haikwan taels to 2,200,000,000 Haikwan taels (the average value of the tael is 65 American cents). The share of the United States in that trade has been noteworthy, not so much in absolute figures as in tendency. Comparing the average of the four years before the World War and the average of the four years between 1926 and 1930, we find that American exports to China increased four and a half times, *e.g.* from U. S. $31,000,000 to $134,600,000. While never bulking large in the whole of American foreign trade, the exports to China have risen from 1 percent of the total American export in 1910 to more than 3 percent in 1930. And what is significant is

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that the rise has been steady and, still more, that in the last few years the United States has been the largest single exporter to China. So a substantial material loss is involved when it is said that other countries will lose by Japan's acquisition of control in China, except in so far as her exploitation of China will in turn add to her own power — and willingness — to purchase from abroad. This brings us back to the two points that were called crucial: the rate of acceleration of China's industrial development under Japanese control and the interposition of impediments to the free flow of resulting benefits.

When we talk of acceleration we mean a comparison of what will happen if Japan wins and what will happen in any event. Not even the most impassioned Japanese army advocate maintains that China will not make some progress in industrialization whatever happens. She has been doing so for years. That she began doing so in earnest soon after the World War is shown by the fact that her foreign trade almost doubled in value in the succeeding decade. The last few years witnessed an almost fanatical movement for modernization, and under its impetus both industrialization and foreign trade have increased.

That China lacks Japan's technical proficiency and would need years to attain it is undeniable. She has tremendous social and political obstacles to overcome, old institutions to modify or uproot, new ones to create. Further, she is handicapped by lack of free capital, though this is not irremediable. Given a continuance of progress toward unification and stabilization as evidenced in the last year or two before 1937, China would have had little difficulty in raising loans abroad. Japan is even more handicapped in this respect unless Western nations come to her assistance. And it is at least arguable that foreign lenders would be less reluctant to lend to a unified China than to a Japan victorious over China but left in a precarious domestic position as a result of a costly and prolonged war. With all the factors that operate against China conceded, it may also be said that forces had been set in motion that only the war could have arrested. Had the war not come, China would have proceeded with modernization at a geometric rate of progression. She would have extended means of communication and transportation, multiplied public utilities, established factories. For all of these and cognate enterprises she would have required goods, which would have come from abroad. With these, in turn, she would have produced enough to increase

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her purchasing power for imports not only of durable goods but consumers' goods. And if Japan should be repelled and China should retain her independence, the Chinese will resume at the point at which the war forced them to suspend all activities not directly connected with self-preservation. Under normal conditions nothing could have prevented China from offering a large and constantly growing market for the world's manufactured products. Under normal circumstances in the future nothing can prevent this from happening, regardless of events in the next year or two. The tide of social evolution is setting that way.

The argument might even be made that this tide would be arrested if Japan should defeat China and then take over both the government and economy of the country. Japan would begin with her own resources depleted by the war. Her surplus capital, already decreased by the expenditures in Manchukuo and the armament program indispensable to safeguarding her subsequent continental position, would be exhausted. She, too, would need years for recuperation. Moreover, she would have to undertake the reconstruction of China in the midst of an embittered and hostile population, a considerable part of which can be expected to continue some form of resistance for years. Both Japan's resources and energies, or what is left of them after the war, would have to be divided between the attempt to develop China and the compulsory task of pacifying and policing the country. It may even be confidently predicted that the larger share of both would go toward pacification and policing. This would be true whether Japan were spending her own money or money borrowed from Great Britain and the United States. Any credits advanced to Japan would be used for completing the subjugation of China as well as for developing a market in China for foreign goods.

Japan must complete the conquest of China, guard against recurrent uprisings and at the same time set about the construction of an administrative mechanism extending over half a continent and governing more than 400,000,000 people. She must do this, too, before she can proceed with building railways, opening mines, erecting factories and carrying out other projects which will need foreign raw materials and machinery from abroad. In sum, against all the factors making for the accelerated development of China under Japanese auspices and a consequent increase in China's demand for foreign goods can be set just as many factors that make for retardation of China's development under

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Japan. That China's economic progress has been checked by the war, no matter how it ends, is obvious. There are perfectly good grounds for believing that it would be checked even more drastically if Japan won.

We come now to the second point: what impediments will Japan interpose? If normal economic processes were allowed to function, then it might well be that in accordance with economic law the increment from China to all industrial countries would be the same no matter which of the two nations was sovereign. The same quantity of steel rails, motors, locomotives, machine tools, oil and cotton would then be required for China whether the government of China was Chinese or Japanese. Goods would, in the second case, merely be sold to China through Japan. The increase of prosperity accruing to Japan from its profits in China would be reflected in Japan's increased purchases from Western countries. The addition to Japan's wealth might be employed in investment in other Far Eastern regions, increasing the purchasing power of these regions and Japan's purchasing power through them. The volume of goods interchanged and, therefore, produced would be larger or at least as large. The question of who happened to act as intermediate agents in the transactions would be of minor importance.

The condition to such a consummation, however, is that normal economic processes should function. It is indispensable. And it is most unlikely to be fulfilled. If Japan's past practices were not sufficient to warrant doubt, there is more direct evidence in Japan's declarations of intention. These give little reason to believe that Japan will undertake the problem of developing China with the main purpose of extracting Chinese wealth as quickly as possible and opening the Chinese market as fully as possible. All the tendencies in Japan's own economic organization in the last few years and the declarations of ruling Japanese groups are in the opposite direction, indeed, almost constrain her to act in the opposite direction. Japan will develop China according to what she conceives to be her own national needs and with regard to the profits of certain groups in Japan allied with the military rulers. To understand what lies behind Japan's hopes and plans in China it is necessary only to skim through the periodical press, the economic journals, the reports of the Diet debates and the published statements of government officials, bankers and industrialists. Faint verbal tinctures of the ideas of nineteenth century

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free economy may be detected; but meaning and purpose are quasi-totalitarian. Granted that labels describing Occidental social institutions cannot be fitted patly to Eastern social forms, and that the word "autarchy" covers too much to describe accurately even war-time Japan, it remains true that the main tenets of economic nationalism have been adopted in Japan and are being steadily applied. And this is the scheme into which Japan will fit China if she has the power, just as already she has fitted Manchuria. This is what is meant by the words "the Japan-Manchukuo-China economic bloc," so commonly used in Japanese public discussion.

There could not be a more explicit declaration of what we may expect from Japan in China than was contained in the address of Prince Konoye, the Prime Minister, at the opening of the Diet on January 22 last. This was a formal, considered statement of national policy on the future relations of the two countries. Prince Konoye said: "In the field of industry the basic principle of the Government will be laid in the increase of our nation's productive power under the one comprehensive scheme covering Japan, Manchukuo and China, and efforts are to be exerted toward supplying the articles needed for national defense, promoting all the important industries and expanding our export trade."

This should be read in connection with the terms of peace offered China in January through German mediation. In Foreign Minister Hirota's official version, the third point read: "Conclusion of an economic agreement among China, Japan, and Manchukuo." And if Prime Minister Konoye's translation of this condition was not enough, Mr. Hirota gave further details in answer to a question in the Diet as to what he meant by an economic agreement. He answered: "Geographically speaking, Japan is considering the conclusion of an economic agreement applicable to the whole of China. I understand that agreements in connection with the exploitation of natural resources, communications and trade will be set up. It is possible that special arrangements will be made between Japan and China in view of their special conditions."

In other words, China's economic rôle will be to supplement Japan's national needs, the criterion being first military and then economic. China will be "coördinated," in all the authoritarian connotations of the word. Exchange, production and trade will be rationed. The principle governing the plan of rationing will be

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Japanese self-sufficiency. Decisions will be taken in Tokyo, with reference mainly to considerations of Japanese national power and profit. In the nature of things, when one of the three must be subordinated to the others it will be China, just as Manchukuo has already been subordinated to Japan. The idea of the tripartite bloc is one of planned economy for purposes of military power primarily, and then the assurance of Japanese self-sufficiency. Europe has shown us how wide and free the play of economic forces is under that principle, how equitable the diffusion of the benefits of a productive system.

This is not a theoretical analysis. The steps already taken in China by Japan provide the documentation. The so-called Federal Reserve Bank established in Peiping in March attaches the currency of North China to the yen, so that though to buy foreign exchange in order to make payments in countries other than Japan is possible it is not feasible. More important are the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company, both organized under Japanese government direction. The first has a capital of Yen 350,000,000, half of which is subscribed by the government, and the other a capital of Yen 100,000,000, half subscribed by the government. Both are gigantic holding companies, designed to serve in China the same purpose as the Oriental Development Company in Korea and the South Manchuria Railway Company in Manchukuo. Already franchises have been allotted to certain subsidiaries (newly formed or already existing) of a favored group, for the substantially exclusive exploitation of Chinese resources. In the words used in the Diet in February by General Sugiyama, then War Minister: "The projected company (North China Development Company) will manage six enterprises — telegraphs, telephones, electric power, gas works, water works and transportation." Other important industries are being parcelled out to subsidiaries. Two companies have been chosen to divide the field in tobacco. Wool has already become the monopoly of a "guild." A company is being formed to monopolize shipping in China waters. The Japan Electric Power Federation will have power development, the Japan Coal Mining Association the exploitation of coal, the Japan Iron Manufacturing Company the exploitation of iron. An oil monopoly, similar to that in Manchukuo, has been formed to the exclusion of the foreign companies that formerly supplied the North Chinese market. Step by step, the procedure followed in

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North China parallels the first steps in Manchukuo. An enlightening comment on the outlook for free enterprise is contained in a statement in the Diet by a Mr. Miyazawa, a member of the Lower House. "In North China," he said, "the commercial and industrial possibilities of the field are coming under the domination of influential Japanese capitalists, with the result that industrialists and business men of lesser financial resources have been denied similar prospects."

If that is the situation of smaller Japanese business men, what chance will there be for European and American business men? There are several indications already. The so-called Provisional Government set up by the Japanese in Peiping has promulgated a new tariff, which by coincidence reduces rates on commodities in which Japanese are most interested. Wang Keh-ming, head of that government, in a formal interview in Tokyo on May 2, promised that a system of foreign exchange control would be introduced in North China "in the near future." And while still Foreign Minister, Mr. Hirota gave an interview to Reuter in which, asked point blank whether Japan would impose the same exchange control in North China as in Japan, he answered that it would be done "in case it is deemed necessary," but that the time had not yet arrived.

With regard to freedom of enterprise and unimpeded development of China, there may be quoted a statement by Mr. Kaya, made while he was Minister of Finance, before the budget committee at the last session of the Diet. Asked to explain the government's refusal to approve certain investments in China, he answered: "It is true that the restoration of spinning and other industries in China is urgently necessary, considering the need of economically developing China under China's new régime and of accelerating Sino-Japanese economic coöperation. However, if the government gives wholesale permission, this will result in reckless investment of capital in non-urgent and unnecessary enterprises. . . . Indiscriminate permission for investments in China at this moment is against the policy of the Finance Ministry."

Finally, typical of public discussion in Japan now is a long article in the *Nikkan Kogyo*, a generally well-informed publication, purporting to be based on information from the Ministry of Finance. After describing the scheme by which the currency of North China has been pegged to the yen, the paper goes on:

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"If the North China foreign trade is left free, with the result that its excess of imports reaches an enormous amount, Japan will have to pay for it. Even in case of direct trade between Japan and North China, the result will be the same. Especially if North China's trade balance becomes unfavorable, Japan will have to readjust the situation by establishing credits. Therefore the import excess of North China will be shifted to Japan after all, threatening to make this country's [Japan's] adverse balance worse and worse. These things have determined the Finance Ministry to start positive action with the Peiping régime to prevent the situation from becoming worse. Except for goods really necessary to North China, imports from countries not in the yen bloc will have to be restricted more or less severely."

The last sentence should be pondered carefully. Though only a newspaper statement, it reflects the general belief and intention of those who carry power of decision in Japan. It is a summation of the prospectus for China in the event of a Japanese victory.

Advocates of the theory that Japanese tutelage will open China to penetration by Western trade make loose generalizations about the wealth that will flow thence when, for example, North China is brought within the system of industrial production, her resources are unlocked to the world, and her inhabitants are given a higher standard of living and the means to satisfy it. But what evidence is there that Japan has any plans for that region that can be so described? What is it that Japan wants from North China and will get if she can? Raw materials mainly: iron, coal, salt, and above all cotton, in order to emancipate herself from dependence on the American supply. In the scheme of the integrated tripartite bloc, North China's rôle is that of reservoir of raw materials. Its population will remain predominantly a peasant population. Only such light industries will be established as can produce certain simple consumers' goods for local use more cheaply than they can be produced in Japan. There will be no industries that can compete with Japan's. In short, Japan will be the manufactory, North China the source of supply of raw materials. What, then, is offered to Western trading interests? What machinery will they sell, how many automobiles and typewriters and radios? Without a balanced industrialization and the earning power that goes with industrialization, what will the inhabitants use to pay for imported articles? Peasants live at subsistence level. Japan will organize the production of the area to yield such

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raw materials as she needs and as much as she needs, striking some equation between what she needs and what the region must produce to exchange for the cheap manufactures that Japan expects to sell there. All the instrumentalities of exchange control, quotas, bounties and subsidies will be employed to bring about such a balance — a balance as between Japan and North China.

The question whether this program is feasible need not be dwelt on here since it is not germane to our subject. It has not been feasible in any other area, however, and it is doubtful whether all the devices of totalitarianism can make it work. More likely Japan will find herself in the same position vis-à-vis North China that the older industrialized countries have found themselves in vis-à-vis the East. When the pressure to dispose of surplus products becomes irresistible, it will be found desirable to dispose of them in China. To that end, China's purchasing power will have to be raised. The temptation to sell producers' goods to China will not be resisted, just as England could not resist the temptation to sell power looms and spindles to Japan. Thus Japan in China will be setting up competition with Japan proper. This has been the cycle of Western expansion everywhere. The expansion of Japan in China is not likely to be an exception.

Western countries will have no place in China under Japanese control. China — colony, protectorate or "independent" ally of Japan after the fashion of Manchukuo — will not be quite closed to Western enterprise. A little trade may steal through the interstices left by Japan's own deficiencies in raw materials. A certain amount of steel will be sold for, say, the railways that Japan decides to build either to export certain natural resources or to satisfy her strategic necessities. Japan may permit the sale of capital goods which she herself is not yet able to produce and which she thinks China must have right away. Other countries may be called on to supply what the Japanese quasi-totalitarian régime requires to attain its ends. But no more; and much more than this Western countries could expect in the normal course if China were to remain independent, even though her independent development might not be so spectacular as it might be in the first few years under Japanese domination. On balance, Western countries have nothing to gain from Japan's success in China and much to lose. And for them to provide credits to Japan in the belief that Japan will act as their pioneer traveling salesman in Eastern Asia is to underwrite their own undoing.

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THE OFFENSIVE STILL GIVES VICTORY

By George Fielding Eliot

IN military matters, public opinion tends to lean upon what it deems the lessons of experience; that is, upon a somewhat cursory and uncritical examination of the history of its own country culled from the books on that subject used for texts in the public schools. The great majority of citizens in any democracy have no greater or deeper knowledge of history than that. Thus in the United States there seems to be a very general opinion that by reason of having come through our past wars without serious disaster, we shall inevitably be victorious in the future; while the cruel and unnecessary sacrifice of lives and treasure imposed upon us in all those wars by neglect of the most elementary precautions in time of peace makes but little impression. Even today, when the need for a reasonably adequate navy has at last attained a considerable measure of popular support, there is still a "get-rich-quick" tendency to assert that submarines and airplanes form an adequate "defense" of our shores. One has but to read the hearings before the Naval Committees of the Congress in connection with the last Navy Bill to realize the widespread lack of understanding of the true functions and nature of a navy and of what is actually connoted by the much abused term "national defense."

And as in America, so in Britain. The British Isles have not been invaded by a foreign army since the Norman Conquest. Strong in a centuries-old preponderance of naval strength, British policy occupied itself with maintaining the European balance of power; it made use of its navy and its financial strength, and occasionally sent small expeditionary forces provided by its professional, volunteer army, to prevent the undue aggrandizement of any Continental Power; at home, meanwhile, "business as usual" was the slogan. The burdens of universal military service have been no part of British life. For the century from Napoleon to the World War the British public did not have to fear invasion. But in 1914 Britain was forced to fling all her resources into a savage struggle for survival; and the sacrifices imposed upon her made so deep a scar on the national consciousness that, inevitably, there arose the cry of "Never again!" Unfortunately it is an aspiration which the cold facts of military progress will not per-

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mit to be realized. The coming of air power has bridged the Channel and deprived Britain forever of her insular security. Quite as unfortunately, the British people do not seem to realize this fact. They know that London is within 2½ hours' flight for loaded bombers from the German air bases, but they do not realize what that implies, nor do they understand the sacrifices it imposes upon them if they are to have any measure of security against such a visitation.

We will build up our navy, they say, as we have always done; we will add to that an air force of sufficient size to protect us; we will create Territorial anti-aircraft divisions to deal with such raiding planes as get past our air force. Thus we shall be able to defend ourselves. Thus we shall be safe. But the idea of creating an army capable of taking part in a Continental war is excluded. Appalled by the holocausts of the Somme and Passchendaele, the average Briton instinctively recoils from their repetition.

The British popular view is not without support from what must be considered informed quarters. The military correspondent of the London *Times*, in a series of three articles,[1] insists that Britain's participation as the ally of France in any future struggle with Germany must be confined to naval and air measures and financial aid. He supports this view by the assertion that, so far as ground forces are concerned, the defensive is now so superior to the offensive, by reason of the increased fire power which the development of automatic weapons makes available to the defender, that, short of an overwhelming superiority in numbers or armament improbable of realization by France and Britain vis-à-vis Germany and her possible allies, stalemate is certain to ensue within a comparatively short time. That stalemate is unlikely, he holds, to be affected by the arrival in the theater of operations of the small British Army, which would be uselessly destroyed in vain endeavors to accomplish a task beyond its powers. Therefore, in this view, British troops should be trained only in defensive tactics; and, in the larger sphere of imperial defense policy, a defensive strategy should be adopted which will serve to "convince the enemy that he cannot win" and thus bring about a satisfactory conclusion of hostilities.

With this opinion a number of noted British and French military writers have taken definite and in some cases impassioned issue. But judging from present developments in Britain it seems

[1] *The Times*, October 25, 26, 27, 1937.

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that theirs are but voices crying in the wilderness; for British defense forces are being formulated precisely on the lines that would be taken were the ideas of the *Times'* correspondent accepted government policy.

The immediate effect of this British policy on the prospective allies and opponents of Britain in a possible European war has hardly been conducive to the prevention of that war. On the one hand, the French, apprehensive lest British support be given in grudging measure, or perhaps withheld altogether, feel themselves unable to take a strong stand in defense of their interests in Spain and Central Europe; on the other hand, Germany and Italy are emboldened to make demands quite out of proportion to their actual military power to achieve those demands by force.

In the opinion of many American military observers, the theory of the inevitable superiority of the defense is ill-founded in fact, is a contravention of sound military principle, and therefore is dangerous of acceptance by a people seeking to secure itself against the perils and horrors of war. In the larger view of war as it is waged today, the alleged superiority of the defensive is a snare and a delusion. It is based purely on tactical considerations as applied to land warfare on the surface of the earth. It has no application to naval warfare, where the offensive is always the superior form of war. It applies still less to air warfare, where the defensive cannot but be disastrous to whoever adopts it. In land fighting, modern fire power does give an advantage to the defense; but the results are only local and negative, denying rather than achieving. This advantage must be countered by the obtaining of local superiority of fire, by the use of surprise, and by adherence to the principle of attacking "*de fort au faible*" — all of them possible achievements for a force which possesses and retains the initiative. Most attacks in the World War were initially successful. The difficulty lay in reaping a permanent and more or less decisive advantage from the original success.

The present "cult of the defensive" has its origin and derives the greater part of its theory from the peculiar tactical conditions found on the Western front during the period 1915–1918, when continuous fortified lines faced each other from the Swiss frontier to the shores of the Channel, and tactical success seemed possible only by breaching those lines by main force. To those who urge that all the history of warfare shows that decisive results are achieved only by the offensive, that a leader who would impose

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his will upon another cannot do so by sitting still, but must attack, the high priests of the defensive cult reply that, while this contention is doubtless historically and strategically sound, nevertheless the tactical means are no longer available for carrying it into execution upon the battlefield. They point to the vast hecatombs of gallant soldiery on the Western front as proof positive of the truth of their assertions. And, sometimes, to Gallipoli.

Yet somehow they contrive to ignore the eastern theater of war, in which the vast empire of the Tsars — once rated the premier military power of Europe — was brought to complete military and political ruin by offensive action; they ignore the fate of Rumania and Serbia; and they ignore the fact that it was that very offensive pressure on the Western front which they are wont to describe as useless slaughter which in the end denied Germany the fruit of those eastern victories and brought her, in turn, to surrender in the only way possible — by the defeat of the German Army. This is by no means to belittle the very great part played by the "silent, inexorable pressure of sea power," of blockade, in the final downfall of Germany; but it illustrates the principle that sea power by itself will not serve to defeat a continental nation possessing a strong army which can expand its frontiers and seek in the territory of its neighbors new sources of supply to replace those denied to it by blockade. As for Gallipoli, the losses in the vain attempt to conquer that peninsula are often cited as reinforcing the theory of the superior strength of the defense; more rarely is it pointed out that the attack on Gallipoli was foredoomed to failure from its inept and bungling beginnings, in which every principle of amphibious warfare was ignored, in which the fleet first made useless attacks and the troops were brought in later when the fleet had failed, throwing away every advantage that might have been obtained from surprise and allowing the Turks ample opportunity to make their defenses impregnable. Had the attack on Gallipoli been properly inaugurated it would doubtless be cited today as one of the most brilliant achievements of offensive warfare. As the case stands, it is a horrible example of how not to conduct amphibious operations more than a proof of the superiority or otherwise of the defense as against the attack.

The cult of the defensive, as has been said, came prominently to the front in military discussions after the close of the World War. It was countered by proponents of the tank, who claimed

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qualities and possibilities for armored fighting vehicles out of all proportion either to their achievements in actual fighting, or to anything that could reasonably be expected of them within the foreseeable future. The development of anti-tank tactics — the use of obstacles, tank mines, armor-piercing ammunition, and the anti-tank gun — afforded an adequate reply to such military extravaganza. It also strongly reinforced the defensive cultists, who were presently found claiming that, indeed, armored fighting vehicles, and motor transport generally, afforded a greater advantage to the defense than to the attack, since they enabled reinforcements rapidly to be rushed to any threatened spot. This, of course, failed to take into account the principal asset of the attack — the retention of the initiative — which, tactically, makes use where possible of the principle of surprise. Nevertheless there was something to be said for the claim; for once infantry — the decisive arm — has been committed to an action, progress can be no faster than the pace of the foot-soldier.

Thus, in the view of some students of war, a deadlock seemed to have been achieved. Unarmored infantry could not advance against machine-gun fire, save when supported by a powerful artillery and accompanied by armored fighting vehicles. The latter could attack alone under certain conditions, but they could not hold; and the motor afforded the defender a means — not wholly compensatory — of reinforcing the threatened point and delivering an eventual counter-attack.

Yet the means to break the deadlock have been found, as throughout the diversified history of human conflict the means to break similar deadlocks always have been found. The story is written for those who will see on the long and bloody scroll of the Spanish civil war — if such a term may be applied to a conflict in which there is so considerable a degree of foreign participation on both sides.

At the outset of the struggle, the Loyalists were without the means of taking the offensive; Franco had far the greater part of the trained officers, and was soon, by German and Italian help, superior in the air, in tanks and in most classes of artillery. A defensive rôle was thrust upon the Loyalist armies by the fortune of war; and the successful stopping of Franco's drive at the gates of Madrid may well have brought them to an exaggerated notion of its powers. At any rate, when Franco settled down to siege operations around Madrid and turned to attack the Basque

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enclave, the Basques put their faith in passive defense. They built around their main city of Bilbao a system of fortifications called "The Iron Ring," reported as extremely formidable by all foreign observers who saw it.

Here it was that it first became apparent that the means to overcome the terrific fire power of modern weapons had been found. They are the same means which, developed and improved, Franco has subsequently employed to overrun three-quarters of Spain, to separate Catalonia from Valencia, to come painfully close to final victory.

Briefly stated, the system which Franco has employed consists in the addition to the old infantry-artillery team of a third partner — attack aviation. His employment of aviation as a battlefield instrumentality foreshadows its true place in the war of tomorrow. Consider his attack on the tremendous fortifications of Bilbao. An initial reconnaissance; a heavy air and artillery bombardment; an infantry attack, supported by tanks, initially successful as were most attacks on the Western front. But here the similarity ceases, for Franco's attacks were not pushed on when they encountered secondary resistance, nor was there allowed an interval for counter-attacks while he displaced his artillery forward. Instead, having achieved local success, he was content with that; and after macerating the Basque counter-attacks, he shifted to a new objective and struck again in similar manner. Thus, bit by bit, he ate his way through the Iron Ring about Bilbao. In his great Ebro offensive of last March, the lessons learned at Bilbao came into full flower. The coördination of his air force with his ground troops was here brought to a new perfection and the operations of horsed cavalry, armored fighting vehicles, artillery, and motorized infantry on the ground were supported from the air with a disciplined efficiency which carried all before it.

The intervention of air power — carrying war into the third dimension — has thus restored to ground troops the power of manœuvre which the cult of the defensive had asserted to be forever lost. It has given the attacker a flexibility of action which enables him to support his infantry with fire of an accuracy, at the decisive moment, beyond achievement by distant batteries, thus solving in many instances the problem of close support which has been so vexatious in modern tactical studies. Nor can the assertion, sometimes made, that air power confers equal benefits

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on the defense be supported. The airplane is essentially and inherently an offensive weapon. It cannot hold a line. It can act with great flexibility, and over a wide front, but it is limited as to its time of flight and as to its total military load. Admirably adapted to the purposes of surprise, it is the weapon par excellence of the side which possesses the initiative. It is far more formidable when used in the execution of a plan in which its intervention at the right time and place has been carefully prearranged by a competent staff than it is in warding off an attack conceived by someone else and striking at an unforeseeable time and place. Moreover, it affords a partial reply to the claims of the defensive cultists that motor transportation enables the defender's reserves to move more rapidly to counter-attack positions; for it is air power which will, in the battle of the future, impede such movements, finding still another mission in isolating the battlefield. All this naturally implies as a *sine qua non* the attacker's possession of at least temporary and local air superiority.

It will not do, of course, to lose sight of the fact that Franco's foreign allies have kept him far better supplied with the tremendous quantities of weapons and munitions demanded by the modern offensive than the Loyalists have been able to procure. Yet, in general, the Loyalists have not lacked rifles and machine-guns; they have on occasion been superior in the air; they have had considerable quantities of tanks and artillery. They have taken the offensive locally, and for limited purposes; but they have not succeeded in any case in accomplishing any considerable strategical gain thereby.

At Brunete, for example, the Government forces so mishandled their tanks as to lose any value they might have derived from their support; they won an initial success and then hesitated, apparently bemused by their own good fortune, until the Rebels had time to bring up local reserves; and their air superiority was frittered away in futile bombings of Rebel positions instead of being employed for close support of their infantry. At Teruel they chose a sector for attack which, by reason of its terrifically difficult terrain, could hardly be expected to yield strategical fruits comparable with the losses which success would exact; and that it did not yield them is plain. Recently their attack across the Ebro against Franco's communications was gallantly pushed forward, yet it could not, by reason of the flimsiness of the communications (pontoon bridges, easily demolished by air attack),

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be expected to be anything but a diversion. The main attack, which the diversion was intended to support, was undoubtedly Miaja's thrust for Alberracin and Teruel; it advanced slowly, consolidating each trifling gain, and was abandoned altogether when Queipo de Llano in his turn created a diversion by thrusting for Almaden. Yet it should have been quite clear to the Loyalist high command that Miaja must burst into Alberracin and Teruel at all costs, within the limited period of time that Rojo could maintain himself beyond the Ebro, and before Franco could gather together a new strategical reserve. The most far-reaching results might well have followed such a success, which would have placed all the Rebel troops on the Mediterranean front in deadly peril, dependent on a single line of communications via Alcaniz for supply and reinforcement or for withdrawal. Beyond the immediate military gains, such a victory at this time would have been of incalculable value to the Loyalist cause abroad.

Instead we must add another to military history's long list of lost opportunities. This is not attributable to any lack of courage or devotion on the part of the Loyalist troops, or of incorrect conceptions of war on the part of their leaders. The leaders tried to do the right thing, the troops tried gallantly to carry out their orders. But they lacked one essential ingredient of victory — the offensive spirit. Two years of almost constant defense had sapped their belief in their ability to attack, and in the attack itself as the decisive form of war. They could not turn readily or confidently to it. The Rebels were neither braver nor better men than their opponents; but they were an offensive army, organized for decisive action, experienced in its infinity of detail. They had begun the war in full possession of the initiative, and had maintained it steadily throughout. That this was in large part due to material advantages is here beside the point. The point is that when the initiative passed to their opponents, they were instantly on their toes to reclaim it; they succeeded not only in checking the Loyalist attacks, they came back promptly with vigorous counter-attacks of their own. This is a result which cannot simply be ascribed to Rebel superiority in equipment. It is clearly due, rather, to the inability of an army trained and accustomed to defense suddenly to acquire the quite different qualities required for successful attack.

This is not to say that a headlong offensive will accomplish complete victory in any war. In China, for example, the Japanese

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have been constantly on the offensive, have driven the Chinese from province after province, and yet they are today in a most unenviable military position; as was Napoleon after he had submerged himself in the vast depths of Russia. We must not forget the contribution to their plight made by the continual offensive pressure of Chinese guerilla activities against their communications, any more than the similar pressure of Cossack cavalry against Napoleon's communications. In the larger sense, however, both their failure — if failure it turn out to be — and Napoleon's, must be ascribed, not to this or that method of war, but to an initial error of overconfidence, an incorrect estimate of the degree and nature of the resistance to be encountered. In both cases this led the commanders to undertake a task beyond the power of their forces.

Consideration as to whether in a given case war must be the means by which a nation seeks its objective belongs to the realm of statesmanship. The soldier can play only an advisory rôle. If he is compelled to admit that the national means are inadequate to achieve victory, some method other than the use of force must be sought to compose the difficulty or secure the objective, or the objective must be abandoned. It was here that Napoleon, combining in his own person statesman and soldier, erred; and similarly Japan seems to have erred today, allowing the military to exercise too great an influence in the determination of state policy. But once war is decided upon, whether in purpose defensive or offensive, it is only by offensive *action* that a favorable decision will be obtained. History presents no single example of mere passive defense achieving final victory.

Defensive tactics, even defensive strategy, have, of course, their necessary part in war. Indeed, a successful attack in one place is almost always based on resolute defense elsewhere. Defense and offense are tools in the hand of the skilled commander, to be employed as occasion may make advisable; war, in its infinite variety, presents daily some new condition which must be met by the application of the ancient principles to ever changing situations. The principles themselves are not numerous, nor difficult to learn; it is in their application that the difficulty lies. And like any other artist, the general must so absorb them, so make them part of himself, that application becomes automatic, without the necessity for consciously taking thought. From a leader so inspired by correct principle, and possessing those per-

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sonal qualities enabling him to translate principle into decisive action, there runs through all his subordinates a spirit of confidence, of will to achieve, of determination: and it is this that soldiers call the spirit of the offensive. Troops so led and so inspired can defend as well as any others, perhaps better; for ever within them is the thought, or rather the inbred feeling, that though we stand today, tomorrow we are going to attack those fellows and drive them over the river. Troops not so led and not so inspired will, however courageously they may defend themselves, rarely be successful in offensive warfare on a large scale.

The notion should not be entertained that the task of the modern attacker is an easy one. It is far from that. Indeed, more than ever before, a successful modern offensive requires coördination not only between units of the same arm, but between at least four separate arms of the service: infantry, armored troops, artillery and aviation. In that coördination there are many diversities. The use of tanks in the attack is, for example, subject to many variations, must be accommodated to the number available, to the accidentation of the terrain, to the enemy's character and dispositions, the weather, the velocity and even the direction of the wind (as affecting the use of smoke by either side). Yet with the most careful plan, a great deal has to be left to the judgment and initiative of battalion, company and platoon commanders; even, on occasion, to that of the commanders of single tanks. So with attack aviation, as it takes its place in the battle team. The method and time of its intervention may be determined beforehand, yet unforeseen circumstances (which always arise in war) will give full scope to the battle leadership of squadron and flight commanders. And the same thing is true of the commanders of small infantry units, who will, in tomorrow's war, have increasingly heavy responsibilities laid upon them. Not only will they command teams of riflemen and machine-gunners, but they will have to employ curved-fire weapons (mortars and rifle grenades of increased power) to overcome local resistance; they will have anti-tank and anti-aircraft fires to deliver; the problem of ammunition supply for all these weapons can no longer be wholly the responsibility of higher echelons; and communication between infantry units is now no more vital than communication between infantry and tanks, between infantry and attack aviation. Behind all this "orderly confusion," the artillery must act so as to help the infantry forward, to impede the movement of enemy

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counter-measures, to neutralize enemy fires of every sort when it can reach them without danger to its own attack echelons. Thus it is more indispensable than ever that, above the arms, there be a commander who can direct and inspire, and a staff which can coördinate.

The qualities required in an offensive army, from commander-in-chief to private, are human qualities: the fruits of experience and leadership, of mutual confidence between man and man, between battalion and battalion, between arm and arm, between soldier and commander, acquired by proper training and indoctrination in time of peace, cemented on the battlefield at the price of blood, and fired from within by the offensive spirit.

Applied to the strategical problem facing Britain, what does all this mean? It means that the British people, if they are to continue their national existence, must face the unpleasant fact that they can no longer continue in their presumption of military isolation. The immediate danger that threatens them is from the air; it is a greater air danger than faces any other great European Power because Britain presents a most concentrated target to the bomber — in the industrial districts of the Midlands and, above all, in London — and because the attack will come with little warning. How can they meet this danger? There is but one way: by being prepared, if need be, to attack the source of the danger, not only by air, which can have but an uncertain and intermittent effect, but by the only method which can afford permanent military results — by the advance of ground troops into the enemy's country. This implies the possession of an adequate army trained for offensive war. If Britain fails to face this responsibility, if she depends for the essential measure of protection on the army of a prospective ally, she may find that ally either unready or unable to bear the burden alone or offering only half-hearted and half-effective aid.

"If Germany attacks our country," wrote the French General Baratier in the *Temps* of January 4, 1938, "she will wage a totalitarian war, in the course of which France and England, in order not to succumb, will have to throw into the balance all their resources on land, sea and in the air." Quoting this, Colonel Beadon of the British Army adds (*Journal of The Royal United Service Institution*, August 1938): "Such indeed would be the reasoned and reasonable demand of any or every ally. The alternative seems to be that we should cower behind the whole strength

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of other Powers and only propose to use all our own if — like a rat in a corner — we could not be defended by others."

Of course it has not yet come to this stage. The German military power is not yet ready for a major war. At present — as the writer has elsewhere taken occasion to point out — the state of German armament with respect to trained reserves, trained officers, heavy and medium artillery, and naval equipment, is not yet up to the standard required even for a short war against formidable enemies. The strength and readiness of the German air force has been ridiculously overestimated in Britain and America, perhaps in part for propaganda purposes. And expensive *ersatz* processes cannot in the long run compensate for Germany's shortage of essential raw materials to feed her industry. But the military shortages are being made up with feverish energy; and the more difficult question of raw materials can be solved if the *Drang nach Osten* continues. Whether it does or not, is largely a question, not so much of British and French military power, ample at the moment — but only at the moment — to check a Nazi advance into southeastern Europe, but of the willingness of the British and French peoples to use force if need be to stop it. Potential force is often successful in obviating the need for the use of actual force; but the moral factor must be there. The will must lie behind the power; and the existence of the will must be recognized by those against whom the power is to be applied. Hitler's much vaunted "sense of timing" is nine-tenths his ability to gauge how far France and Britain will let "I dare not" wait upon "I would."

To be more precise, it is quite apparent that Germany will in the end overrun, conquer and destroy the Czechoslovak Republic unless she is stopped by force — actual or potential. That force can, as a practical matter, take two forms, both essential to successful resistance: one the force with which the Czechs can oppose an attack upon their frontiers, the other the force which their ally, France, can bring to their aid, with or without British support. (It must be put down as uncertain whether the Soviet Army can undertake offensive operations in Europe, given the geographical difficulties in the way of an attack on Germany and the risks which it would entail in the Far East.) Much has been written about the desperate stand which the Czechs will make along their fortified frontier. But behind that frontier is — or will be — a mobile striking force, admirably organized and

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equipped for offensive warfare, possessed of an excellent road and rail net and a central position which will enable it to act most advantageously against a series of concentric attacks on exterior lines delivered by German columns. However, a nation of 15,000,000 people cannot long withstand the concentrated attack of one of 72,000,000. The decision must come in the west, on the Rhine frontier; and though France may be able today to breach this frontier unaided, it is by no means certain that she can do so tomorrow.

Behind these purely military considerations, as always, lie moral factors, and it is in this field that the assertions of the defensive cult become pernicious. If these assertions are to be believed, Germany can defend her western frontier indefinitely, while bringing the greater part of her power to bear against Czechoslovakia. Once the French and British people are brought to believe this, their governments, dependent in the end upon popular support, will be unable to rally that support for an attack on Germany. If matters reach this stage (and are so understood in Berlin), Czechoslovakia's doom is sealed, and with it, perhaps, the doom of European civilization. For if Hitler's Germany is ever able to realize the dream of the *Drang nach Osten* — to sweep the Czechoslovak Republic from its path and to march on to the mastery of Hungarian wheat, of Rumanian oil and timber, to stand triumphant on the shores of the Euxine — then there will have been created in Europe an empire of such sinister potentialities that the rest of the world may well tremble at its frown. And beyond the Euxine lie the Caspian, and the Persian Gulf, and the vital life lines of British imperial communications.

If that day ever comes, the British Empire must fight for its life or perish; and the decision will be had, not in the distant regions to which advancing Germany may have penetrated, but in Western Europe. Just as the German victories over Russia were canceled by her defeat in the west, so new German advances in the east can be canceled only by a similar defeat — by France and Britain attacking and overpowering the German home base. Germany was beaten in 1918 when her army was defeated and her homeland in danger of invasion; Germany will be beaten in any future war when, and only when, a similar situation has been achieved. And that will not be done by making war upon her with reservations, employing only air attacks which can never be as effective — for unalterable geographical reasons — when

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used from Britain against Germany as vice versa, but by an "all-out" assault upon the citadel of her power.

Britain's days of "limited war" — war conducted by means of an overwhelming sea-power, giving mobility, on occasion, to small expeditionary forces of regular troops for operations of limited nature — are over and done. These methods used to be the secret of her strength; they gave her not only security but predominance, without wasting her substance in vast armaments or her man power on the battlefield or in great peace-time armies. But the whole vast structure of imperial power which Britain built up by such means was dependent on a single factor — the security of its base, the British Isles, from direct attack. While the British Navy afforded such security, all was well. On the day the Wright brothers first achieved the miracle of flight, that security began to wane. Just as Portugal's vast overseas empire fell to pieces because the mother country was vulnerable at home, just as Holland was unable to maintain her once enormous colonial and maritime position for the same reason, so Britain, unless she finds means to make the British Isles safe from the air menace, must face the same inexorable fate. The United States is the one nation in the world which can today "take as much or as little of the war as she will," by means of a powerful navy and a small highly-trained army sufficient to protect that navy's bases. We can still make "limited war;" but the British have definitely passed out of the phase where the conception of "limited warfare" is any longer tenable. The British people must realize this fact in time, and prepare to assume the burdens which it imposes upon them — burdens such as no previous generation of Englishmen has ever had to bear.

Nations which hope to survive in the world of today must — if they are within the reach of powerful and predatory foes — prepare to defend themselves, not with one claw and one tooth, but with every weapon at their command, employed without stint and without reserve. If they fail to make practical application of the truth that force and the means of applying force underlie all the relations between states, they will suffer consequences certainly evil and possibly fatal. These consequences are not to be evaded by heeding counsels of despair to the effect that man has no power to overcome the instruments of war he has created — that the shield is of more value than the sword.

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THE CONFLICT OF GENERATIONS IN FRANCE

By Julien Benda

THERE is a clash between two French generations, the prewar and the postwar. The first is made up of those who were thirty years old or more at the outbreak of the war, and whose ideals, consequently, had already been formulated; the second is made up of those who were twenty or less, and who therefore set up their system of values after the catastrophe.

I will at once be asked: "Does a conflict really exist between these two groups? It seems doubtful when we note how many of those whom the young generation has made its gods — Barrès, Maurras, Claudel, Péguy, Bergson, Nietzsche, Marx — belong to what you call the old generation, sometimes to one older still." Of course. Yet when the old generation itself was young (if I may generalize about it), those were not the men whom it considered masters; it favored, rather, men with precisely contrary philosophical leanings. Of these, Ernest Renan and Anatole France were the two outstanding. We may say that the old generation, from a philosophical point of view, was that of the Dreyfus affair, and that in many regards (though not in all) Romain Rolland might be considered a typical representative. I will be told that some young people still admire Renan and France. But they are rare, and their generation on the whole inclines to reject them. Anatole France's unpopularity with most young Frenchmen today is well known. Furthermore, no one who knows anything about French life would deny that these young people have been continually reproaching the old generation with having made such a fetish of the critical spirit that it failed to "arm them for the struggle." Taking each generation as a whole, although we recognize that any mass characterization is necessarily arbitrary, we nevertheless must conclude that the conflict between them is not a figment of the imagination but is a reality which some day will occupy a prominent place in the history of ideas in France.[1]

I am told that a third generation exists, distinguished from that which I have called the postwar generation by its complete

[1] It may also be objected that certain of the old generation who were not at all disciples of Maurras or Sorel were repelled by the moral skepticism of Renan and France. But they were a small minority.

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indifference in matters ideological and by a sole concern with day-by-day existence. This generation would not interest the historian of ideals in any way for the very good reason that it has no ideals. Groups of this sort have always existed.

II. HOW THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE OF THIS CONFLICT IS THAT THE OLD GENERATION WAS HAPPY, WHEREAS THE YOUNG GENERATION IS NOT

It seems to me that this conflict is adequately explained by the fact that the two generations in question have lived under such different economic conditions. The old generation was a happy one — unusually happy, I venture to say; the young generation is unhappy, hard pressed by circumstances.

I should here like to make some incidental observations on a statement we have often heard of late, namely that civilization never was more menaced than it is today. The truth is that it has been threatened, time and time again, infinitely more so than at the present time. In Christopher Dawson's "The Making of Europe" (a work which I recommend highly to those interested in the trials of humanity), we see that after the fall of Rome and also at the dissolution of Charlemagne's Empire, the world witnessed the breakdown of every juridical system, the destruction of all social order, and the disappearance of security for the individual to a degree scarcely suggested in even the worst moments of our present age. Stendhal has said somewhere, with his gift for striking phrases, "A man of the Middle Ages had but two desires: first, to avoid being killed; second, to own a good warm coat." Though that second desire is still very strong, the assurance of not being killed has become quite general. Our time is by no means the worst that history has known. These are matters which I can confide to my readers, that is, to people who reflect; they cannot be told to everyone. It seems that average humanity, in order to bolster up its courage in times of adversity, needs to believe that it is living in the most tragic epoch that mankind ever endured. In addition, the young generation knows nothing and cares nothing about the situation of the men of the tenth century or of those who witnessed the fall of Rome; youth compares its lot only with those relatively recent periods which it has heard discussed by its elders and parents. By this comparison youth deems itself unhappy. In this it is unquestionably right.

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The old generation was happy because of two circumstances, the disappearance of which left what may be defined as the modern world.

In the first place, the old generation was not brought up in constant fear of impending war. By 1880 the feeling of revenge had almost entirely died out in France. Even more to the point is the fact that for fifteen years, from 1890 to 1905, date of the dismissal of Delcassé demanded by Germany, the old generation was in a position to believe — naïvely but sincerely — that the day of wars was in general past. Many contemporaries of mine remember how great was our stupefaction upon hearing in 1899 of England's declaration of war on the Transvaal. We also remember how at the same time we felt sure that the opponents of Dreyfus kept alive the specter of war with Germany merely to further their own cause. From such a state of affairs we derived a peace of mind which, I need hardly emphasize, the present generation lacks.

The other fortunate condition which obtained when the men of my age were young was the feeling of real security, of genuine stability, at least as far as practical matters were concerned. In the political realm, the nation had just passed through two great ordeals — the Sixteenth of May and the Boulanger affair. It had emerged victorious, and it seemed no longer to have anything very serious to fear. If we found the young Republic tolerable, all we had to do was to let it live. In the economic realm, an average middle-class family like mine thought that its easy circumstances, the result of its own work and of that of its ancestors, would never be called into question and that the threats of people like Guesde and Marx against the capitalistic system were mere literary exercises. The only thing that stirred my generation deeply in its youth was the Dreyfus affair, a purely intellectual sham-battle. I need not explain that such a state of security, political and economic, is the exact opposite of the situation of young Frenchmen today.

The contrast might be further described in the following way. We of the old generation grew up in a *fully developed* society, which we thought we had only to let continue on its way while we devoted ourselves, if we were fortunate enough to belong to the privileged classes, to æsthetic pursuits, to art, literature and philosophy. Whereas the youth of today is growing up in a world which it believes (I do not say that it is right in believing this; but

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believe it it does) is crumbling to pieces and must be rebuilt in every particular. I should compare this young man to Rodin's man of the Bronze Age, bewildered, hand on brow, awed by the immensity of the task which he thinks is before him.

Such a difference of situation seems to me enough to explain the whole moral attitude of the young generation, its whole system of values, as opposed to those of its elders.

III. THE POLITICAL CREED OF THE YOUNG GENERATION

First, let us notice youth's intolerance toward the skepticism which marked the political thinking of my generation. We who grew up before the war scorned politics, not only the politics of our own time, but of all times: we disdained political activity in general. Having been disciples of Renan and France, my contemporaries believed that politics could be only quackery and empirical patchwork, essentially incapable of real intellectual discipline. Politics therefore were unworthy the attention of a serious man, who reserved his respect and regard for private activities. The attitude of the young of today has none of that detachment. They are hostile toward democracy in direct proportion as it seems to them the symbol of political skepticism. They are dominated by profound faith in the organisms which they propose to create, whether Fascism or Communism. And appropriately enough, their creative will hates in proportion those who, never having been subjected to the same exigencies, honored other values in earlier days.

This hostility of youth toward democracy is based especially upon the fact that the Third Republic has so often been the scene of great financial scandals (*e.g.* the Panama affair, the Humbert and Stavisky affairs). It cannot be denied that Fascist régimes — or Communist — owe part of their prestige with the young to the fact that these consider them comparatively free from the domination of money. I shall of course be reminded that democratic governments on both sides of the Atlantic have likewise sought to curtail the money power, specifically that in France an endeavor was made to check the "*deux cents familles*." Yes, but these efforts have met formidable resistance, and in France, at least, they have finally collapsed. The result is that youth sometimes wonders whether the continuance in power of the financial interests and the failure of attempts to check them are not inherent traits of democracy; they wonder, in short,

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if democracy is not by definition a synonym of plutocracy. I do not say that this opinion is either right or wrong. I simply make note of it.

We may remark in passing that for a whole group of young men, followers of Maurras, the condemnation of democracy on the above grounds is nothing but a ruse to discredit a régime which they detest for entirely different reasons. Plenty of financial scandals (the Fouquet and Collier affairs, for example) existed under the *ancien régime* which the followers of Maurras cherish so dearly—a régime, incidentally, which differed from democracy chiefly in that it stifled small groups like theirs.

IV. ATTITUDES OF THE TWO GENERATIONS TO TRUTH

On one point the clash between the two generations is particularly striking: on the question of truth. The old generation respected, and still respects, objective truth — truth, the only concern of which is to be true and which does not occupy itself with practical consequences. Renan, Fustel de Coulanges and Gaston Paris made declarations on this subject which have become famous. In his first lecture at the Collège de France in December 1870 (a time when it was considered meritorious for a Frenchman to pay homage to truth, regardless of any nationalistic consideration), Gaston Paris declared: "I maintain absolutely and unreservedly that science has no other goal than truth for its own sake, without concern for the consequences, good or bad, happy or deplorable, which might ensue from the practical application of this truth." He added that a man who for any reason at all — patriotic, social or moral — allows himself to make the least alteration of truth, should have no place in the temple of the mind.

The young men of today, on the contrary, abhor objective truth. They intend that truth shall serve their plans of action, or rather, they call truth that which serves such plans.

Some disciples of Charles Maurras will protest that I am misrepresenting their way of looking at the matter, that they respect intelligence only in its search for truth, that this is the entire doctrine of their master as expressed in "L'Avenir de l'Intelligence." They neglect to add that, for them, truth represents precisely that type of society which they desire, and that their originality lies in proclaiming true, on the same basis as physical laws of weight or optics, political principles which in reality are

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nothing other than personal preferences. Although the young generation will not always admit it, we may say that all young people, Fascists and Communists alike, are "pragmatical".[2] An explanation for this is not far to seek: a generation living in an ordered society, which it believes will so remain for years to come, can permit itself the luxury of loving truth for its own sake without caring about the outcome; whereas a generation which has to create its own moral climate — or at least which thinks that it must — cannot do so, and must therefore take up arms against those who extol a spirit which is not solely practical.

V. OF THE POSITION OF YOUTH IN RESPECT TO INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY

The old generation, in honoring the Rights of Man, honored dictates of the human conscience, things which *ought to be* rather than things which *are* or which *have been*. It was idealistic.

The young generation scorns this attitude. It wishes to know only "facts" based on "experience." It is "realistic." Hence, one of its accusations against democracy. Rightist youth declares that democracy, with its worship of an ideal, obeys the "clouds" (that is the way the *Action Française* puts it); while Leftist youth insist that democracy fails to recognize the most important realities: economic facts. Let us note that the policies vigorously advocated by these two groups of youth are not at all based on a strict examination of the facts, but on an ideal imposed upon the facts: for one group it is "order," for the other it is "social justice," objectives which they themselves admit still remain to be achieved (at least as they conceive them) and of a kind that has not yet existed.[3] And because both wish "to know only facts," both make the mistake of not taking into account desires, aspirations and feelings — as though in history feelings were not facts, perhaps the most powerful facts of all!

In fine, the young generation of today is by no means exclu-

[2] Marx expressed this idea formally: "Communistic humanism has no worse enemy than speculative idealism," *i.e.* objective activity of the mind. (Quoted with enthusiasm by Jean Guéhenno, one of the leaders of French youth.)

[3] The Rightists have a great advantage in this particular: they can maintain that under certain régimes of the past their ideal *has actually existed*. Whereas the Leftists, the Communists at least, must admit that their ideal is to be established despite historical precedent. However that may be, the "order" which the Rightists promise will be different from that which history has seen. In 1797, Louis XVIII, in exile, sent this order to Pichegru: "Explain [to our people] the constitution of the State, which has been calomnied only because it is misunderstood; teach them to distinguish it from the régime which long ago set itself up as an intruder."

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sively realistic. But it pretends to be, and such a violent pretension is one of its distinguishing traits in relation to its predecessors.

The attachment of the old generation to the Rights of Man — of Man *in general*, independent of his political position — indicates its willingness to admit that there were principles which were above parties and which, theoretically at least, might entail inconvenience to its own party. They subscribed to Aristotle's famous proposition: "The state should never be an organized faction." The State advocated by the young generation — whether Rightists or Leftists — is indeed precisely that. Fascism and Hitlerism are openly government by party; Stalin is officially the party secretary. To be sure, youth asserts that party interests are identical with the interests of civilization.

A capital point on which the two generations differ widely is individual liberty. For the old generation, again because of its devotion to the Rights of Man, individual liberty is almost sacred. Nothing of the sort for the young generation. Liberalism is one of those "outmoded" values and its devotees seem rather ridiculous to youth. In France today the young liberal is an almost extinct species. The systems which youth likes, Fascism or Communism, not only deny individual liberty but make a boast of denying it. "The belief that the individual human being has a right to liberty and dignity has wreaked enough havoc; it will not weigh a straw the day when it will be imperative to take the necessary steps for the preservation of the race and of racial purity," writes the author of "Mein Kampf." And in the article on "Fascismo" in the "Enciclopedia Italiana," written by Mussolini himself, we read that man is only free in the whole, and this whole can only be an authoritarian state, which tolerates no arguments, no criticism. In other words, the soldier is free *within the army* — which allows him not a single free gesture! Let him who can understand.

One reason (there are others less honorable) why the young generation takes this attitude is that it is eminently social, much more so than its predecessors, which tended to be political. Now, radical social reforms are not made under a system of liberty. Liberty is a phenomenon of relatively happy societies; and in them whatever changes are made in the social order are not really organic. This is what has happened in France during sixty years

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of a republican régime, as many young men now allege by way of reproach.[4]

VI. THE ETHICAL PECULIARITIES OF A LARGE SECTION OF PRESENT-DAY FRENCH YOUTH

Determined to act, the young generation turns to the cult of energy and sacrifice. Renan has asserted somewhere that there is a kind of opposition between a cult based upon values of this sort and the cult of intellectualism, and that, generally speaking, an intellectual period is usually not a very moral one and a moral period is not highly intellectual. As with all parallels, this one is unconvincing, for during the seventeenth century a way was found in France to foster both virtues, mutually exclusive though they were supposed to be. Nevertheless, it may be admitted that the older generation was primarily intellectual and that the younger is, at least in fervor for the values just mentioned, comparatively moral. I have ventured to point out in a recent work, "La jeunesse d'un clerc," that in 1885 we were taught in the lycées to have far less respect for energy than for intellectualism. The young generation criticizes this kind of education sharply.

In speaking of ethics, let us make sure of what we mean. The word implies respect for a whole series of other values besides energy and sacrifice. Many young men of various parties seem set on emancipating themselves from these other moral values. "We must," declares the high priest of one of their groups, "be resolved to practice everything possible: trickery, artifice, illegal methods; we must be ready to silence and to dissimulate the truth; in short, we must derive our moral system from the interests of the class struggle."[5] Others lay down the same code, in almost the same words, for the establishment of a new order which they deem indispensable for the salvation of society. The *Action Française* expressly boasts of having resorted to trickery when the occasion required, of having lied, of having incited to assassination.[6] M. Thierry-Maulnier, a young Rightist leader, recently

[4] The idea that liberty has a negative, not a constructive value, and that true social reform cannot tolerate it, seems to have been expressed for the first time by the socialistic philosopher Henri de Saint-Simon. A very stimulating commentary on this matter may be found in the exhaustive work of Renouvier: "Philosophie analytique de l'histoire" (vol. IV, book 16).

[5] Lenin, *Sur la religion*, p. 73.

[6] "Let us be clever . . . let us practice trickery and violence. . . . We accept willingly, proudly, the reproach of having made a criminal attack upon private life." These statements were put by M. Ernest Renaud as an epigraph to a book on the *Action Française*, entitled "L'Action Française contre l'Église Catholique et contre la monarchie."

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published in the *Insurgé* (this paper, together with another named *Combat*, is the organ of a whole section of French youth), an article entitled "France dazed by ethical ideals." Here, the moral system of our young people, like their above-mentioned conception of truth, shows itself clearly pragmatical.

VII. THE SPECIAL CASE OF FREEDOM FOR THE WRITER

Another disputed field, very similar to the one just mentioned, is the question of freedom for the writer. The old generation demanded *complete* freedom for the writer, his right to remain totally unconcerned about the interest of the state, and even to write against the state. It was outraged because Zola's name was stricken from the roll of the Legion of Honor for having written the letter "J'accuse." One of the old generation, Alain, even maintains in his book, "Elements d'une doctrine radicale," that the chief function of a writer should be to snap constantly at the legs of those in power like an angry dog.

The young people of today have a great aversion for that sort of liberalism. Some of them support vigorously the thesis put forward by Pierre Lasserre in his famous book "Le Romantisme." According to this thesis the free functioning of the intellect, without concern for the interests of the State (the supporters of Dreyfus, they claim, were guilty of that indifference), is the action of a primitive man and is contemptible. Others go further and demand that the writer not only respect the type of society which they wish to establish, but that he work (and work exclusively) for its establishment. Some time ago, I attended a meeting of young men organized by the revolutionary paper *Vendredi*, at which the following question was the principal topic: "For whom do you write?" The upshot of it all was, according to them, that anyone who did not write expressly in favor of social regeneration was unworthy of the name of thinker. Note that, according to this dogma, Valéry and Giraudoux are not thinkers.

Again there is an explanation: the old generation, brought up in an established society, can afford to let the writer be aloof; the young generation, who think they must build their own society, cannot do without his help. They force him to support them.

VIII. HATRED OF THE "IVORY TOWER"

The old generation likewise permitted the thinker to live in his study, to avoid debate. Those who did so received the greatest

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homage. But the young generation has nothing but contempt for the ivory tower. They despise the most profound thinker if he keeps above the battle. Their mentor here might be Péguy, who, in his "Note sur la philosophie bergsonienne," declared that a system of philosophy merits respect only in proportion as it awakens active opposition. The other day I read in an article of one of their group: "We laugh at any system of thought, even the purest, which does not draw man into the struggle." It is a natural enough doctrine for a generation which believes that its task is not thinking but doing.

Youth demands that the thinker, even in his manner of thinking, should eschew tranquillity and live "dangerously." This reflects youth's hatred of large concepts, of general ideas, of basic forms of intelligence; its strong desire that the mind imitate "life" in its constant uneasiness (Bergson), in its "dynamism"; its worship of Hegelian dialectics. "General ideas," Nietzsche said arrogantly, "are a spar to which those obsessed with longings for security cling during the tempests of life!" Nearly all our young zealots hurl this sort of remark at those who propose to hold the eternal laws of the mind firm against the pressure of passing circumstances and, in the admirable words of Malebranche, "keep steady in the midst of currents."

The divergence is indeed profound. The old generation was not completely lacking in regard for happiness, for one reason that the world in which it grew up had permitted it to be somewhat happy. It had been brought up with what in my book, "Jeunesse d'un clerc," I called a non-tragical conception of life. It was not shocked by "Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse" of Renan, wherein the master, nearing life's end, declared that he would gladly begin over again "this delightful journey towards reality." The young of today disdain what in this case they would call "feebleness." Renan, extolling the peace of his oratory, seems to them a hideous symbol. They all would sign the following manifesto from the "Twilight of the Idols" (incidentally, nearly all of them are Nietzschean, the Rightists as well as the Leftists, from M. Thierry-Maulnier to M. André Malraux, and including M. Guéhenno): "Shame on the ignoble happiness that is the dream of grocery clerks, Christians, cows, women, Englishmen and all democrats." Once more I pause to point out that those who believe they must create cannot stop to evaluate happiness; they are obliged to exalt the pathetic conception of life.

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There is one more conflict, a very natural one. The old generation respected certain absolute, abstract values, considered apart from reality, such as justice and reason. In a work which some of my readers may perhaps know, "La Trahison des Clercs," I even maintained that the thinker "betrayed" his function when he ceased honoring these values except in the compromised forms which they inevitably assume once they become widely diffused. One of our young writers, M. Ramon Fernandez, in a work which throws much light on our subject — "*L'Homme est-il humain?*" — replies that it is solely these compromised modifications which he respects; for values honored in an absolute state, transcending human reality, he has only a shrug of indifference. This young man, in so far as he wishes to create, is playing his part quite well: for it is by practising the cult of compromise and by scorning eternal values that practical objectives are attained.

One last trait of the youth of today (whatever its party) which distinguishes it from its elders: its extreme self-importance, its supreme intolerance of everything and everybody not its own. M. Robert Brasillach, representative of an important group of his generation, recently attacked my ideas in the *Action Française*, citing my age as a principal argument against those ideas (he forgot that his master, Maurras, is as old as I; but impassioned polemists are not required to be logical). The young generation differs in this particular from the old: the latter sometimes announced that it was going to renovate everything in literature and art, but it did not imagine that it could make the political order over entirely and at once. The contrast is explained: political modesty is a commonplace when your chief task is to develop your own mind within a tolerable social framework set up by others; but you believe only in your own generation and belabor your elders when you become convinced they bequeathed you a world which is falling to pieces and which must be entirely rebuilt.

IX. IS THE DEMOCRATIC RÉGIME IN FRANCE MENACED BY THE HOSTILITY OF THE YOUNG GENERATION?

From the foregoing it can be seen that hostility to democracy is characteristic of modern French youth, whether Fascist or Communist. True, there is one section which is distinctly pro-democratic, including the readers of the Christian-Democratic paper *Aube*, in which often appear articles by Jacques Maritain

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and André Thérive; the readers of the magazine *Esprit;* and the "Jeunesses ouvrières chrétiennes," known as the J. O. C. But these groups form a minority in their generation. Besides, by conviction they oppose all violence, and so attract little attention from anyone studying the political *battle*. I may add that the Communist youth groups defend the democratic régime when it is in danger (*e.g.* the Sixth of February) and support it when it undertakes social reforms which they consider right and desirable (*e.g.* the platform of the Blum ministry). But this is strategy. They are convincedly hostile to democracy, believing it to be an essentially bourgeois and capitalistic system.

The question then arises: Is French democracy really in danger because of the hostility of the young generation? To put it another way: What, from the political point of view, is the effective power of youth and of its opinions in France?

My answer is that this power is not great. And here we come to a fundamental difference between democracies and totalitarian states. The latter "play up" youth. The dictators make a particular point of winning over youth, gaining its blind support, dominating its action completely. They profess to hold the judgment of youth in sovereign esteem. "Our doctrine is founded on truth," they say, "since youth favors it." They unhesitatingly proclaim also that their supreme (not to say sole) objective is to insure the happiness of youth and to put an end to the difficulties which strangle it.

The tremendous place given to youth by totalitarian systems is natural enough. The embryo dictators found they needed above everything good fists and strong lungs, the sort of irrationalism which consists in replying to an argument with a blow of a cudgel — a characteristic procedure for a certain type of youth.

Democracies, to be sure, are concerned with youth, but only in the same degree as they are concerned with all their citizens. They do not accord youth exclusive consideration. Above all, they do not worship the judgment of youth or think of decreeing that a doctrine is right simply because youth is in favor of it. In fact, they tend to pay particular attention to the opinions of mature persons of real or supposed experience, and to the counsel of the "Senates."[7] Public opinion, being feminine, likes youth,

[7] Thibaudet proposed dividing the European nations into "éphébocraties" and "gérontocraties." I need not say that a systematic desire to turn over the direction of government to old men seems to me perfectly stupid: Foch and Clemenceau saved France at the age of seventy, Bonaparte at thirty. Old age is not an essential of merit.

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pities its difficulties, desires to see them remedied, is attracted by the intransigeance of its doctrine. Nevertheless, reacting as an adult does to the notions of children, it scarcely thinks of putting these doctrines into practice. This is apparent at elections. The fact would become even more obvious if the electorate were to be consulted now, for very probably the Communist Party would receive still fewer votes than it did two years ago. In a word, the democratic régime in France does not seem to have much to fear from the hostility of youth.

Does this mean that democracy should remain indifferent to the criticisms of the young? That would be a great mistake. The wish of every true democrat should be to see democratic governments cease incurring youth's accusations, for some of these only too often are quite justified. If, in particular, the young generation could oblige democracy really to bring the domination of financial interests under control; if it could inspire it to show more courage in crises, more willingness to take risks on behalf of worthy causes; if it could force it to renounce the cult of well-being, which in some countries it practises to the extent of making one wonder whether it is not sacrificing national dignity and independence to it — if the young generation were to bring these things to pass, then I should say that by its very excessive severities it would have deserved well of civilization.

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TOTALITARIAN INROADS IN LATIN AMERICA

By Carleton Beals

FROM the American point of view one of the most disturbing developments in the international field is the rapid expansion of German, Italian and Japanese influence in Latin America. This influence, while still primarily economic, has already given clear indications of having serious political implications. Any such trend is obviously of the utmost interest and concern to the American public. Unfortunately there is not space in the scope of a single article to describe all aspects of this invasion in detail. It is nevertheless possible, by enumerating examples in the four largest South American states — the "ABCP" Powers — to convey a fairly accurate picture of the manner in which this invasion is being carried out and with what consequences to the economic and political interests of the democratic Powers, particularly, of course, the United States.

Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina are approximately six hundred miles closer to Lisbon than to New York. Communication facilities have emphasized this fact, bringing the three countries much nearer to Europe in point of time than they are to the United States. For several years, two-day trans-Atlantic airmail service has been maintained by France and Germany. German commercial flights to South America average almost a plane a day. The *Air France* is planning to establish a fifty-hour air service for passengers and freight between Paris and Buenos Aires. The Italians and Germans are also inaugurating overseas passenger flights. German and Italian steamship services to Brazil and Argentina already far surpass those of England, France or the United States in comfort, swiftness and cheapness.

II

Recent shifts in Brazil's internal economy have brought her closer to Europe in other ways than in space and time. Though Brazil is still dependent for her prosperity upon the foreign coffee market — principally that in the United States — cotton is today looming ever larger among her exports: she is now producing over two million bales a year. To dispose of this cotton, she must turn to Germany, Italy and Japan, now that England is obtaining

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most of her supply within the Empire. Brazil's citrus fruit — she is the world's largest exporter of citrus fruit — and bananas go mostly to Europe.

It is the so-called Fascist nations which are most aggressive in trying to expand their foreign trade and gain control of new supplies of raw materials; and it is they which, far more than England, France or the United States, seek to impose their own philosophies of government upon the smaller nations with which they deal. In exchange for Brazil's nickel and tin Germany sends not merely aski marks but also Nazi political theories, hoping to acquire enough influence there to prevent Brazilian products from being sent to England and France in time of war. Germany's system of nationalized foreign trade, state subsidies, organized dumping, currency control and direct barter are all used, in Brazil as elsewhere, to further Nazi political designs.

The penetration of German capital into Brazil thereby assumes added significance. Brazil is said to have a fourth of the world's known iron reserves; and Thyssen and Krupp are said to have secured concessions in Itabira, which reliable geologists have claimed to contain the richest deposit in the world. The *Deutsche Luxemburgische Bergwerks und Hütten Aktiengesellschaft* controls the mines of Corrego de Meio; other German concerns own copper mines in Parahyba, nickel mines in Goyaz and a million and a quarter acres of presumably oil-bearing lands in Matto Grosso. And this is only the beginning of the list of German mineral holdings in Brazil.

The great German air corporation, *Lufthansa*, has rapidly built up a continental network of aviation lines in South America. In Brazil its subsidiary — *Syndicato Condor* — has woven a 5,000-mile network of routes over the more developed portions of the country. From Natal, where connections are made with trans-Atlantic planes, lines run south through Rio de Janeiro to Porto Alegre, Montevideo and Buenos Aires. Others run westward across the hinterland of Brazil and over the Andes to Bolivia, Chile and Peru. Eventually these routes will be extended through Ecuador to connect with the web of the *Scadta*, also a *Lufthansa* subsidiary, in Colombia.[1] That these lines may have some political purpose is indicated by the statement of an Argentine editor that swastika-bearing planes are more numerous than could be used "in a hundred years of strictly commercial expansion."

[1] See "Atlantic Airways," by Edward P. Warner, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1938, p. 467–483.

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Estimates of the number of German residents in Brazil, including descendants of early settlers, vary from 400,000 to a million. Their presence there makes it possible for German business men to sell their goods on the Brazilian market with a minimum of sales' costs. German cotton and coffee plantations use German agricultural machinery and electric motors. German textile factories use German looms. The state-owned railroads have been turning heavily to Germany for equipment. According to the American Chamber of Commerce in Rio, German goods have been underselling American products by 10 to 40 percent. During 1936 and 1937 Germany led all other countries as a provider of Brazilian imports. The United States dropped to second place. England, on the downgrade everywhere, dropped even behind Argentina. Germany gained a favored position for her aski marks, whereas the United States and other countries saw their credits frozen and exchange operations frequently hampered.

All this is accompanied by a vigorous propaganda drive under the supervision of the foreign propaganda bureau in Berlin. Many agencies (which also function in other Hispano-American countries) are utilized; not excluding the *Gestapo*, Germany's world-wide and very efficient secret service. Germans all over the continent have been herded into Bunds, Turnvereins, Jugend clubs and swastika-saluting congregations, trained by German war veterans. Lectures, organizers, literature, schools, films and radio have all served, with the result that, except for German Jews, outward conversion has been well-nigh complete.

Germans who resisted this pressure have had their business boycotted, their properties damaged, have lost their citizenship or have been physically assaulted. Four Nazi agents have been put on trial in Buenos Aires for attempted arson against the property of anti-Hitler newspapers and other "enemies." The German Jew has seen his business ties with the Reich destroyed; everywhere he has been boycotted by German merchants and by the many Brazilian firms dependent on them. The continent has been doused with anti-Semitic propaganda. Anti-Semitism is one of the active doctrines of the Brazilian green-shirted Integralistas and of the imitative Fascist and Nazi bodies in all countries.

After securing the undivided obedience of the local Germans, the next goal of the Nazis has been to convert the native population to National Socialist doctrines. Brazilian educational institutions are honeycombed with German professors, whose salaries

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are paid by the Reich. Brazilian students and military and naval cadets are taken in droves to Germany, free of cost, and return home indoctrinated with National Socialism. Brazilian radio stations are provided by Germany with phonograph records for transcription; and radio sets, which in the short-wave field can receive only German programs, are given away or sold cheaply.

Heavy German advertising, and apparently in some instances direct subsidies, effectively help to block criticism of the Reich. According to the latest available figures, there are fifteen Nazi newspapers in Brazil. Their influence has doubtless been circumscribed by a recent decree of Vargas prohibiting the circulation of foreign-language newspapers in rural areas. The German News Agency, known in Latin America as *Trans-Ocean*, gives its news away practically free through sixteen-hour-a-day radio broadcasts. Easy facilities are provided to news-dispensing agencies for acquiring automatic radiotype recording apparatus. In this Nazi propaganda the Reich is held up as a happy land of unemployment, America as a land of gangsterism, strikes, greed and Bolshevism.

The German Embassy in Rio maintains a Cultural Attaché, who until recently was Herr Hans Honning Von Cassel, a former sewing machine salesman in São Paulo. According to *Claridad* of Buenos Aires, he personally directed many Integralista activities. German firms required their employees to join the Integralista movement, helped finance it and provided it with arms. The Vargas régime for years encouraged these Green Shirts, using them as an aid to the police in crushing all opposition. Last November, Vargas used them to overthrow his own government and abolish the last vestiges of democratic processes. In the first victory parades, the Green Shirts marched past Guanábara Palace, along with the army and navy. Vargas' new constitution contained most of the Integralistas' program and he admitted some of their leaders into government posts. Little wonder, then, that the Italians and Germans exulted over this new addition to the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo combination.

But their enthusiasm was premature. Vargas, thinking entirely in terms of his personal power, did not long permit the Integralistas to continue as a semi-governing body.[2] He soon ordered them to disarm and finally outlawed the movement entirely. A

[2] See "The New Régime in Brazil," by Ernest Hambloch, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1938, p. 484–493.

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preliminary plot to revolt was uncovered, arms were confiscated and the leaders arrested. In the abortive "pajama revolt" of last May — in which were implicated the Palace Guard, the Integralistas, part of the navy, and apparently Italian and German secret agents — Vargas escaped destruction by the skin of his teeth. He thereupon curbed German activities. Cultural Attaché Von Cassel hurriedly left the country under a considerable cloud. German schools, of which in one province alone there are over 2,000, were ordered to teach Portuguese, display the Brazilian flag, show no swastika or other foreign emblem and to cease accepting funds from foreign organizations or governments. Nor could anyone not a Brazilian citizen henceforward teach in them.

The efforts of the United States to combat Nazism in Brazil have been quiet but persistent. After the November coup, the anti-Semitism of President Vargas was checked, apparently in part as a result of American diplomatic pressure. The American treasury provided Brazil with $60,000,000 in gold credit and proposes to advance more. Secretary Hull made his famous (and probably unwise) offer to lend Brazil outmoded American war vessels. A leading Brazilian paper, apparently American-subsidized, now prints elaborate pro-American supplements with words of good cheer from American officials and business men. Persistent efforts won the unfreezing of American credits and a counter-restriction on German aski marks. Whereupon Germany, unable to buy Brazil's cotton and cacao with blocked marks, carried out her threat to buy elsewhere and placed large orders in Colombia, Panama and Central America. Provisional figures for the period from May to July 1938 show that Brazilian imports from the United States once more exceed those from Germany.

The Italians have long hoped for the establishment of a subservient corporate régime in Brazil. Luigi Federzoni, President of the Italian Academy, declared in Mussolini's *Popolo d'Italia* that "the Italian Fascist organization, the Italian press and the Italian support of Brazil" had contributed to Vargas' successful November coup. During the last seventy-five years over one million Italians have emigrated to Brazil. Italians own large coffee and cotton plantations, numerous mills and factories, and engage in lumbering. A powerful Italian economic influence is exercised through the wealthy Banca Commerciale Italiana and the Banco Italo Brasileiro. With the exception of half a dozen smart new German vessels, Italian companies operate the finest and swiftest

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passenger ships and give the lowest rates in the South American trade. The Italians are opening a new trans-Atlantic air service; they already maintain an airline between Rio and Buenos Aires. They have staged many military air flights to Brazil and elsewhere in South America for political and propaganda purposes. In 1934 Balbo took a squadron of twenty-one war planes across the Atlantic, and sold them all. More recently Bruno Mussolini led three planes across, and donated his ship to the Brazilian Government in an elaborate ceremony. Italy has made strenuous efforts everywhere in Latin America to sell munitions and war vessels. Last February, for instance, three Italian-built submarines were delivered to Brazil.

Mussolini wants all Italians in South America to be loyal Fascists. In Brazil, Italian firms not only boycott non-Fascists, but at one time even obliged their employees to join the Integralista movement. Besides the various Italian-language newspapers, many Portuguese-language publications are induced through advertising and subsidies to play up Fascist activities. The Rome propaganda office maintains a free press service, utilized by many Brazilian publications, which of course makes a point of running down the United States and democracy. Short-wave broadcasts are sent out daily from Rome over three powerful stations. By two-way broadcasts, local Brazilian and Argentine stations are induced to handle Fascist programs. The Italians are also heavy purchasers of radio time on local stations. The *Istituto Universitario Italiano* promotes cultural relations. Many Italian professors, whose salaries are paid by the Fascist Government, are sent over. The whole faculty of Economic Sciences at São Paulo is an Italian gift. Numerous scholarships are granted to Brazilian students and cadets. Known Fascist sympathizers (including in the past many of the Green Shirts) have been invited to Rome at Italian expense, to be personally fêted by Mussolini. Similar activities are carried on in the other Latin American countries.

Japan also exercises a large influence in Brazil, where 200,000 of her emigrants live. The Japanese Embassy, like the German, has a Cultural Attaché for the promotion of favorable publicity. Numerous Japanese professors have been sent to Brazilian educational institutions; in one a Japanese professor even teaches American history! Our State Department recently rejoiced over the cancellation of a large Japanese agricultural concession. But in May 1938 the ban on Japanese immigration was lifted. This year

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São Paulo has a farm-labor shortage of 300,000 hands, and plantation owners find Japanese to be the most efficient workers.

The Japanese take 29 percent of Brazil's exports of agricultural produce. They own large rubber plantations: one of them near Pará contains over a million acres — a rubber farm rivalling Ford's. They also possess cattle, rice, sugar, banana and coffee estates. A third of the new cotton-growing industry is in Japanese hands. They have also introduced the cultivation of silk, tea and rice, products which can be sold on foreign markets. The Yokohama Specie Bank and the Bank of Taïwan maintain several branches and correspondents in Brazil. The large Japanese colony, extensively engaged in the retail business, provides a normal outlet for many types of goods from the home country. The *Associção Central-Nippon Brasileira* actively promotes cultural and business relations. The Japanese Central and South American Export Association, headed by Ruyuzo Asama, owner of one of the largest export companies, is aided by his government with subsidies and diplomatic support. In pursuance of a ten-year trade program, Japanese commercial missions constantly tour not only Brazil but all South American countries. In return the Association invites leading South American business men and cabinet officials to visit Japan at its expense.

III

In Argentina, American sales are outdistancing those of the United Kingdom. But in general, British and Italian influence predominates in both Argentina and Uruguay. The Anglo-Italian diplomatic rapprochement of last spring — still hanging between life and death — was very pleasing to the Argentinians.

Within the last century two million Italians are estimated to have emigrated to Argentina, where they now form roughly one-third of the total population. Many prominent Argentine families bear Italian names, and Italians have long played leading rôles in business and politics. Fascism has given the bulk of Italian immigrants a new militant unity. The Italians have various large dailies in Buenos Aires and control one of the larger afternoon Spanish-language papers. Italian propaganda has been facilitated by a common Latin culture. The persecution of the Church in Germany has raised Argentine doubts about the Nazi movement. Fascism, however, is regarded as a protector of religion — a belief

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confirmed by Italy's armed support of the "Christian" Franco and by Mussolini's liberal concessions to the Church in Italy and to Catholic missionaries in Ethiopia.

A strong Fascist group, the *Legión Cívica* with about 150,000 members, was organized in Argentina with the aid of wealthy Italians and the government in 1931. Seven smaller Fascist organizations have now been welded into the *Guardia Argentina*. Uriburu's successor, President Justo, removed one elected governor after another, replacing them for the most part with pro-Fascist interventors. Ortiz, elected President last winter, ran on the Concordancia ticket made up of Conservatives, renegade Fascists and former members (of which he was one) of the Unión Cívica Radical Party. Fascists are rarely molested in Argentina, though democratic groups enjoy few rights. Dr. Manuel Fresno, Governor of Buenos Aires Province (containing a fourth of the country's inhabitants), has referred to Mussolini and Hitler as "the saviors of Europe."

The approximately 100,000 Germans who live in Argentina have gone largely into ranching, commerce, banking, engineering, medicine, dentistry and teaching. A number of years ago Hugo Stinnes bought large oil tracts in Neuquén Territory. The Germans are wrenching the railroad-supply business away from the British: for example, forty new locomotives for the Argentine State Railways have recently arrived from Germany. German-Argentine capital, using German planes and German technicians, runs the *Aeroposta* line south across the Pampas and Patagonia to Tierra del Fuego. The Chief of the Argentine Air Force, General Armando Verdaguer, and two aides recently made an extensive "informative" trip to Germany at German invitation and expense. Hitler personally decorated him with the order of the German Eagle. He bought five Junker planes on trial.

The Japanese have invested in Argentine meat, fur, quebracho and cotton. High Argentine officials have warmly urged them to increase their investments.

So far little open opposition has been noted on the part of Argentines to Italian penetration, though *La Critica* — the large opposition daily which was suppressed during the recent elections — has been carrying on an active anti-Fascist campaign. The existence of the anti-Nazi daily *Argentinisches Tageblatt* (even if it is largely supported by Jewish elements) indicates that Nazi regimentation and violence have not converted all the local

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Germans. Various native groups conduct boycotts of German goods, and German schools have been closed in certain areas.

IV

In Chile the origins of German influence go back to the middle of the last century when a number of German immigrants settled at Valdivia. Encouraged by liberal land grants and other concessions they have continued to emigrate to Chile, especially to the southern part, until today a large number of the leading families in Chile bear German names. For several decades the German element has been prominent in directing the country's economic and political life. In recent years there has been a steady growth of Nazi agitation, as was evidenced by the abortive Nazi rebellion which occurred at Santiago on September 5 of this year and led to the deaths of nearly a hundred persons.

In Chile Germany is running nip and tuck with the United States for trade leadership. Britain is definitely down in third place. The Germans, strongly welded together in clubs and associations, preserve their language and have their own schools. The Gildermeister family of Peru has expanded its sugar industry into Chile. Not long after the World War, the Krupps acquired in Llanquihue province land on which to build a large steel and munitions plant, and Germans were settled nearby. German capital has recently gone into Chilean nitrates. It has also put up a big paper factory, is active in the leather industry and is edging into other fields.

Chile does not place as severe restrictions on monetary exchange with Germany and Italy as it does with most other countries. More German than British automobiles are sold: the cheap Opel car is especially popular. (However, the United States still maintains a commanding lead in the Chilean automobile market.) The Germans have supplanted the British as purveyors to the state railroads, the most efficient system in South America. This year the government-owned airlines were equipped throughout with JU-86 Junkers. Immediately after the Buenos Aires Peace Conference, General Diego Aracena spent 100,000,000 pesos in Germany and Italy for war equipment; and more recently, after inspecting planes in the United States, he bought another 16,000,000 pesos worth of German hydroplanes for the line between Santiago and Magallanes at the country's southern tip. Many Italian planes are also being bought. An Italian officer,

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General Longo, is the key man in the air force and directs a corps of Italian instructors. When the Chilean poet Vicente Huidobro wrote a biting poem, "Fuera de Aquí" (Get Out of Here), he was brutally beaten up. Not long ago a pro-Loyalist lecture on Spain was prohibited at the request of the Italian Embassy.

V

In Peru the influence of Italy and Japan is stronger than Germany's. Italians constitute the largest European group. Galvanized into aggressiveness by Fascist organizers, they have assumed a dominant position even in Peruvian military and political life. The long-established *Banco Italiano de Lima*, as a result of government favors, has become one of the two most powerful financial institutions in the country. Peru's immediate destinies are largely decided by Dictator Oscar Benavides and by the *Banco Italiano*, which is under the direction of Gino Salocchi, popularly known as "the Viceroy of Peru." Long ago, when he was Peruvian Minister to Italy, Benavides enjoyed intimate relations with Mussolini. Later, when Minister to Spain, he declared that "the peoples can be saved only by men identified with Fascist doctrines." Italians operate the light, power and tramway facilities of Lima, Callao and other cities. The *Italo Peruano* provides much of the country's electrical apparatus. The *Dusa Radiodifusión* controls the leading broadcasting station and many radio sales agencies. Italians are engaged in the wine industry, own sugar and cotton estates, are active in lumbering and manufacturing.

The four leading dailies of Lima enjoy intimate relations with the *Banco Italiano* and receive heavy Italian advertising. The most powerful of them, *El Comercio*, preferred organ of the wealthy Civilista landholding class and of the Catholic hierarchy, supports Fascism whole-heartedly. One of its co-owners, Carlos Miró Quesada, now in Italy studying the corporate system with a view to implanting it in Peru, directs an Italian propaganda bureau for half a dozen countries. Many private schools, some partly subsidized by the Peruvian Government, are run by Italians. The most active supporter of Fascism in the National Catholic University, where numerous lectures praising Fascism are given, is Professor Alberto Benavides Canseco, brother-in-law of the Dictator-President. The Italian propaganda bureau in Peru, a branch of the central office in Rome, is run by two Italians

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close to the Benavides Government and is the center for Fascist indoctrination in Ecuador, Colombia and Chile.

Students, military cadets and officials go to Rome to visit or study, with their expenses paid by either the Italian or the Peruvian Government. Colonel Jorge Vargas, Chief of Staff of the Peruvian Army, recently went to Rome to study Italian methods and buy Italian munitions. Italian officers train Peru's large flying corps, the planes of which are of Caproni and Breda manufacture. Various Italian mass flights have been made over Peru. The Italians are building a modern Caproni aircraft factory and are putting up the largest airdrome in Latin America at Las Palmas, near Lima. Italian officers have charge of the President's Palace Guard; they also direct the police and the civil guards, whose numbers are equal to those of the regular army. Italian artillery and machine guns, sent out last December, have been distributed to various parts of the country, in particular along the Ecuadorean frontier.

There is little chance to ascertain the attitude of the Peruvian public toward this aggressive Italian penetration, since there is no free press, and the jails and jungle concentration camps are full of political prisoners.

The Japanese come next after the Italians in importance in Peru. The official statistics report that there are 22,600 of them. However, unlike Americans, Englishmen, and other nationalities, the Japanese are not required to register; consequently no exact count of them has ever been made. Competent observers claim that actually they total around 60,000 (as compared to 1,229 Americans), or 25 percent more than all other aliens together. High Peruvian officials, in violation of the immigration laws, bring in Japanese as plantation hands. Over two-thirds of the saloons and bread stores and one-half of the barber shops in Lima province are in Japanese hands. They control a larger share of retail business than does any other foreign group. Japanese operate factories making auto bodies, auto upholstering, rubber goods, light steel articles and electric light bulbs. They produce much of Peru's cotton and sugar. They own 18,000 of the 30,000 acres under cultivation in Chancay Province and all the waterfront adjacent to Chimbote, the first good salt-water harbor south of Panama. Through this port Japanese goods and immigrants are easily smuggled into Peru.

Japanese merchants in Peru (where 85 percent of the popula-

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tion is Indian or mestizo) have spread the theory that the country's original inhabitants came from Japan many centuries ago and that the two peoples are therefore blood brothers. Leading Peruvian merchants are invited to Japan at the expense of the Japanese export association. Japan buys much of Peru's raw cotton, fifty percent of her guano and a considerable share of her oil, vegetable-ivory and mineral products. During the Leticia trouble she sold Peru 60,000,000 soles worth of munitions.

Germans are strong in retail lines such as machinery, hardware, electrical goods, jewelry, paint and chemicals. Sixty percent of the business of Arequipa, third city of Peru, is in German hands. The Gildermeisters, with 100,000 acres under cultivation, operate the most powerful sugar concern in South America and alone account for 43 percent of Peru's exports of that commodity. They also have a powerful radio station, constantly guarded by armed Germans, and enjoy the privilege of a private port. By means of aski marks German imports into Peru quadrupled between 1932 and 1936, and continued to increase during 1937. German sales now exceed British sales.

VI

At the present moment no European Power is likely to invade Latin America. But the activity there of the totalitarian states, and the growth of their economic and political power, might produce a set of circumstances which they could exploit as they have exploited the civil war in Spain. The United States has pledged its word not to intervene in Latin America; but no European Power has made any such pledge. The struggle for trade and raw materials, in the course of which the so-called Fascist Powers have improved their position in the countries to the south, is undoubtedly being carried on with one eye cocked on the possibilities of a world war. In the case of a major conflict, by means of their emigrant colonies, their propaganda, and the influence of their banking and commercial enterprises, Germany and Italy might be able to interfere with the flow of supplies from Latin America to nations against whom they were fighting. Wars or revolutions fomented in Latin America at opportune moments might serve the same end. These possibilities may force us to a reappraisal of the Monroe Doctrine: territorial conquest is no longer the only European danger with which we have to reckon in Latin America.

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HAWAII: RACIAL PROBLEM AND NAVAL BASE

By George H. Blakeslee

TO THE tourist Hawaii means "Aloha," the land of friendship and flowers and moonlit surf at Waikiki — "the loveliest fleet of islands that lies anchored in any sea." But to the statesman, the diplomat and the General Staffs of the Army and Navy it means America's powerful mid-Pacific naval base, it means problems of naval warfare and of national defense — political as well as military. Among these problems one of the most serious arises from the racial composition of the islands' population. A few years ago it was frequently stated that Hawaii would soon be dominated by Japanese. In 1920 a political leader of Hawaii predicted: "Within seven years from now a majority of the voters in Hawaii will be Hawaiian-born Japanese." Somewhat later one of the leading Americans on the islands wrote, more conservatively: "Between 1940 and 1950 the voters of Japanese blood will reach the point of numerical majority."

It is now clear that these forecasts were entirely incorrect. Inhabitants of Japanese race will never constitute the majority of Hawaii's population; their proportion is now declining, and will continue to decline in the future. Among the voters, those of Japanese ancestry will never much exceed one out of three; and, once having attained that ratio, their proportion will thereafter gradually decrease. The most numerous racial group in Hawaii will eventually be, not the Japanese, but the Hawaiian and part Hawaiian.

Nevertheless, twenty years ago the prophecy that the Japanese would shortly constitute a majority of both the population and the electorate seemed reasonable enough. In 1920, they comprised nearly 43 percent of the population and that percentage appeared to be increasing. In 1923, 50.2 percent of the babies born in Hawaii were of Japanese parents. During the years 1912–1916, 53.8 percent of all the marriages performed in the islands were between Japanese. But since then the proportion of Japanese population, births and marriages has declined strikingly. In 1937, the Japanese constituted only 38.1 percent of the total population; and, of greater importance for the future, their births were 35.6 percent and their marriages only 29.7 percent of the total.

The accompanying tables, prepared by Professor Romanzo

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Adams of Honolulu, the outstanding authority on racial problems in the islands, indicate population trends among the important racial groups over the last forty years.

I. POPULATION OF HAWAII BY RACE

	1896	*1910*	*1920*	*1930*	*1937*
Hawaiian, including part Hawaiian	39,504	38,547	41,750	50,860	60,546
Caucasian	22,438	39,158	49,140	73,702	89,253
Japanese	24,407	79,675	109,274	139,631	151,141
Other Asiatic	21,616	28,568	49,488	96,692	87,370
All Others	1,055	5,961	6,260	7,451	8,405
Total	109,020	191,909	255,912	368,336	396,715

II. PERCENT OF POPULATION INCREASE BY RACE

	1896–1910	*1910–1920*	*1920–1930*	*1930–1937*
Hawaiian, including part Hawaiian	−2.4	8.3	21.8	19.0
Caucasian	74.5	25.5	47.9	21.1
Japanese	222.9	37.1	27.7	8.2
Other Asiatic	13.2	73.2	95.4	−9.6[1]
All Others	465.0	5.0	19.0	11.3
Total	76.0	33.3	43.9	7.7

[1] The result of the departure from the islands of several thousand Filipinos.

III. BIRTHS BY RACE

(in percent)

	Hawaiian and Part Hawaiian	*White*	*Japanese*	*Others*[6]
1922[1]	17.2	15.0	49.7	18.1
1923[2]	17.1	13.2	50.2	19.5
1925[3]	15.1	12.4	47.2	25.3
1930[4]	20.0	12.9	42.8	24.3
1936	26.6	15.5	36.3	21.6
1937[5]	27.5	15.1	35.6	21.8

[1] The first year for which registrations were sufficiently complete to make valid comparisons. [2] The year of the maximum Japanese percentage. [3] The year of the maximum number of all births. [4] The year of the census. [5] The most recent year for which data are available. [6] This column includes Filipinos, Chinese, Koreans, Puerto Ricans, plus a few Negroes, South Sea Islanders and smaller groups.

These tables show clearly the proportionate decline of the Japanese population in contrast with the Hawaiian and part Hawaiian group. This decline has been due in part to migration and in part to a drop in the birth rate. Immigration from Japan was limited by the Gentleman's Agreement of 1908 and was stopped altogether by the Immigration Act of 1924. Since then many Japanese have left Hawaii: during the five years ending

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with 1937, the excess of departures over arrivals was 5,231; while during the three years ending with 1937, the white population had a net increase of over 5,500 Americans from the mainland, not including men connected with the Army and Navy. The decline in the Japanese birth rate has been due in part to the aging of the women who came to Hawaii as "picture brides" before 1920, and in part to the fact that the Hawaiian-born Japanese have largely adopted an American standard of living and therefore marry later and have smaller families. With these facts in mind the Joint Committee of the United States Senate and House of Representatives, appointed to study conditions in Hawaii, stated in its report of February 15, 1938, that "The figures to date warrant the conclusion that before the end of the century the great majority of the people of Hawaii will be partly of Hawaiian ancestry. The future of Hawaii belongs, in fact, to the part Hawaiians." A similar forecast is made by Professor Adams.

The number of Japanese voters will eventually correspond roughly to the total number of adult Japanese in Hawaii. At present, however, over a third of the Japanese, being aliens, cannot vote; nor can they ever acquire the vote for, like other Orientals, they cannot be naturalized. But every person born in Hawaii is an American citizen, and after a few years practically all Japanese will be actual or potential voters. At the last election (in 1936) the Japanese who were registered as voters numbered 24.9 percent of the electorate. This proportion will doubtless increase for a time as Japanese who are citizens take the places of the alien Japanese who, being older, are dying off somewhat rapidly. But apparently voters of Japanese ancestry will never exceed approximately one-third of the total.

However, the important question regarding the Japanese is not whether they will obtain a majority of the electorate, which is impossible, but whether they will form a helpful, coöperative, loyal element in the islands. On the answer to that question depends, in the judgment of many, the kind of government best suited to Hawaii. At present Hawaii is an organized territory: its voters elect members to a territorial legislature and a delegate to represent them in the House of Representatives at Washington. The President of the United States, however, appoints the Governor and therefore controls the Executive Department of the islands. Though this form of government appears to have worked well, Hawaii is officially asking for statehood. The leading

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arguments advanced in favor of this change are that Hawaii deserves it and that, although it is constitutionally an integral part of the United States, it needs statehood to protect itself against discriminatory legislation at Washington. Opposition to this proposal is based primarily on the apprehension that Hawaii's Orientals, especially the Japanese, are not yet adequately Americanized. To study this question Congress appointed two Joint Congressional Committees on Statehood for Hawaii, which spent several weeks in the islands during 1935 and 1937, heard much testimony and gathered much material.

Three issues which bear on the loyalty of the Hawaiian Japanese to the United States are causing considerable controversy: dual allegiance, foreign language schools, and bloc voting. A substantial number of American citizens of Japanese ancestry have dual nationality: they are American citizens by American law since they were born in the United States, but they are also citizens of Japan by Japanese law since they are the children of Japanese subjects. To meet American criticisms of this dual status, in 1924 Japan put into effect a generous nationality law which provided that: (1) Japanese in the United States who had dual allegiance could expatriate themselves from Japan, and (2) children of Japanese subjects born in the United States after 1924 would automatically lose their Japanese status unless their parents should register them within two weeks of their birth at some Japanese consulate.

Among the Japanese born in Hawaii since 1924, the great majority owe sole allegiance to the United States, since they have not been registered at any Japanese consulate. Of the others who have dual allegiance, several thousand have formally expatriated themselves from Japan. More would have done so but for the time and expense involved. Many do not concern themselves over the situation any more than do most American-born children of European aliens in the United States. But it is widely felt that, under the exceptional conditions obtaining in Hawaii, the loyalty of all American citizens should be undivided. It is regarded as unfortunate that there are at present living in Japan some 14,000 Hawaiian-born Japanese who are legally entitled to return to Hawaii and resume their American citizenship.

Another issue is that of the Japanese language schools. These were established and have been supported by Japanese residents in order that their children might have some training in the

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Japanese language. They do not replace the public schools but supplement them: the children attend the language schools daily for about an hour after the close of the public schools. They have been widely criticized on the ground that they tend to make the children Japanese rather than American. For this criticism there was formerly some justification, since in the early days practically all of the teachers were aliens and since the courses, while imparting a knowledge of the language, dealt in subject matter largely with Japanese customs and loyalties. In recent years, however, these schools have become increasingly Americanized. At present over a third of their teachers are American citizens (348 citizens to 451 aliens), the textbooks have been translated and made available to the Territorial Department of Public Instruction, and the topics discussed are in large part American.

These language schools formerly met a real need of the Japanese community, and are still distinctly useful. The first Japanese to come to Hawaii were aliens and could therefore never be naturalized; they spoke only Japanese and naturally wished their children to have some systematic training in their native tongue. Even now a good knowledge of their racial language is valuable to second and third generation Japanese. American firms in Honolulu sometimes refuse to employ young Japanese unless they can speak the language of their people. And these private Japanese language schools are the only institutions in Hawaii, apart from the University, where Japanese is a part of the curriculum.

Many believe that these schools will eventually disappear. Such schools normally meet the temporary need of an alien racial group in the early stages of its progress toward complete Americanization. In Hawaii the German, Portuguese and Hawaiian language schools were closed as the members of these groups came to use English as their regular language; for the same reason attendance in the Japanese, Chinese and Korean language schools is now declining. Although apparently nothing anti-American is now taught in these institutions, some of the fairest-minded Americans in Hawaii believe that the Japanese language schools, especially the personal influence of some of the more recently arrived teachers, tend to retard Americanization.

There is no truth in the charge that the Japanese vote en bloc. Voters of Japanese ancestry, like the voters of other racial groups, divide between the Republican and Democratic Parties and often oppose each other enthusiastically. The Joint Congressional

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Committee, whose members would naturally have a keen interest in everything which concerned party politics, stated in their recent report: "racial voting . . . seems to be indulged in less in Hawaii than on the mainland. . . . So far it is safe to say that elections have been decided on individual merit rather than racial ties; and no good reasons exist for believing that any different policy will be accepted by the citizenry in the future."

A more fundamental question is whether the Japanese in Hawaii are genuinely American. Do they have characteristics which make them a desirable element in the community? Are they so thoroughly loyal to the United States that they would fight for the United States in an American-Japanese war?

The Japanese in Hawaii have proved themselves to be outstanding in those qualities which go to make desirable citizens. They are law-abiding, hard-working and efficient. In proportion to their numbers, fewer Japanese are arrested, in prison and on charity than any other racial group, including the Caucasian.

As regards the degree to which they have been Americanized in their daily life and thought, we must differentiate between three generations. The first immigrants from Japan were of course thoroughly Japanese; and, although many of them have adapted themselves in varying degrees to life in an American community, they still remain on the whole Japanese in customs and ideas. Their children, the second generation, were born in homes where Japanese was the common language; but when they went to the public schools they learned English, adopted American customs and absorbed American ideas. This second generation, American citizens because American born, has become in large measure American in speech and in ways of living and thought. Visitors from Japan, when invited to address an audience of younger Hawaiian Japanese, have frequently found it advisable to speak in English. The leading Japanese language newspapers now publish half of each issue in English.

One aspect of this change was somewhat humorously described by the present postmaster of Honolulu: "The younger element [of Japanese and Chinese] live just as we do, on beefsteak and onions, and they get their orange juice and ham and eggs for breakfast. You don't suppose they want to return to a diet of rice and seaweed, which they would get if they went back to Japan or China." The extent to which Americanization has gone is strikingly shown whenever a second generation Japanese goes to

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Japan. As one of this group has described it: "One born here finds it very difficult to fit himself into the life of Japan. His ignorance of the language, customs and manners brand him as an outsider and subject him to great embarrassment. His meager training received in the local language schools does not prepare him for life in Japan, and he is tempted to board the first boat home to Hawaii."

The third generation, now at school or already in business, is almost entirely American in its way of life. It speaks English at home and starts its school life with a background of American habits. The second generation — at present the dominant Japanese group in Hawaii — is the one which has had to make the difficult cultural transition. That on the whole it is making this transition satisfactorily is the conclusion of the Joint Congressional Committee on Hawaii. "The Americanization of the Japanese in Hawaii," reports this body, "has perhaps made greater progress than it has with many immigrant groups of longer residence in America living in mainland communities."

A final important query is whether the American citizens of Japanese ancestry are completely loyal to the United States. Certainly, the Japanese in Hawaii who are American citizens have a very good record. In the World War some 600 men of Japanese descent served from Hawaii in the United States Army, and at least four were commissioned as officers. During the draft no Japanese claimed exemption, even if an alien. Of the Boy Scouts, 57 percent are of Japanese ancestry and each Scout meeting opens with a pledge of allegiance to the United States. Many of the Japanese students speak as ardent Americans, and in debate refer to "the ideals for which our forebears fought in 1776." Such remarks are common and, since they honestly reflect the attitude of the students concerned, are fully as justified as similar expressions by students on the mainland who belong to the second or third generation of European immigrants.

The query is often raised, and in view of the peculiar conditions in Hawaii very naturally raised, whether the Japanese would be loyal to the United States in case of a war with Japan. When this test came, would American citizens of Japanese ancestry fight for the United States? One can well understand the answer of a young Japanese who replied to such a question: "I would kill myself." Many well-informed persons in Hawaii believe that in such a war most Japanese-Americans would act as loyally as did the thou-

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sands of German-Americans who served in the American Army during the World War. The attitude of a great many Japanese-Americans has been well expressed by one of them: "The fact that I am an American doesn't mean that I should hate my own race. . . . If war comes — for our parents' sake we do not want to see war with Japan — but if it should come, you will find a great majority of us on the side of the Stars and Stripes — not because we hate Japan, but because it is our duty to America."

It is unfortunate that the question of loyalty should have been openly raised, as is evident from the intensity of feeling sometimes manifested by Japanese-Americans. For example, in the recent hearings before the Congressional Committee one Hawaiian-born Japanese said: "I want to be treated as a citizen of the United States, and not as a Japanese. I have been telling my good, white American friends that as long as you treat American citizens of Japanese ancestry as Japanese, they are going to be Japanese. If you treat them as Americans, they will be Americans, and they will be Americans 100 percent." Some of the white Americans hold much the same view. General B. H. Wells, formerly Assistant Chief of Staff at Washington and for four years Commander of the Hawaiian Department, recently said: "In case of trouble with Japan . . . I think the majority of citizens [of Japanese ancestry] would be loyal, but this is the thing we don't know and are not going to definitely find out. It does no good to speculate about it in time of peace, and I think it is something of a tragedy. If we want to drive these people into a bloc, all we have to do is go ahead and suspect them." As a prominent American official in Honolulu remarked, "You cannot breed loyalty with suspicion."

But the problems of statehood and of defense make it necessary to raise this question of loyalty. If a referendum on statehood were to be submitted to all the voters at a general election, a majority would probably favor it, since the Hawaiian legislatures for thirty years have continuously asked for it and the platforms of both the Republican and the Democratic Parties have endorsed it. The "Big Five" sugar companies have recently declared for statehood, largely to prevent anti-Hawaiian discriminatory legislation at Washington. The white Americans are much divided in opinion and it would be hazardous to prophesy what the vote would be if it were limited to them alone. Nevertheless, most of them probably look forward to the achievement of statehood whenever the citizens of Japanese ancestry shall have be-

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come thoroughly American, whether that be after ten years or two generations. Many believe that statehood would strengthen the loyalty of these people to America. As Dr. David L. Crawford, President of the University of Hawaii, has said: "Statehood will make better citizens of our oriental young people . . . it will prove to them that they are being trusted as fellow citizens."

Statehood and Americanization are problems in which the American naval and military authorities are vitally interested. The naval base at Pearl Harbor, near Honolulu, is one of the greatest in the world. A narrow channel through the coral rock leads to six square miles of protected water, in which most of the American fleet can lie at one time. In fact, during the 1935 manœuvres the entire fleet of 163 ships (all except the large airplane carriers) did anchor in Pearl Harbor. At the naval yard ships can be refuelled, repaired and provided with ammunition.

Immense sums have been spent on Pearl Harbor. Up to June 30, 1938, the total amounted to $127,479,557, while the last Congress appropriated an additional $4,575,000. But if Pearl Harbor is to be made fully adequate for any contingency still more must be done. To accommodate the entire United States fleet, and to make it possible for the airplane carriers and battleships to anchor there if damaged and low in the water, further dredging is necessary. Larger dry docks are needed, since the present 1,000-foot one cannot take the airplane carriers and the largest battleships — nor indeed any of the battleships if they are damaged and drawing more than their normal depth. Congress has twice appropriated $10,000,000 for a floating dry dock adequate for the largest naval vessel; but, as no bid has yet come within that figure, no construction contract has been awarded.

To protect Pearl Harbor the United States maintains on the island of Oahu an extensive military establishment. There are batteries of 16-inch, 14-inch and 12-inch guns; many miles of military roads; concrete and steel observation posts, searchlights and sound detectors to guard against hostile airplanes; a depot in the crater of an old volcano containing about $20,000,000 worth of ammunition; and a highly efficient mechanized and motorized military force of 20,000 officers and men. The Army air base at Hickham Field is being rapidly completed. It comprises 2,300 acres, will cost $18,000,000 and is to be the largest of all the United States Army airports. With this defense Oahu is practically impregnable. Pearl Harbor has been called the most strongly

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defended naval base in the world. In the words of Admiral Leahy: "So long as the United States fleet is intact in the Pacific, there is no danger of an enemy capturing the Hawaiian Islands." Hawaii is the outpost guarding the Pacific coast of the United States. It is generally believed that so long as Pearl Harbor is securely held and a strong American fleet is intact in that ocean, no hostile fleet will dare to attack in force anywhere between Panama and Puget Sound. And, if the United States should be at war in the Far East, Hawaii would serve as the base for an advance across the ocean.

The Army and the Navy are, however, somewhat apprehensive as to two possibilities: a food shortage in case communications with the mainland are interrupted, and sabotage. Oahu, whose soil is devoted to producing sugar cane and pineapples, raises only fifteen percent of the food consumed by its civilian population. The Army has therefore developed plans for quick-growing crops, some of which could be harvested in 80 days: the lands which would raise these crops have already been selected.

The fear of wartime sabotage is primarily due to the Japanese in Hawaii. Ninety-nine out of a hundred of them might remain thoroughly loyal to the United States in case of a war with Japan. Yet the Army and Navy know that even if only one percent should be aggressively disloyal there might be disastrous consequences. Their apprehension is shown by their disapproval of early statehood for Hawaii. This opposition rests on two assumptions: (1) that American citizens of Japanese ancestry might be elected to the executive offices of the new state, and (2) that if so elected they would not coöperate fully with the Army and Navy. The proponents of statehood insist that the possibility of a Japanese-American Governor is very remote and that in time of war, whether Hawaii be state or territory, the Federal Government would take control by declaring martial law.

In Hawaii, then, the United States has two great tasks which often conflict: the protection of the country's greatest naval base and the blending of diverse racial groups into a loyal American community. Hawaii has already made striking progress towards creating racial harmony, and if this progress can be continued into the future there is every promise that time will eventually weld the racial groups into a thoroughly American population. Nothing should be permitted to interfere with this process which is now so happily going forward.

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BLACK AFRICA TOMORROW

By W. E. B. Du Bois

FOR the last century, Europe's interest in Africa has been the conversion of the heathen, the annexation of colonies and investment for profit in African labor and raw materials. Once, investment in Africa involved the slave trade and the transport of Negro labor to America. American Negro slavery, through the crops it raised, the commerce it gave rise to, the cities it built and the inventions it inspired, helped bring the Industrial Revolution. With the new industrial era began the decline of the slave trade and slavery and the utilization of African labor in Africa to develop African resources. Thus the search of finance capitalism for new fields of exploitation introduced a new set of problems into the relations of Africa and the white world.

In 1870 a young man dying of tuberculosis, Cecil Rhodes, began to dig diamonds in South Africa. Within a year he was a millionaire. Within a decade he had planned an empire built on diamonds and gold. A few years later he set his face toward the copper, tin and platinum of the inner regions of the continent. A bearded roué in the royal palace at Brussels caught the significance of the trend and planned an international state in central Africa, nominally for "scientific and philanthropic" motives, but in reality out of the love of gain. Even Bismarck, against his better judgment, felt obliged to follow England and France into colonial imperialism.

At first these political schemes led only to expense and controversy. Gradually, however, economic profits began to accrue. Foremost among the sources of these profits was the mineral wealth of the Rand, which was to furnish half the world's gold and most of its diamonds. Another — one that steadily increased with the years — was the vegetable oils from which Europe and America made their soap. Later, with the electric age, came copper — one of the greatest copper reserves in the world is in Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo — to be followed by tin, manganese and rarer but increasingly necessary minerals like vanadium. Africa's possibilities for the cultivation of cocoa, rubber, cotton and other fibres were exploited in ever increasing degree. Imaginative men conceived of an Africa which, with im-

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proved techniques, trained labor and the utilization of the boundless sources of water power, might easily become one of the most productive regions in the world.

But these resources could be extracted from field and mine only by the labor of the native peoples. The most pressing African problem hence came to be how to put Africans to work for the profit of white investors. It was a problem which presented many difficulties. There could be no question of compelling the African to work against his will indefinitely. The pressure used must be the pressure of circumstance rather than of physical force.

The efforts of the profit-seekers to get the African native to work for them received unintended help from the missionaries. It seemed both logical and natural to the missionaries of the nineteenth century that their activities should involve the disruption of African tribal life and the introduction of work for wages. The European wage system appeared to them normal and progressive while the communalism of the African clan, the African subordination of labor to life, and the lack of any African conception of individual land ownership seemed proof of African barbarism.

II

One of the first objectives of European investors in Africa was to gain ownership of the land. This effort had two purposes: to establish plantations on which cocoa, coffee, tobacco, grain and other profitable products could be raised; and to sequester enough land to make it impossible for the natives to live without working for the outside capitalists. This transplantation of Europe's disastrous land economy to Africa has not been carried out in the same way or at the same speed throughout the continent. Its effects are today most manifest in South Africa, where seven and a half million colored folk own ten percent of the soil while two million whites control the rest. By recent legislation the natives may increase their share to thirteen percent if they can obtain the necessary funds.

In the early years the whites who acquired this land were the Dutch pioneers who wanted it to farm with their own hands, aided by black labor. But with the development of the South African mining industries, the desire to speculate and to monopolize overrode all other motives, until today only five percent of the vast amount of land controlled by the whites is in actual cultivation, while the blacks and even the poor whites are a landless

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proletariat. In Northern Rhodesia the development of copper mining by European capital is bringing about among the native workers a cataclysmic change from tribal and rural life to industrial and urban life. In the train of this uprooting have come boom and depression, forced labor and unemployment. The small European minority which governs Southern Rhodesia is seeking to set up a caste alignment in agriculture and mining between white capital and colored labor, with the poor white excluded entirely.

There are in South Africa four protectorates which are not a part of the Union: Bechuanaland, Swaziland, Basutoland and Barotseland. Together these are as large as Abyssinia and have a native population of a million and a third. They are the remains of unconquered Africa, brought under British protection only by solemn agreement between blacks and whites. Here the natives own most of the land and retain their local autonomy under the general supervision of the English. But economically they are bound hand and foot to the Union of South Africa; and the Union wishes to annex them in order to obtain lands for further speculation and for the settlement of poor whites, and in order to obtain greater control over the labor of their inhabitants. It would be an indefensible betrayal of trust for England to surrender this territory to the South Africans.

In South Africa the present land situation evolved gradually by force of circumstance. In Kenya it was planned. Kenya is an island of high and fertile land rising above a vast expanse of equatorial steppe and swamp. On this wide plateau Negro tribes, such as the Masai, had for centuries pastured their cattle. Early explorers had pointed out that these mountain sides were high enough and free enough from disease to support a white population. England tried to give the land to the Jews in 1902 as a homeland, but they refused. She advertised for settlers and got a large contingent from South Africa, who naturally brought their South African ideas with them. After the World War Britain gave land to indigent officers and soldiers, charging them a penny an acre, until by 1924 the first Labor Government awoke to find two thousand white landowners in Kenya demanding absolute political control over three million natives and the ownership of the best land in the colony. Even the Anglican bishops upheld the doctrine that laborers must be forced to work. Today one-quarter of the land in Kenya is owned by whites, and the figure tells but

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part of the story for that quarter represents most of the fertile land in the colony.

In the Congo, Leopold of Belgium decreed his personal ownership of all the land and used forced labor to gather its fruits. When his domination was replaced by that of the Belgian state, his policy was modified but not reversed: though large blocks of land remain under the control of great corporations exploiting the colony's mineral and agricultural resources, the rules of ownership are now stiffer and certain native rights to the soil have been protected. Nevertheless, there is nothing in law or policy to prevent any amount of land in the Belgian Congo from being put under white control whenever and wherever such control yields the profit which European industry demands.

In West Africa, both British and French, the pattern changes, for there the political and social organization of the natives was strong enough to withstand the disintegrating force of European penetration. In South Africa long wars so broke the tribal life of the Negroes that opposition to white domination was impossible; in Kenya tribal organization was so loose and the population so scattered that the concentrated power of new settlers could override native resistance. But in West Africa tribal life stood firm, supported as it was by the great native states whose origins went back to the twelfth and fourteenth centuries. Here European domination had to be accomplished by negotiation and treaty, tempered with occasional sharp blows of force. Seven wars were necessary to bring the Ashanti under British control, and France went through continuous campaigns to gain possession of Dahomey and the French Sudan. In the end, however, European political domination was imposed under a compromise which left the land largely in the hands of the indigenous black folk. The profit of the white investor came only through handling the products raised by peasant proprietors or extracted from the forests to which the Negroes still had claim. Not long ago, Governor Cameron attempted to impose the West African pattern in the mandated territory of Tanganyika, but met the united opposition of South Africa, the Rhodesias and Kenya. He accomplished much towards restoring tribal government, less in the direction of restoring the land to the native.

In other words, the plantation economy of America and other parts of Africa could not be reproduced in West Africa. Instead, native proprietors by the thousands took to cocoa raising. The

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figure of 500 tons of cocoa exported in 1900 had risen by 1935 to 270,000 tons — grown on the farms owned by 50,000 black peasants. Half the cocoa consumed by the world comes today from West Africa.

After the war the Empire Development Society in England vainly demanded land monopoly and forced labor in the West African colonies. The organization of the blacks was too strong. But there are many ways of skinning a cat. English industry organized itself to buy and sell the produce raised by Negro peasants. The former Royal Niger Company merged into Unilevers, controlling six hundred companies and operating in sixteen countries all over the world. Transportation companies were organized and monopolized. Local chambers of commerce, closely associated with Liverpool, received political representation in the colonial governors' councils. Through mining companies, railways and government loans, the grip of finance capital was fastened on British West Africa.

Only in French Equatorial Africa were there granted concessions and rights over the land similar to those which had led to forced labor and monopoly in the Belgian Congo. But these concessions have now been in part liquidated. By means of these and similar processes a native labor force is today available for white exploitation throughout much of Africa: it forms the main working population in South and Central Africa, in the former German colonies and in the Belgian Congo. But in British West Africa ninety-eight percent of this labor is self-employed on its own land.

III

To render firm the foundations of this investment and industrial activity, political control was necessary: first to keep other nations from trespassing, and secondly to keep the Negroes regularly at work by legal, social and military means. For the most part Africa is today kept in order by black soldiers under white direction. All through British and French West Africa black soldiers make up the police and military forces. This is also true in the Belgian Congo and in East Africa. It was largely by the use of native troops that Italy conquered Abyssinia. In Portuguese Africa Negroes and mulattoes constitute the armed force. In South Africa the soldiery is chiefly white, although during the World War black soldiers and stevedores were used to a considerable extent. The conquest of German East and West Africa

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was to a large extent accomplished by black troops under white officers.

The execution of this policy has called for thought and ingenuity on the part of Europe. A large degree of autonomous and tribal government had to be left to the Negroes. Their social organization could not be entirely overthrown. Even in South Africa the chiefs still retain — or have had restored to them — recognition, power and political status, and they are paid largely with government funds. (In some cases the place of native chiefs has been taken by white officials acting as chiefs and enforcing ancient tribal custom.) Native law has to be widely recognized. The establishment of native councils, even after long abolition, has been found necessary in South Africa and the Rhodesias, and efforts along that line are being made in order to repair the damage of tribal disintegration in the Belgian Congo.

In French West Africa the chiefs and councils were for a long time, without regard to native law, replaced by Negroes trained in the French schools, with the result that the native chieftainship has been in great degree supplanted by a new chieftainship, a tendency which has been accentuated by bringing the natives into consultation on all government bodies. In some cities there is an elected native element in the governing authority.

In British West Africa the development has been more complicated. In such places as Free Town (Sierra Leone) and Lagos (Nigeria), there were beginnings of elective democracy. There gradually has been substituted a policy which allows tribal autonomy under the direction of British advisers whose effective control is exercised through their rights of veto and of legal, and even military, interference, and through their ultimate control of the courts. This benevolent despotism can be made a training school of peoples in government and social organization; but it can also be made a process of grim repression by encouraging conservative reaction and by setting up in opposition to each other hand-picked chiefs and councillors on the one side, and young educated and impatient progressives on the other. Thus "indirect rule" may be a policy to still opposition and increase profit, or it may be a step towards the development of black democracy and culture.[1]

Facts like these have led to an extraordinary and almost un-

[1] See "British and French Colonial Technique in West Africa," by Derwent Whittlesey, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1937, pp. 362–373.

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noticed agitation for democracy in British West Africa. It began in the Fanti movement for confederation in 1867, it developed into the Gold Coast Aborigines Rights Protection Society in 1899 and culminated in the National Congress of British West Africa of 1920. When the Fanti tried self-organization for social advance, the British governor threw their leaders into prison and accused them of high treason. But their effort brought crown colony government in place of that by commercial enterprise. The Aborigines Rights Protection Society took the agitation to England and hired Herbert Asquith as its advocate. They secured partial government recognition between 1898 and 1905. In 1920 Negro representatives from the four British West African colonies met and demanded political recognition. They declared: "In the demand for the franchise by the people of British West Africa it is not to be supposed that they are asking to be allowed to copy a foreign institution. On the contrary it is important to notice that the principle of electing representatives to local councils and bodies is inherent in all the systems of British West Africa." They demanded the right to elect their officials and control the revenues. Partial yielding to these demands took place between 1922 and 1925, so that today the legislative councils in parts of each West African colony contain a minority of members elected by the Negroes. This movement towards native participation in government is likely to gain momentum in the future.

In South Africa the question of the native's right to a political voice in the state has led to curious complications. Cecil Rhodes laid down the dictum of equality for all civilized men south of the Zambesi regardless of race and color. As a result there were Negro and colored voters in the Cape Colony. Later, as racial lines hardened and economic competition stiffened, this recognition of Negroes as voters by the Cape nearly ruined the possibility of uniting the four colonies into the Union. In the other three provinces there was, and is, no Negro suffrage. Recently, in the curious coalition government which included the Dutch independence movement and union labor, a policy was inaugurated which drove black labor out of all skilled industries, limited the Negroes' right to vote in the Cape Colony to the election of three white members no matter how many black voters there might eventually be, and ordered the establishment of a Negro council for the entire Union. This council, containing both ap-

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pointive and elective members, can discuss all legislation relating to natives but has only advisory power.

In Uganda native autonomy has been more extensively recognized than in most African states, though even here it is supervised, especially in its economic features, by British advisers. The British, who at first tried to turn the chiefs and councillors into an aristocracy of landholders, have recently been compelled to distribute the land more widely. Through their own democratic assemblies the natives have been able to assert, and to some extent protect, their economic rights. Nevertheless, finance capital is pressing to control the peasant cotton crop and to exploit mining, and in Kenya it is seeking to increase the number of workers who must hire their labor.

Especially has the weapon of taxation been used throughout Africa to force the native into hired labor. Most of his wants the native can fill by his own labor at home, or simply go without. But in the case of government taxes he must pay, and pay in cash; as a result, taxation has been in many cases oppressive if not overwhelming. In Northern Rhodesia, for instance, taxation absorbs ten percent of the native's income, and in Kenya African laborers working for a shilling a day pay in the aggregate four million dollars a year in taxes. An extraordinary situation has arisen in places like Kenya, the Rhodesias and South Africa where the black community, poor as it is, has actually been taxed for educating white children and paying the expenses of a government carried on primarily for the whites.

IV

All through Africa the acquiescence of Africans in foreign control has been induced by the educational activities of missionaries. They have given schools to young black Africa. But the amount of this schooling is limited. In South Africa primary grades are taught by poorly-trained and poorly-paid teachers. Eighty percent of the black children are illiterate. In Nyasaland, on the other hand, due to the persisting tradition of Livingstone, there is good primary instruction and some secondary. In the Belgian Congo there is excellent and widespread instruction, given principally under the Catholic Church but confined to the first two grades without secondary or higher work even sufficient for the training of teachers or the necessary professional men. In West Africa there has been a determined impetus toward higher

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training. Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone is affiliated with Durham University in England. Achimota College in Nigeria, while doing only secondary work at present, is designed eventually to be a full-fledged university; and Mackerere College in Uganda has similar plans. In South Africa the natives have one college — at Fort Hare — started by native chiefs but limited unfortunately to theology and teacher-training.

The most complete educational system is in French West Africa, where the schools run from the primary grades to institutions of university standards on a level with their counterparts in France. This French system is however still in its early stages and is handicapped by lack of funds. There are 70,000 children in school out of 1,360,000 of school age. At the capital of each of the colonies there are higher primary schools. Entrance to these schools is by scholarships awarded through competition to the best boys from the regional schools. The staff is composed of university men of high standing. There are special technical departments which provide for artisan training in the postal and telegraphic service, the survey department, the public works department, the railways and other government or commercial undertakings. Then there is an academic division giving an education in French arts for those who propose to be government clerks, to enter commercial firms or to compete for scholarships which will fit them for careers in the learned professions.

Each year the best pupils from the higher primary schools compete in a federal examination for the selection of candidates for the state secondary school — the William Ponty and Faidherbe School at Dakar. Fifty to eighty boys are selected each year. About one-half of these are trained as teachers and the other half for medicine, veterinary work and engineering. The course is four years and the pupils are from twenty to twenty-two years of age at graduation. Work in this school is similar to that covered in secondary schools in Europe, except that the students are taught with special reference to Africa. "The graduate of the William Ponty School is so fine a product that the education there given seems a complete vindication of French educational theory and practice in Africa."

V

Here then is the present African situation. What connection has it with the modern world, in particular with that part of it

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which must labor with its hands? The fact of the matter is that Africans have received practically no recognition from modern labor organizations elsewhere. The Labor Government of England made fair promises in Kenya which they did only a little to carry out. The Labor Party can, of course, plead that they did not have an independent majority in Parliament. But, the trades unions of England continue to be guilty of inexcusable discrimination against their black fellows in Africa. They recognize in the Union of South Africa and Rhodesia white trade unions which exclude Africans for race alone; they withheld aid to the heroic black I.C.U. labor crusade; and they have repeatedly refused to stand solidly back of the attempts to organize labor movements in West Africa. As for the Russian Soviets, they have appeared in Africa chiefly as deliberate trouble-makers without waiting to study local conditions.

This means that the efforts of European labor to raise its social level are handicapped and contradicted by its refusal to recognize black labor as a part of the world-wide labor movement. It does not seem to see that this rift in world labor ranks is paralleled by the attempts of skilled labor in England and America to profit by the degradation and low wage of ordinary labor, attempts which in America have led to the revolt of the CIO.

Is it not possible to forecast similar revolt on the part of dark-skinned labor in India and the East, in the West Indies and South America, and in Africa? What will that mean for the future of democracy? The communalism of the African tribe has not disappeared. Negro land in West Africa is still held by families, clans and Negro states. Coöperative enterprises have been begun there and in French Equatorial Africa. Wide differences of wealth are absent among the Negroes of South and East Africa and only beginning in West Africa.

The Negro worker has not been despoiled of his art or his joy of life. He can be lazy, engaging in work as a pastime rather than for the income it brings. The white worker, rising at six in the morning and dropping to dreamless stupor at nine in the evening, may feel satisfaction in knowing that his machine-like effort supports civilization. Yet he may well ask himself whether it is necessary that labor pay for industrialized civilization with emasculated manhood, whether his poverty is necessary, whether wealth is the extreme of luxury or whether it is calm contentment. Has the African worker a message for European labor?

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Beyond all this lies — less mentioned today than twenty years ago, though it is just as real — the danger which Africa's reservoir of military manpower represents for Europe. There is not a European colony in Africa that could stand for a moment against the armed force of its black inhabitants. Who can be certain that the white rulers in Kenya, the Union of South Africa and the Belgian Congo may not some day face the mass of their black subjects in arms — arms supplied by European rivals, or by black America, or even by brown and yellow Asia? The conflict has already reached a breaking point in the British West Indies. Only in South America has it found a solution — racial amalgamation. The conflict is of serious proportions and it can be met only by a steady will to think of Africans as men whose development is going to be along the line of all men. The fact that at least some white men can think of black men in these terms has been proved in the United States over long and difficult years.

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BRITAIN AND THE CONTINENT: THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

By Pierre Renouvin

BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR, 1898–1914. Edited by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1927–1938, ten volumes.

"IF there is war between France and Germany it will be very difficult for us to keep out of it. The *Entente* and still more the constant and emphatic demonstrations of affection . . . have created in France a belief that we should support her in war. . . . If this expectation is disappointed the French will never forgive us . . . we should be left without a friend and without the power of making a friend and Germany would take some pleasure, after what has passed, in exploiting the whole situation to our disadvantage. . . . On the other hand the prospect of a European War and of our being involved in it is horrible" (III, 299). In these words Sir Edward Grey, confiding his innermost thought in a personal note written at the time of the Algeciras crisis in February 1906, summarized the dilemma confronting British policy. And from then until the outbreak of the World War this same dilemma was upon many other occasions to confront English statesmen. The publication of "British Documents on the Origins of the War," just completed after more than ten years of painstaking work, now enables us for the first time to give a true picture of the evolution of British policy toward Europe, to appreciate its nuances, and to understand its motives.

I

In the second half of the nineteenth century Great Britain clung to the policy of isolation, though not always as strictly as those who guided British policy would have us believe. For, at least during the years from 1887 to 1892, England and the Triple Alliance had been drawn into close collaboration by the Mediterranean Agreement. Nevertheless, in 1898 Joseph Chamberlain was justified in saying, "We have no allies. I fear that we have no friends." From that moment English statesmen gradually became aware of the dangers of this situation. Chamberlain foresaw that Great Britain might "run head on into a combina-

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tion of the Great Powers" which would try to settle vital questions of European expansion without taking account of English interests. He saw that complete fidelity to the policy of isolation was incompatible with the development of the British Empire.

The dangers Britain ran as a result of her isolation were brought home to her statesmen at the close of 1904 by Japan's defeat of Russia. This event had modified the European balance of power. Now that Russia, its army weakened, would for several years be unable to resume her rôle as a "counterbalance" on the Continent, should not Great Britain fear the predominance of Germany? True, German hegemony after the war of 1870–71 had not interfered with English interests. But Bismarckian Germany was a continental Power, whereas the Germany of Wilhelm II was fast becoming a great naval Power. Fear of the formation of a combination hostile to Britain's world-wide interests, anxiety to maintain the balance of power on the Continent, and, above all, the uneasiness provoked by German naval rivalry (particularly after 1906) — these factors explain the evolution of British foreign policy and the formation of the Triple Entente.

What was the true import of this new English policy? To what extent was the British Government willing to coöperate with France and Russia? To what point was it disposed to enlarge its responsibilities? The test for Anglo-French relations came during the Moroccan crises; for relations with Russia, during the Bosnian crisis in 1908–09.

As regards the Moroccan question, Great Britain promised France (treaty of April 8, 1904) diplomatic support, nothing more. Was that guarantee sufficient for French interests? German policy — *i.e.* Holstein's — thenceforward anticipated that in any threat of a French-German clash over Morocco, the British Cabinet would hesitate to embark on an adventure. After the Tangier coup of 1905 the Foreign Office became fully aware of this German belief. Lord Lansdowne, Foreign Secretary in the Conservative Cabinet, accordingly declared — in order to cut short, he said, the insinuations of the German press — his community of views with the French Foreign Minister. A month later he even announced his willingness to join France in a study of all possible eventualities, without waiting for a threat of German aggression (III, 94–95). The French Ambassador in London, Paul Cambon, declared that this general understanding "was equivalent to an alliance." The English proposal

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was not followed up because the French President, Rouvier, fearing to "exasperate" Germany, brushed aside the idea of Anglo-French collaboration and engineered Delcasse's resignation.

But six months later, on the eve of the Algeciras Conference, Rouvier himself solicited the support of Great Britain. At that time the Conservative Cabinet was no longer in power. The Liberal successor to Lord Lansdowne, Sir Edward Grey, was not bound by his predecessor's offer. Nevertheless, he admitted that Great Britain might be induced to assume new responsibilities. If the diplomatic support which she had promised France were not enough to halt German aggression, he would then consider armed intervention. "My opinion," he wrote on January 15, 1906, in a personal letter to the British Ambassador in Paris, "is that if France is let in for a war with Germany arising out of our agreement with her about Morocco, we cannot stand aside, but must take part with France." Sir Edward authorized the British General Staff to get in touch with the French General Staff in order to study the necessary technical arrangements, but he took care to stipulate that the conversations were not to bind the governments and that the British Cabinet was to be free to decide, when the time came, whether those arrangements should or should not be carried out. "A deliberate engagement pledging this country in advance before the actual cause of the war is known or apparent, given in cold blood goes far beyond anything that the late Government said or as far as I know contemplated" (III, 216). This engagement would have given the character of an "alliance" to the Anglo-French Entente, and neither Parliament nor British public opinion would allow the Government to give such a promise in advance.

At the same time that Grey was evading the requests of the French Government he also was giving Germany a warning. In a personal, unofficial statement he told Wolff-Metternich, the German Ambassador, that in the event of a Franco-German conflict he believed Great Britain could not remain neutral. Would it not have been better for England to declare herself frankly? Germany would not then have dared to risk war (III, 229). This was the opinion of certain high officials in the Foreign Office, of Sir Charles Hardinge for one. But Grey was not of that mind. He believed that his personal warning to the German Ambassador would have sufficient "moral effect." He anticipated, besides,

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that France, uncertain about English intervention, would be obliged to make "some sacrifices" to Germany — enough, perhaps, to avert war. Nevertheless it was his private conviction that if Germany provoked an armed conflict, Great Britain would have to intervene.

In 1911, during a new Franco-German crisis, England pursued the same policy. European peace had been endangered by Germany's dispatch of the *Panther* to Agadir on July 1. What was Great Britain to do? Would she agree to send warships to the Moroccan coast jointly with France? The Cabinet — the King himself — refused. "We are bound and prepared to give them diplomatic support, but we cannot go to war in order to set aside the Algeciras Act and put France in virtual possession of Morocco," wrote Grey. "If we go to war it must be in defense of British interests." At what point, then, did the defense of English interests start? Whenever Germany tried to "humiliate France"? But "there is no case for that at present." The opinion of the British Government was, then, that France ought to negotiate and offer Germany "compensation" (VII, 405).

This reserve and advice alarmed the French Prime Minister. Would England desert France? No, for General Wilson, Director of Military Operations at the British War Office, arrived at that moment (July 20) to confer with the French General Staff on "les conditions de la participation éventuelle d'une armée anglaise" in a Franco-German War (VII, 640). Although that conference bound the two governments no more than the preceding ones, it had the effect of reassuring the French. Besides, the British Cabinet, through Grey's statement to Metternich and through Lloyd George's famous speech of July 21, again "warned" Germany; and this warning, bolstered by an order to the fleet to stand ready, was energetic enough to cause the German Government to relinquish its demand for the whole of French Congo as "compensation." Did that mean that France could now depend on English support if her negotiations with Germany were broken off? Not at all. Twice — on July 28 and on August 22 — Cambon asked Grey what Great Britain's attitude would be in such an event. Grey's reply was the same: ". . . no definite decision could be come to until we knew what was the actual situation when the failure took place" (VII, 433). For Great Britain to decide on armed intervention, public opinion would have to feel that Germany was responsible and that

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France "has no reasonable or honorable means" of avoiding war.

The British Government, without ever giving France a definite pledge, did therefore recognize that her interests might oblige her to take part in a Franco-German war. With Russia, however, Britain was much more reserved. With that country she undertook no engagement, not even diplomatic, beyond those concerning Asiatic questions contained in the Agreement of 1907. Yet the Foreign Office, Sir Edward Grey, even King Edward VII, seemed to attach great value to this new Anglo-Russian friendship. "In seven or eight years' time," wrote Hardinge, "a critical situation might arise, in which Russia, if strong in Europe, might be the arbiter of peace. . . . For this reason it was absolutely necessary that England and Russia should maintain towards each other the same cordial and friendly relations as now exist between England and France" (V, 195).

But when the crucial moment for Russia arrived, British policy was reserved. In the Bosnian crisis of October 1908 the Russian Foreign Minister, Isvolsky, would have liked to count on Great Britain's effective support. He received only kind words. He had hoped to obtain, in "compensation" for Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a revision of the Straits Convention: he asked that the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles be "opened" to Russian men-of-war, and to them alone. Grey would not accept this "unilateral" solution. In vain Isvolsky insinuated that England's refusal might be "fatal" to the Anglo-Russian entente. The British Cabinet made no promise and simply left Isvolsky with a vague hope. And when Russian diplomacy demanded territorial compensation for Serbia, a demand which Austria-Hungary definitely refused to entertain, Grey confined himself to stating that he would give Russia "diplomatic support" but that "it must not be expected that we should push matters to the point of provoking a conflict" (V, 416). To risk European war for such an end would be "out of all proportion to the interests involved." Diplomatic action was futile, because the Central Powers were well aware that England would no more go to war to protect Russia's interests than would France.

Was it not from that moment to be feared that Russia, disappointed, would cherish a grudge against Great Britain and would let the Triple Entente "languish, and possibly die"? Perhaps it would have been expedient, in order to prevent Russo-

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German conciliation, to give Russia guarantees "by bringing it nearer to the nature of an alliance . . ." (V, 764). This was the opinion of Sir Arthur Nicolson, British Ambassador in St. Petersburg. Grey, however, held that English public opinion would not find an alliance with Russia acceptable. "Wait and see," he said, in effect. And he was right, for Russia, in spite of her pique, ended by affirming her strong desire to preserve the Entente. Thus England kept to a "middle-of-the-road" policy, as Trevelyan has expressed it. She maintained close collaboration with France without making a definite engagement; she humored Russia without giving her real support.

But, though the British Government found the Triple Entente a useful "barrier" to German ambitions, it none the less looked upon any such idea as the "encirclement" of Germany as "nonsense." After each international crisis the British Cabinet tried to negotiate with Germany: it wished to find a friendly solution for Anglo-German naval rivalry which would allow the English fleet a sufficient margin of superiority. But how could Germany be made to accept naval limitation? She must be offered "compensation," for instance, a British promise of neutrality or of non-aggression. Grey had refused to consider such a proposal in 1909 and 1910, for he did not wish to weaken the Anglo-French Entente. Colonial compensation, then? This would have suited England, but Germany did not seem to relish it.

In 1911 negotiations were still going on. After the Agadir crisis the British public became uneasy. When the danger was past, they could see how narrowly they had escaped being involved in a war. They had now learned that Germany was going to make a new effort to increase her naval forces; they therefore wished to limit future risks. The Cabinet, taking account of this state of mind, was disposed to enter into a "friendly conversation" with the German Government. Even if this attempt had failed, it would not have been without value: it would have shown Parliament and the public that the Government had done its best to avoid an armaments race. It would have justified the necessity of another effort. On November 28, 1911, Grey declared to the House of Commons that if Germany wished a place in the African sun, Great Britain would not hinder her. On December 20 he told the German Ambassador that Great Britain did not intend to "thwart German interests everywhere" and that it would welcome, for example, the extension of German colonial territory:

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". . . if the Congo should be for sale it would be no object of ours, as some people supposed, to prevent German territory from extending across Africa from East to West as it would do if Germany purchased part of the Congo between Angola and German East Africa and eventually acquired Angola . . ." (VI, 480).

II

It was during 1912 that Great Britain's European policy became more definitely oriented. The failure of attempts at Anglo-German rapprochement bound France and England more closely together. These facts have been well known; but the "British Documents" now clarify the motives of British policy.

The Anglo-German negotiations revolved around three questions: naval armament, colonial expansion, a political agreement. In order to obtain a limitation on Germany's naval construction, the British Cabinet considered giving her opportunities for colonial development. But the German Government was not satisfied with this offer and demanded that Great Britain promise to modify her attitude on European questions. After Haldane's "mission of investigation" in February 1912 — in which he showed more good will and optimism than clairvoyance — the conferences continued for six weeks. The British Cabinet wished to modify the "bases of agreement" which had been established *ad referendum* by its envoy. On the question of naval armament, the German Admiralty at first approved only a slight *decrease in the speed* of its construction program; on March 12, however, it consented to a *limitation* of the program itself. But this was contingent on Britain's making a political concession, and upon this point agreement was not possible. The German Government wished England to promise "benevolent neutrality should war be forced on Germany." The British Cabinet would consider only a formula of "non-aggression." "England will make no unprovoked attack upon Germany and pursue no aggressive policy towards her" (VI, 537, enclosure). The German Government declared this formula unsatisfactory; on March 19 it declared that since it had received no promise of "neutrality" it would place before the Reichstag a proposal to increase the navy. On March 22 it carried out this threat and on April 10 both governments acknowledged the failure of negotiations.

Thus it was a question of general policy which prevented Anglo-German rapprochement. By insisting on a promise of

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British neutrality, German diplomacy hoped to destroy the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale. The British Cabinet was well aware of this. However, for Britain to promise Germany neutrality would, said the high officials in the Foreign Office, mean abandoning the policy she had pursued ever since 1904, and would encourage another "coup d'Agadir." Besides, "a day might come when a German Government might desire to crush France" (VI, 539). Could Great Britain permit this? If she remained neutral in such a war, she would at its conclusion find herself isolated, helpless and face to face with a victorious Germany. That was the argument which Grey put before the German Ambassador. Prime Minister Asquith was firmly decided not to subscribe to a promise of neutrality, regardless of the eagerness displayed by certain members of his Cabinet to do "something" to gain Germany's good will. "Even if there were no Entente, Great Britain would be obliged to refuse for her own sake." How could she avoid "going to the aid of France in case Germany attacked her on some pretext or other and seized the port of Calais?" And exactly how could one define, with sufficient precision, the term "aggression"?

It therefore was not mere fidelity to its friendships which dictated the decisions of the British Government, but the necessities of Britain's general interests. "The continued existence of a strong and independent France was of vital interest to this country" (VI, 564, Minutes), observed Sir Eyre Crowe, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The French Government anxiously watched the Anglo-German negotiations. It made an attempt to warn Great Britain against the danger of even a "formula" of non-aggression; but it took this step only at the end of March, when the critical moment had already passed. After the failure of the negotiations France continued to be uneasy. Must the Entente remain at the mercy of "the favorable or unfavorable inclinations of a cabinet"? The French Prime Minister, Raymond Poincaré, asked "how far France could count upon British support in the event of any difficulties with Germany." He asked that the reply on this point be in the form of a diplomatic note: in that way the Entente would be consolidated and confirmed. With the full approval of Mr. Asquith, Sir Arthur Nicolson, then Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replied that it was impossible. To revise the Entente, "to give it more or less the character of an

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alliance," to make an agreement which would tie the hands of the British Government, would be a challenge to Germany; the great majority of public opinion and the Cabinet could not embark on this course (VI, 576).

For the moment France's entreaties were in vain. But the British Cabinet could not evade them for long. The increase in Germany's naval forces obliged the British Admiralty to recall part of its Mediterranean fleet to the North Sea. Thereafter the safety of British communications in the Mediterranean could no longer be guaranteed without the collaboration of the French fleet. Paul Cambon hastened to propose this collaboration. France, he said, could undertake the "care of the whole of the Mediterranean" (X, part 2, 383). But did anyone think France would render this service to England without asking a return?

The time had come to make a decision. As Sir Arthur Nicolson said: ". . . we shall very shortly have to decide our future policy in regard to our relations with France and Russia" (X, part 2, 383). In exchange for a naval agreement which would assure the protection of British interests in the Mediterranean, France would try to obtain "an understanding . . . which would . . . be very much of the character of a defensive alliance" (X, part 2, 384). Should she be given satisfaction? Yes, replied Sir Arthur, because it would be "the cheapest, simplest and safest solution" (X, part 2, 385). Grey supported this point of view. In July 1912 the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, and Grey proposed to the French Naval Attaché that the respective rôles of the English and French naval forces be determined, and asked the French to concentrate the whole of their fighting fleet in the Mediterranean. They added, however, that this naval agreement would not "bind their governments."

In doing so they were well aware that France would not negotiate on these terms but would seize the opportunity to win that confirmation of the Entente which she had asked in vain three months before. It was not possible, said Paul Cambon, for France to strip the English Channel without assurances from Great Britain. Twice, at the end of July and in the middle of September 1912, Poincaré announced that he could not accept a definite naval agreement unless Great Britain gave satisfaction to the French point of view. It was around this "political formula" that discussion centered. Unable to obtain from the British Cabinet a formal pledge to intervene in a continental war, the

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French Government fell back upon its request for a promise of concerted action by the two Powers in case war threatened. "I don't see any harm in Cambon's formula; indeed it is almost a platitude," Asquith observed (X, part 2, 412).

An exchange of letters between Grey and Cambon on November 21 and 22, 1912, produced the following compromise. On one hand, the two governments confirmed that their military and naval staffs had engaged in an "exchange of views," but declared that these technical plans did not imply "an engagement to co-operate in war" and were not of themselves executory. On the other hand, it was agreed that in case of a threat of war the two governments would immediately survey the situation in order to "discuss . . . what measures they would be prepared to take in common." If military action was decided upon, "the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration . . ." (X, part 2, 416). This was the first time that the Anglo-French Entente was mentioned in writing in so far as the general policy of the two countries was concerned; but there was no question of an alliance because Great Britain refused to give a formal engagement. True, the British Cabinet had contracted a "moral obligation." But in declaring that it reserved its liberty of decision it allowed French policy to continue under the weight of uncertainty. In the eyes of Asquith, this was the advantage of the solution.

In order to appreciate the practical value of this accord it is sufficient to examine the attitude of the British Government fifteen days later, when a European conflict again threatened. The war between the Balkan countries and the Ottoman Empire, which had been going on since the middle of October, had precipitated first an Austro-Serb crisis, and then an Austro-Russian crisis. Austria-Hungary wished to keep the Serbs from gaining access to the Adriatic. Russia protested. Germany backed up Austria-Hungary, while France promised Russia to stand by their alliance. In case of a general conflict, what attitude would Great Britain assume? When this question was put to the British Foreign Secretary by the French Ambassador on December 4, Grey replied that the moment to raise the question was not yet at hand. The attitude of his government hinged on public opinion, which in turn "would depend upon how the war broke out," on whether Serbia took a provocative attitude or whether Austria-Hungary was "clearly aggressive." If the situation be-

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came serious, added Sir Edward, "I thought that public opinion would first require an attempt to secure that Germany, France and England kept out of the trouble" (IX, part 2, 328).

In 1912 — as in 1906 and in 1911 — the policy of Britain was to avoid giving a promise to France. Grey told the Russian Government that the question of a Serbian port on the Adriatic "is not really worth a European war." At the same time Germany, as before, received a warning, this time from the King himself. On December 5 Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of Wilhelm II, visited George V. The Prince asked whether, in case of a war between Germany and Austria-Hungary on one side and Russia and France on the other, Great Britain "would come to the assistance of the two latter Powers." "Undoubtedly yes under certain circumstances," replied the King. Prince Henry, without asking what the circumstances would be, expressed his surprise and regret. "Of course," wrote the King to Grey in relating this conversation, "Germany must know that we could not allow either of our friends to be crippled" (X, part 2, 452). Grey found this royal declaration to be "very fortunate." While Great Britain "is not committed in the event of war," and public opinion "is . . . very averse to a war arising out of a quarrel about Servia," nevertheless, in the event that Austria-Hungary were to attack Serbia "aggressively," or Russia, in assisting Serbia, were to be attacked by Germany, or France were finally to be drawn into the conflict, "it might become necessary for England to fight . . . for the defense of her position in Europe and for the protection of her own future and security" (X, part 2, 453).

British diplomacy made every effort to avoid this hypothetical situation. During the course of the long Balkan crisis it maintained a pacific attitude and preached conciliation. Even when the conflict presented problems which touched directly on British interests (such as the threat of a Bulgarian occupation of Constantinople or the Italian occupation of islands in the Ægean Sea) British action remained prudent.

III

After the Balkan crisis of 1912–13 the peace of Europe became more and more precarious. Austria-Hungary was not resigned to the consequences of the Treaty of Bucharest and tried to form a Balkan coalition against Serbia. Germany took advantage of

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the Ottoman Empire's weakness to reorganize the Turkish Army. Russia encouraged Serbia's ambitions. Throughout Europe the armaments race heightened the nervous tension, thereby adding another menace to peace.

In this situation the rôle of Great Britain was pivotal and the great continental Powers looked to her for guidance. In January 1914, when the appointment of a German, General Liman von Sanders, to the command of the First Corps of the Turkish Army in Constantinople precipitated a grave crisis, a Russian inter-ministerial conference studied the chances of victory in case of a European war. France and Russia, said Sazonov, "were hardly in a state to deal a mortal blow at Germany," without Britain's support in the form of a blockade which would paralyze the enemy. The German Government, in spite of the warning it had received from King George in November 1912, did not believe that Great Britain would necessarily be hostile, and several times it questioned its Ambassador in London on the attitude England would adopt in case of conflict. Asquith told the House of Commons on March 24, 1913, that Great Britain had entered no engagement. But, in order to insure peace, would it not have been better to proclaim the solidarity of the Triple Entente? That was the opinion of certain English diplomats, among them Sir George Buchanan, Ambassador to Russia. But the Cabinet was of a different mind. Consequently, during 1913 British foreign policy followed the same course as before: it did not relinquish the hope of a *détente* in Anglo-German relations and it refused to transform the Triple Entente into a Triple Alliance. To be sure, difficulties at home, where the Irish problem was becoming more and more serious, absorbed the public's attention and made the government cautious.

Naval rivalry remained the major problem in Anglo-German relations. But, after the failure of the Haldane mission, renewed negotiations on the subject of armament limitation were out of the question. Unquestionably the British Cabinet still watched for opportunities: in 1913 Winston Churchill threw out the suggestion of a "naval holiday," to which Germany turned a deaf ear. It was only concerning extra-European questions that the two governments entered into discussions (January 1913), at the express wish of the new German Foreign Minister, von Jagow. What was the spirit in which the British Government engaged in this attempt? It evidently felt that by favoring German

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expansion, by allowing Germany a larger place in the sun, it might exercise a calming influence over the general situation. Did it also hope that its complaisance would lead the German Government to resume "naval conversations"? The British documents do not reveal. They do, however, show that Grey had no illusions about the way to negotiate with Germany: "The Prussian mentality is such that to be on really good terms with it one must be able to deal with it as an equal." Yet the superiority of the British Navy remained in his eyes an ineluctible necessity. "If our Fleet was not superior to the German Fleet, our very independence would depend on Germany's goodwill" (X, part 2, 455).

Two questions dominated these Anglo-German conversations: Central Africa and Asia Minor.

In Central Africa the Germans had dreamed, especially since 1911, of laying the foundations of a "Mittelafrika." They also had designs on the Belgian Congo and they longed to give effect to the agreement concerning the Portuguese colonies which they had made with England in 1898. Grey did not discourage these ambitions — quite the contrary. "As to the future," he declared, "it is clear . . . that the Germans would like the division of the Portuguese Colonies to take place as soon as possible. So should I . . ." This affair was most delicate — "somewhat exasperating" — since Portugal was an ally of England. But, as Portugal was unable to develop her colonies, she would very likely be obliged to put them up as security against loans which she would want to contract; otherwise the colonies would remain so impoverished they might revolt. In case either hypothesis eventuated — a sale authorized by the Portuguese Government or a revolt in the colonies — Britain's guarantee of Portugal's colonial domain was *ipso facto* abrogated (X, part 2, 266, 312, 323).

These, then, were the possibilities visualized in the Anglo-German pourparlers. The agreement signed on October 20, 1913, divided the Portuguese colonies into British and German spheres of influence and specified what action the two countries could take if Portugal asked for a loan or if the internal affairs of the colonies became unsettled. In the end the intervention of the two Powers, first economic then political, could lead to annexation. In that event Germany was to receive the northern part of Mozambique, the major part of Angola and the territory of Cabinda (north of the mouth of the Congo). The German colonies would then have a long common frontier with the Belgian

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Congo. We have incontestible proof that at the beginning of 1914 the German Government saw in this Anglo-German agreement a means for initiating a vast program of expansion in Central Africa at the expense of Belgium. We also know that in 1911 and 1912 Great Britain foresaw — "in the distant future" — the passing of the Belgian colony "to other hands," though she thought it unwise to negotiate on this subject with Germany. "We should probably be rather worse than better off as regards making a full and public revelation of our policy and aims," wrote Sir Eyre Crowe (X, part 2, 281). What was Britain's position on this question at the beginning of 1914? The new documents give no clue — a regrettable lacuna.

In Asia Minor the chief object of Anglo-German negotiation was the Baghdad Railroad. For six years Great Britain, as well as France and Russia, had impeded this German enterprise. In 1913 she accepted an arrangement which provided that British interests were to be respected in the Persian Gulf region. On June 15, 1914, long technical discussions finally resulted in the signature of a preliminary agreement. According to this document, Great Britain agreed to open her financial market to the Baghdad Company. In return, Germany renounced her right to extend the railway beyond Basrah, thereby losing her access to the Persian Gulf. English, German and Dutch interests were to join in exploiting the petroleum fields of Mesopotamia. This agreement was a success for Germany: as Under-Secretary of State Zimmermann pointed out, she gained a sphere of economic expansion in a region where Great Britain's interests had been preponderant "for centuries."

These negotiations could have had important consequences on general policy. They ought to have had, said Jagow, a happy effect "on public opinion in both countries" (X, part 2, 223). But the signatures had not yet been exchanged. The British Government, although it had agreed in October 1913 to sign the agreement pertaining to the Portuguese colonies, put off ratification. Why? Apparently because of opposition from France. The British had negotiated the agreement without consulting Paris; they had sought "to appease Germany" by sacrificing, not their own interests, but those of other countries. According to Paul Cambon, the publication of the text of the Anglo-German agreement caused an "explosion" in French public opinion. The British Ambassador in Paris, Sir F. Bertie, echoed this belief. Why did

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Britain take this risk? It was logical that Grey should decide on postponement in order to humor the French. But did he not regret leaving the matter suspended in mid-air? He had given Germany certain satisfactions in principle; he could now employ delay in their realization as a means of inducing her to resume naval negotiations. This interpretation, it is true, is merely a "hypothesis," conditioned by the present state of our knowledge.

While the British Cabinet was negotiating with Germany, it received urgent entreaties from France and Russia. At the beginning of 1914, therefore, the "enlargement" of the Triple Entente was once again proposed. Russo-German tension, which had been serious during the winter of 1913–14 at the time of the Liman von Sanders mission, and which caused a prolonged press controversy in March 1914, explains why the St. Petersburg authorities were anxious. If the Triple Entente — "whose existence is no more proven than that of a sea serpent," said Sazonov — is transformed into a defensive *alliance*, "openly announced in all the newspapers of the world," peace would be assured, for Germany would not dare run the risk of war. The Russian Ambassador in London, Count Benckendorff, never tired of repeating this argument to Grey. At the beginning of April the Tsar himself expressed a desire "to see a closer bond of union established between England and Russia, such as an alliance of a purely defensive character." And, as the British Ambassador remarked that this wish could not be realized at the moment, Nicholas asked that the Anglo-Russian entente be at least confirmed and extended, either by the conclusion of an arrangement providing for coöperation between the General Staffs such as already existed between England and France, or else "by some written formula which would record the fact of Anglo-Russian co-operation in Europe" (X, part 2, 537).

Sir George Buchanan was convinced that Russia was "rapidly becoming so powerful that we must retain her friendship at almost any cost. If she acquired the conviction that we are unreliable and useless as a friend, she may one day strike a bargain with Germany and resume her liberty of action in Turkey and Persia. Our position then would be a very parlous one" (X, part 2, 538). The Anglo-Russian entente had, he pointed out, always been fragile, and the Tsarist régime, dubious of the value of close ties with "weak" and democratic countries like England and France,

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might very well be planning to improve its relations with the German Empire, "which in any case . . . has the appearance of stability and where the monarchical system is firmly established" (X, part 2, 533). Nevertheless, no one in the Foreign Office would admit the possibility of an alliance between England and Russia. The high officials most inclined to an active policy, Sir Eyre Crowe and Sir Arthur Nicolson, had in mind only "an interchange of views between the respective naval staffs, without in any way binding the Governments . . ." (X, part 2, 537, Minutes).

While Sir Edward Grey did not dismiss this idea, neither did he show enthusiasm: "We had better postpone discussion of anything as long as we can," he wrote on the margin of the report. But when King George visited Paris on April 23 and 24 the French Prime Minister, Gaston Doumergue, insisted "on the necessity for doing something to make relations with Russia more secure." He admitted that "an Alliance between Britain and Russia was out of the question," but could not the British Government "at least promise to discuss matters with Russia, if necessary?" Grey made a characteristic reply: ". . . it was more difficult for us in the case of Russia than in the case of France — I would not say to enter into engagements, for we had no engagements with France — but to hold out to Russia any hopes of assistance from us . . . If there were a really aggressive and menacing attack made by Germany upon France, it was possible that public feeling in Great Britain would justify the Government in helping France. But it was not likely that Germany would make an aggressive and menacing attack upon Russia; and, even if she did, people in Great Britain would be inclined to say that, though Germany might have successes at first, Russia's resources were so great that, in the long run, Germany would be exhausted without our helping Russia. Besides this, the French Government were a free Government, while the Russian Government were not; and this affected the sympathy of public opinion in Great Britain" (X, part 2, 541).

Nevertheless, in the middle of May the British Cabinet authorized the opening of negotiations between British and Russian naval staffs. These conferences were kept strictly secret; Germany must not be given an inkling of them, nor should they be exposed to radical criticism. When an English newspaper alluded to them Grey hastened to issue a denial. Their progress was slowed up by the British Government's dissatisfaction with the activities

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of Russian agents in Persia. At the moment of the Sarajevo murders nothing had yet been accomplished.

IV

Through these apparent contradictions in Britain's policy, which sometimes disconcerted her partners, it is possible to perceive a logical evolution. From 1904 to 1914 British statesmen were ceaselessly on guard against a Germany determined to become a great naval Power. They were firmly convinced that they would have to throw their forces into the balance if a war broke out between the continental Powers. The Entente Cordiale had been welded more firmly by the General Staff conferences and the letters of November 1912; while in 1914 Anglo-Russian conciliation was about to assume a more definite form.

None the less, British policy never viewed France and Russia in the same light. England was indifferent to a possible Austro-Russian conflict; only a Franco-German war would really disquiet her. Even while continuing to seek a *détente* in Anglo-German relations, Grey, Asquith and the Foreign Office recognized that the interests of Britain were tied to those of France. Still, they had no desire to make a promise, to assume an obligation in advance, to transform the entente into an alliance.

But would not such a promise have guaranteed peace? If the Germans had been convinced that Britain was to intervene in a continental war, would they not have been more moderate? British statesmen were not unaware of that possibility. Why, then, did they resist every French supplication? They preferred, they said, to leave to English public opinion the responsibility for making the decision at the proper time. This was the solution that conformed with the political traditions of the country, the only one which would make possible "the mobilization of moral forces" in the event of war. England also feared that for her openly to take sides might, by irritating Germany, increase the danger of war. In short, she decided to leave her final decisions in doubt: she would keep France and Russia from assuming too firm an attitude toward Germany and compel them to make concessions. To Grey's mind all these political nuances were aimed at assuring peace.

In July 1914 England merely followed her traditional policy. But her peaceful intentions and her hesitations brought about the very result she wished to avoid.

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CAN INTELLECTUALS BE MARXISTS?

By Ernest Boyd

THE current spectacle of the American Communist Party shedding crocodile tears over the fate of Catholics in Germany and protesting their undying love for the New Deal would excite an onlooker's indignation or amusement even if he did not know that this sudden concern for democratic "bourgeois" principles was prompted solely by opportunism and that this opportunism is dictated by the obvious failure of Communism to establish itself in any of the democratic countries. Marxism, in fact, has been partially established in only one important country. For centuries that country had been the most despotically ruled, the least industrially developed, the most illiterate of those ranking as the Great Powers of western civilization. Pre-revolutionary Russia was, in Marxist theory, the stoniest ground on which the seed of Communism could possibly fall.

This little irony of history is further emphasized for us today by the crop of anti-Communist despotisms which has been the response of the more advanced European nations to the ill-fated evangelists of the gospel according to Marx. Everywhere the ravages of Communism are marked by the bones of democratic government. Revolution was once the traditional monopoly of the Left; it has now become a more powerful instrument in the hands of the Right. As a result, Moscow has uttered the slogan which has sent all Marxists scurrying for the protection of the last remaining bulwark against totalitarianism: the United Front. The Marxists assume that they will be accepted by the free peoples of the world on terms of democratic equality merely because the aims of Communism are not those of Fascism. They pretend not to see that Communism is merely another totalitarian régime, and that the democratic nations abhor totalitarianism as such, in any shape or form, however praiseworthy the theoretical end in view.

A gem of prevarication in Lenin's "The State and Revolution" will show both the distortions of Marxist logic and the fundamental acceptance of the totalitarian principle. "The theory of the class struggle," he wrote, "was *not* created by Marx, but by the bourgeoisie *before* Marx, and is, generally speaking, acceptable to

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the bourgeoisie. . . . A Marxist is one who *extends* the acceptance of class struggle to the acceptance of the *dictatorship of the proletariat.* Herein lies the deepest difference between a Marxist and an ordinary petty or big bourgeois." Herein also lies the reason why it is impertinence on the part of Marxists to presume upon the coöperation of the democracies in the struggle against forces which the Marxists themselves have been partly responsible for bringing into existence. Let us not forget the disdain of Moscow for the Weimar Republic and all that liberal Germany was striving to establish. The shortsighted exactions of the Allies were far from being the only factors in what Georg Bernhard has called "the suicide of a republic."

The psychological slavery of Marxism differs in no wise — so far as mental servitude is concerned — from that of all totalitarian states. All these despotisms rely essentially upon the suppression of the facts of history, upon the distortion of the universally accepted meanings of words, upon the conditioning of the mind through ignorance bred of censorship. Ingenuous intellectuals, now fervently in favor of the United Front, imagine that this is not the case. They point out triumphantly that reactionary capitalists do not make the mistake of confusing Communism and Fascism but always favor the totalitarian states which stand for capitalism and imperialism. This is very much like saying that baseball and cricket are not both games, because almost every American prefers the former. One hardly expects a capitalist to be a frenzied admirer of Lenin. The argument betrays the extreme indifference of the intellectuals to the issue at stake, to the principle of freedom of thought and speech. Every man to his own totalitarianism, in a word.

Some day the historian of ideas will be confronted with one of the strangest enigmas of this troubled era, the complete or partial conversion of a section of the intellectuals to the doctrine of Marxian infallibility. In the past, during periods of social and political upheaval, it has been the proudest distinction of individuals of first-rate intelligence that they resisted, defied, and in the long run overthrew, or at the least very seriously undermined, whatever current dogmas and superstitions prevented the free play of the mind and stifled the human spirit. Today when the darkness of the new mediævalism is obliterating all independent thought, when even the immortal thinkers of the past

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are banned or misrepresented by hooligans, we see intellectuals eagerly defending and coöperating with the very forces that spell their own extinction, accepting the disingenuous rhetoric of mob politics with its specious alternative: Fascism or Communism.

In this country the converts vary in the degree of their Marxian orthodoxy, many evading the issue by taking refuge in the subterfuge of the United Front. In the varying shades of their political colors, from pale pink to deep red, the most militant and vociferous intellectuals seem very largely to belong to that generation which was adolescent when the World War broke out and knows of prewar civilization by hearsay, so to speak. Many of them, after toying with half-witted Dadaism and Surrealism, have gradually lapsed into an amorphous Marxism, the most positive feature of which is a jealous, ill-natured and wholly ignorant denigration of all those who have been most successful during the last third of a century in developing an adult and emancipated American literature. Their successors in point of age are filled with the proselyte's zeal for questions of economics and politics: these were not the chief preoccupation of the prewar generation, which was engaged in other tasks. Sentimental Socialism is now the order of the day, and "proletarian" storytellers and dramatists are encouraged to outdo the pathos and bathos of the most lachrymose Victorian best-sellers.

If there is one factor in Marxism which is supposed to differentiate it from all other forms of social theory, it is that Marx alone has given the world "scientific" Socialism. Before he was liquidated by Stalin, the late N. I. Bukharin (Marx rest his soul!) put the matter in a characteristic nutshell. This, he said, is an epoch in which "all the real forces and potentials of a new world are marching with the slogans of a new, mercilessly bold, scientific and yet revolutionary doctrine which embraces the whole sum of the problems of our time, an outlook whose creator and founder was Karl Marx." Marx was full of scorn for "idealistic" Socialists, for the humanitarianism of the petty bourgeoisie. He alone was scientific, objective, and free from the trammels of old-fashioned moral concepts, and his modern disciples have extended his claims until Marxism has come to be a compendium of all human wisdom. "This universal genius," says Bukharin, "has built up a creative synthesis of all the conquests of thought." And on the same authority we are assured that Marx was not

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interested in any scheme of a rationally constructed ideal society. "He has a very stern attitude towards those splendid fantasies and sentimental ideologies which are fabricated out of illusory images."

Before the Comintern graciously decided in 1935 to admit the existence of "fellow-travellers," with a view to sheltering from the Fascist storm behind the bourgeois United Front, converts to Communism were severely scrutinized as to their motives when seeking admission to the Marxist fold. Poor Barbusse, for example, was at first suspected of heresy, not that his intentions were not pure, but that his motives were sentimental rather than scientific. Some of his Russian inquisitors doubted whether he had really mastered the objective truths of the Marxian philosophy, and they resented an adherent who was clearly swayed by old-fashioned humanitarian motives derived from the libertarian humanism of the eighteenth century. Since then the rules have been greatly relaxed, for the strategic purposes of Moscow — on the same principle, apparently, that, when times are bad and funds are needed, clubs will admit new members who have been hitherto excluded. Hence the crop of misrepresentative Marxists who presume now to speak for the intellectuals. Most of them have little or no knowledge of the Marxian scriptures, whose hideous jargon alone is sufficient to rebuff any reader with a feeling for style. Their conversion is emotional and is rarely based upon the immutable "laws" of scientific Marxism. Neither dialetic materialism nor economic determinism has convinced them. They have simply assumed in desperation that Communism, in some form or other, is the only effective means of improving the lot of the proletariat, for whom they are genuinely sorry.

Marx himself would have regarded them (as Moscow formerly did) as heretics tainted with bourgeois morality. To him and his authentic disciples Marxism is not an expression of tenderness for the toiling masses. It is an analysis of the ineluctable process of evolution whereby the proletariat acquires control of the instruments of production and distribution and substitutes its own scale of values for those which have hitherto prevailed in the civilized world. It implies and involves a complete moral and intellectual break with that civilization and all its works. This fact was recognized and greeted as such by Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Webb in their monumental study of the U.S.S.R. Notoriously

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indifferent to spiritual and æsthetic values, their bureaucratic and sociological pulses beat faster when they observed the dreams of their lifetime beginning to materialize. Never Utopians, and always in favor of any means, from Poor Law reform to Fabianism, whereby the masses of people could be regimented into a general average condition of mediocre well-being, the Webbs are more after Marx's heart than the sob-sisterly Socialists of the American and the International Writers' Congress. However desirable the spread of model housing, tractors, highways and subways, it would seem that the intellectual should be the very last person to suggest that the aim and future of civilization are to be evaluated and determined by such tests. It is not necessary to wait until Russia has caught up with the material routine of Western civilization in order to realize that the widespread distribution of mechanical gadgets and standardized luxuries, so far from enhancing the quality of life, submerges precisely those elements in society whose effective presence has lent to human nature whatever dignity and grandeur it has achieved.

The misrepresentative Marxism of the Communists outside Russia, as André Gide and others have specifically admitted, is humanitarian; it derives from an uncomfortable feeling that oppressors and oppressed are the forces lined up against each other, and that the place of the intelligentsia is on the side of the oppressed. A simplification of such disingenuousness might pass muster in a political harangue, where emotion is substituted for thought; but surely an intellectual ought to be capable of using his brains. To support privilege or oppose it is not a rational decision made in the interests of the general welfare. It is a purely subjective impulse whereby feeling for one particular class or another enables the intellectuals to evade their self-evident duty of thinking objectively and in terms of civilization as a whole. While pretending to defend abstract ideals, they are in reality merely upholding the claims, the demands, the exactions of one class.

In order to grasp the extent to which humanitarian Socialism differs from orthodox Marxism we may consult the learned exponents of the Moscow gospel. There is no uncertainty, no ambiguity, as there are literally no limits to their pretensions. "Logically," writes Bukharin, "Marxism is a scientific system, a scientific practice, and for this reason alone cannot be stupidly 'compared' to the prophets of Judea, to the medieval Taborites,

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etc., with their corresponding eschatologies. It is utterly foolish to compare Marx's scientific forecasts to eschatological Utopias." Warming to his theme, Bukharin proceeds modestly: "On the basis of an astonishingly complete acquaintance with all disciplines, on the basis of an obstinate study of modern natural science, from mathematics to geology, of an exceptional acquaintance with the history and literature of all ages and peoples, of stubborn original work upon primary sources, of a first-class knowledge of world literature and world art, Marxism grew as the all-embracing system of ideas of a titanic class, formed by the titanic genius of Marx."

One gathers that the omniscience commonly attributed to Deity was Marx's, and it is not surprising to find A. M. Deborin reaching the conclusion that "only the teaching of Marx and Lenin can guarantee the further development and progress of humanity." All other social theories "have the same relation to Marx's scientific forecasts as the magic formulas of a witch-doctor to wireless telegraphy, or as books on elementary alchemy to Mendeleev's table." The harsh and sweeping dogmatism, the apocalyptic fervor of such utterances are the simplest confirmation of the fact that the delusions of Messianic Marxism preclude reasonable argument and discussion. A clear consciousness of their own fanaticism is betrayed by the anger of its proponents at the suggestion of a comparison between the Marxist faith and any other variety. Marxism, in other words, is the new "opium of the people," but it must not be called a religion, despite the abdication of reason in the perfervid asseverations of its evangelists.

It is to this feast of unreason that the pseudo-Marxists of the intelligentsia invite us. Whatever may be the sad fate of those within the Soviet Union who try to think independently, there is no reason why the democratic countries outside Russia should be required to make the abject surrender of the mind displayed by those who have swallowed the Marxist faith whole. No witch-doctor nor Grand Inquisitor could rival these incantations and fulminations, this fanatical absolutism masquerading as "scientific" Socialism. The whole farce of Marx's boasted "objectivity" is revealed by these doctrinaires. So far from analyzing the facts and reaching conclusions objectively, Marx and his disciples start with a definite bias in favor of a cause and a class. Their vaunted "historical materialism" consists in twisting the evolution of history to suit the demands of the proletariat, and their

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supposedly logical interpretation of the facts is a predetermined series of arguments in favor of the proletariat. By a strange coincidence, it turns out that the facts thus interpreted lead to the prophecy that the triumph of the proletariat is inevitable. In Marxism the humanitarian wish is father to the "scientific" thought.

Thus Marxism has the temerity to assign a purpose to history, and that purpose happens to be the cause of which Marx was the exponent and propagandist: the collapse of the capitalist system, the seizure of power by the proletariat, and the establishment of a classless Communist society. By no stretch of the imagination can a method be called scientific if it is applied exclusively to justify a preconceived idea. A philosopher may draw conclusions from history, but he may not arrange all the forces of history to suit those conclusions. If he considers that all forms of human thought and activity are determined by historical contingencies, then his own ideas must be subject to the same law. They may be good in their time and place, just as all systems may be desirable or undesirable, according to the particular circumstances. The rhythm of history rises and falls; there is no straight line of constant progression towards a definite end, much less to the proletarian apotheosis promised by Marx. That kind of "objectivity" is sheer sophistry.

The fundamental fallacy of Marxism is the doctrine of economic determinism. Economics represents one phase of social life, an important phase, it is true, but only one. The whole of life cannot be subordinated to it or explained by it. On the contrary, economics must be relegated to its naturally subordinate position in the social scale of values. A social order is not created by economics, for the exchange of goods and services already presupposes the existence of organized societies. In other words, economic determinism does not determine, but is determined by the human personality, by the vast complex of human society. Economics must submit to these natural laws of human development which antedate and are more elemental than the laws governing the exchange of goods and services. That Moscow is aware of this awkward flaw in the Marxian theory is proved by the tactics employed to encourage the Russian masses. Revolutionary idealism is more frequently invoked than scientific Socialism, and a sense of mystical devotion has been aroused to prepare the people to endure hardships and sacrifices. Here the

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technique is like that employed by the Right-wing totalitarian countries. Material changes are preceded by a mental or spiritual transformation. The myth of world revolution and the fetish of mechanical progress supply the necessary spiritual nourishment for those incapable of mastering the Marxian dialectic. In the one country of its election, dialectical materialism has had to have recourse to the derided tactics of ethical Socialism.

If they wish to escape the charge of mere opportunist demagoguery, Communist propagandists outside Russia must give an intellectually honest account of themselves. Converted to Marxism for sentimental reasons, impelled by the very idealism which Marx ridiculed and despised, they misrepresent Marxism, while professing to be its representatives. What is worse, if they are intellectuals, they are traitors to the class to which they belong by definition. "While an intelligent person is merely one who is not stupid or slow-witted," says Fowler's *Modern English Usage*, "an intellectual person is one in whom the part played by the mind as distinguished from the emotions and perceptions is greater than in the average man." This is surely a modest definition which can quite legitimately be applied to those whose profession it is to uphold and advance the claims of the spirit.

Not only are too many of our intellectuals either silent or evasive concerning the atrocious butchery of mind and body in the U.S.S.R., but they are deliberately lending the weight of their support, the dignity and responsibility of their special status, to a theory of history and a way of life which are the negation of that inherited civilization to which they belong and whose spokesmen they should be. Maxim Gorky characteristically declared that individual thought and meditation are for "idlers living on the outskirts of the community." To think abstractly — the refusal to think collectively — he regarded as a sign of decadence and old age. The cult of work and science, with the impudent Communist assumption that work must be manual and science practical, sets the standard of collective thinking — whatever that contradiction in terms may mean. "In our literature," Gorky continues, "we must not draw too sharp a distinction between an artistic work and a work of scientific vulgarization." Even children's fairy tales are not spared. "Fantastic stories must be justified by work and science, and children must be given stories based on the results and hypotheses of present day scientific thought." Presumably it was a child so trained who was rewarded

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some time ago by a month's vacation for denouncing its father as a Trotskyite traitor.

Russia's apologists are never tired of telling us about the wide distribution of books in that country, the tremendous decrease in illiteracy, the special consideration accorded to writers, artists and scientists. By omitting to describe the *kind* of literature, art and science that are encouraged, they conceal the fact that the Soviet Government does not honor creative artists and scientists as such, does not, in fact, allow them to exist. It treats them according to their usefulness as propagandists for the various myths currently being imposed upon the masses. The constant glorification of manual labor, of machines, of applied science, is a direct challenge to a civilization in which work (as thus defined) is regarded as a necessary but incidental evil, at all times subordinate to those higher activities which mark the great creative geniuses and the minority which has supported them and understood them. What the civilized world has regarded as a means, Marxism proposes as an end in itself. As a citizen, an artist may accept the régime under which he lives, but it is absurd for him to make that régime the exclusive preoccupation of his art. Material things have both aided and impeded human development, but they have never been the sole reason for existence, except to people barely distinguishable from animals.

Essentially individualistic, the artist, the writer, the scientist was, until the advent of totalitarianism, content with his own function. It was no concern of his who owns what or whether private ownership should be abolished. The disinterested services of those who have placed their brains and talents at the service of mankind would not have been possible had material rewards been their primary motive, whether in the form of commercial profits or Soviet subsidies. The strangulation of the mind in the totalitarian states works more havoc with man's creative instincts than such compromises and concessions as are made by intellectuals living under capitalism. They are not frightened by the Communist threat to private property, but they are revolted by Marxist threats to the privacy of the mind. The mental bondage of Marxism is more unendurable than the material pressure of capitalism. Death or exile is the only escape from the former; personal integrity has always preserved first-rate human beings from the latter.

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THE MEANING OF BREST-LITOVSK TODAY

By John W. Wheeler-Bennett

TWENTY years ago — on March 3, 1918 — the first treaty of peace between belligerent parties in the World War was signed by the Central Powers and Russia at Brest-Litovsk. Few then appreciated the full significance of the event. At the moment it appeared to mark the complete victory of German arms in the East, and, for Russia, the greatest humiliation in her diplomatic and military history. But though these results were of grave importance in themselves, the more far-reaching effects of the treaty could not be guessed at. In retrospect, however, it is possible to say that, with the exception of the Treaty of Versailles, the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had consequences and results more important than any other peace settlement since the Congress of Vienna.

The long expected Revolution had broken out in Russia with the slogan of "Peace, Bread and Land," and the German High Command had added its contribution to chaos by allowing Lenin and his followers to return from Switzerland to Petrograd in the famous "sealed train." As a result, the political complexion of the Revolution changed rapidly from "parlor pink" to scarlet; the Liberal government of Prince Lvov gave place to the Socialist régime of Alexander Kerensky; and he in turn was ousted by the Bolsheviks at the Second Revolution of November 1917.

Capitalizing the deep-felt longing of the Russian masses for peace, Lenin at once declared a cessation of hostilities, and thus it came about that, after some vicissitudes and the murder of the Russian Chief of the General Staff, there sat down on December 20 at the Brest-Litovsk headquarters of Prince Leopold of Bavaria one of the strangest gatherings in the history of modern diplomacy. Fate had decreed that the representatives of the most revolutionary régime ever known should sit at the same table with the representatives of the most reactionary military caste among the then ruling classes, that a Bavarian nobleman, a Knight of the Golden Fleece, and a Prussian major-general should negotiate on equal terms with a group of Bolshevik leaders but lately returned from exile, and from whose clothes the reek of dungeons had barely been banished.

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The two groups were as widely separated in ideology as in social standing. The representatives of the Central Powers spoke the ancient language of diplomacy. They thought in terms of strategic lines, of provinces ceded, of economic advantages to be gained. Not so the Bolsheviks. Their parlance was not one of frontiers and concessions; they were not concerned with geographical expressions. They aimed by propaganda upon war-weary European Socialism to achieve what they knew could not be achieved by arms, namely the World Revolution and the replacement of military imperialism by the dictatorship of the proletariat. They were prepared to abandon whole provinces to the victors if by so doing they could arouse the working classes of the Central Powers to a realization of the evils of military dictatorship. He is no Socialist, wrote Lenin in his open letter to the American workingmen in 1918, who will not sacrifice his fatherland for the triumph of the social revolution.

So fundamental a difference in approach necessarily resulted in equally different techniques in negotiation. For both parties the time factor was vital. For Germany it was essential to concentrate all available troops on the Western Front as soon as possible in order to ensure the success of the spring offensive against the Allies on which the High Command had staked their all. Hindenburg and Ludendorff therefore demanded a speedy conclusion of the negotiations. Russia was at the mercy of Germany, they urged; no further resistance was possible; and a victor's peace should crown a victor's war. Here at last was a chance to extend the frontiers of Germany to include the Russian provinces of Courland, Livonia and Estonia, where both the aristocracy of the Baltic Barons and the middle class were largely of German origin, and also Lithuania. There opened before their eyes, too, the opportunity to exploit the rich black soil of the Ukraine, whence grain could be exported to feed the army and population of Germany, brought near starvation by the Allied blockade. A dream of reducing the former Russian Empire to a series of partitioned states, each dependent upon Germany as economic and political protectorates, began to take hold upon the imagination of the General Staff. But in any case speed was the essence of the contract. If the Bolsheviks would not immediately accept the terms offered by the Central Powers, then the offensive must be resumed and peace dictated at Petrograd instead of Brest-Litovsk.

The Imperial German Government, and in particular the For-

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eign Secretary, Baron Richard von Kühlmann, opposed this policy because of its crudeness and because, with greater political sagacity, they did not share the illusions of the General Staff. Even at that date Kühlmann doubted the possibility of a complete victory in the field for German arms. A negotiated peace was the best that could be hoped. Like the generals, he was anxious to obtain as great territorial gains as possible in the East, but only in order to hold them as bargaining factors when negotiations for a general peace finally became a possibility. He hoped to avoid making territorial sacrifices in the West by displaying a readiness to surrender conquered territory in the East. Moreover, he was anxious to arrive at a settlement with the Russians peacefully in order to facilitate the course of future negotiations with the other Allied and Associated Powers.

While the German generals demanded a speedy show-down, the Bolsheviks desired exactly the opposite. The longer the negotiations were drawn out the greater the opportunity for propaganda. If the workers and peasants in the countries both of the Entente and the Central Powers were to realize fully what had happened in Russia and were to conceive a desire for emulation, a certain interval was necessary during which the intentions and policy of the new Soviet state might become known. To the vast annoyance of the German General Staff, the Bolsheviks were successful in imposing their policy of procrastination on the peace discussions. First Joffe and later Trotsky carried out delaying tactics with masterly skill, and for six weeks the conference was little more than a debating society. Trotsky discovered in Kühlmann an adversary who was his equal in dialectics, and the two indulged in what the irate Czernin later described as "spiritual wrestling matches." The German Secretary of State was trying to persuade his opponent to accept the fate of the occupied Baltic Provinces as already settled. Trotsky maintained with a wealth of verbiage that their so-called "self-expressed desire" for union with Germany was nothing but a veiled militarist annexation. As neither would abandon his viewpoint a complete deadlock ensued, and remained unbroken despite the protests of the representative of the Supreme Command, General Hoffmann, and the pleadings of the Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Czernin, who was aware that the sands of life for the Dual Monarchy were running out. The Supreme Command wanted troops and Austria-Hungary needed bread: as long as Kühlmann and

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Trotsky remained locked in rhetorical combat, neither was forthcoming.

February 10, 1918, saw the end. On the previous day the Central Powers had signed a separate treaty of peace with the Ukraine, which had proclaimed its independence from Russia under a form of social democratic government. The agreement provided for the exportation to Germany and Austria-Hungary of a million tons of foodstuffs.

Outflanked from the south, and disappointed that the toiling masses in Europe had failed to respond to the glowing prospect of a proletarian paradise portrayed for them in an endless flood of propagandist word-pictures, the Russians were forced to abandon their policy of delay. The January strikes in Germany and Austria had momentarily encouraged Bolshevik hopes, but they had proved a false dawn. The Bolsheviks needed to be able to concentrate their full energies at home to consolidate the Revolution and to defend it against the counter-revolutionary forces of the Right and Center, now organizing in the north, south and east. New tactics were necessary. On February 10, then, Trotsky made his historic gesture of "No War — No Peace." He refused to accept the German terms but declared the state of war at an end, and retired to Petrograd in the belief that the Central Powers were so anxious for peace that they would accept the position despite its anomalies.

This gesture, dramatic and original though it was, had merely the effect of handing the game to the Supreme Command. Against the vehement protests of Kühlmann and Czernin and the weaker opposition of Chancellor von Hertling, Hindenburg and Ludendorff forced the Kaiser to agree to a resumption of hostilities. A rapid advance conducted by Hoffmann brought the German troops to within raiding distance of Petrograd. The remnant of the Russian army, already undermined in discipline and morale by subversive propaganda, broke "like thin clouds before a Biscay gale." There was virtually no resistance. If the Revolution was to be saved, a "breathing space" was essential. After a bitter internal struggle the Bolsheviks sued for peace. The German reply was an ultimatum setting forth conditions, for the discussion of which three days were allowed, while the treaty once signed must be ratified within two weeks.

With no other course open to them, the Bolsheviks accepted the inevitable and on March 3, 1918, the Peace of Brest-Litovsk

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was signed. This treaty, together with the supplementary agreements of the following August, required Russia to renounce sovereignty in favor of Germany and Austria-Hungary over Russian Poland, Lithuania, Courland, Livonia, Estonia and the Islands of the Moon Sound. To Turkey she had to cede Ardahan, Kars and Batum. In addition she was forced to recognize the independence of Finland, the Ukraine and Georgia, and to agree to reparation payments to the amount of 6,000,000,000 marks in goods, bonds and gold, on which she actually paid instalments totalling 120,000,000 gold rubles. Russia lost 34 percent of her population, 32 percent of her agricultural land, 85 percent of her beet sugar land, 54 percent of her industrial undertakings and 89 percent of her coal mines. European Russia was dismembered; she was cut off from the Black Sea and very nearly from the Baltic also.

Such was the result of negotiations originally undertaken on the basis of "no annexations, no indemnities, and the principle of self-determination."

II

The Peace of Brest-Litovsk was a milestone in modern history. For Russia and for Germany it obviously had results of incalculable importance; but for the Allied and Associated Powers its significance also was very great. The course of world history was changed on March 3, 1918.

For the Bolsheviks, peace on the Eastern front, even such a peace as that exacted by Germany, spelled salvation. By a gigantic sacrifice Lenin had purchased a "breathing spell" during which he might discipline his own followers, eliminate the remainder of the revolutionary-bourgeois parties, and organize the defense of the Soviet Power against the attack of the Whites. With the shattering of their early hopes of a widespread revolt by the European proletariat, the Bolsheviks began concentrating their energies on the consolidation of the revolution in Russia. They could do this effectively only after hostilities had ceased to engage their attention. Lenin's stern adherence to the policy of national immolation caused wide dissent among his followers, but it gained that modicum of time necessary for the organization of the Red Army on the ruins of the Tsarist military machine. At the time his sacrifices to some appeared quixotic and unduly pusillanimous, but their wisdom was displayed when the victory

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of Kazan over the counter-revolutionaries bore witness to the growth of the new Soviet military formations. Without the "breathing spell" the Bolsheviks might — probably would — have perished at the hands of the advancing Germans, or of the White counter-revolutionary forces or by the intrigues of the Cadets and the Social-Revolutionaries of the Right and the Left. The world might then have never witnessed the vast experimentation of the victorious Soviet Power nor endured the attentions of the Third International. The potential "ifs" of the question do not cease there; they extend in an unending and roseate vista into limbo, for if there had been no Comintern, would not Fascism and National-Socialism have been deprived of their primary *raison d'être?* And, though the particular brand of extreme disgruntled nationalism which they represent might well have found some other outlet, it probably would not have manifested itself in the form of totalitarianism.

Thus Ludendorff was the involuntary savior of Bolshevism for Europe. By the same reasoning he was the godfather of that National Socialist movement which later he espoused; for if Adolf Hitler is the putative child of the Treaty of Versailles, he also is the offspring of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk.

For Germany both the issues and the results were more complicated than for Russia. Yet, in the case of Germany, the importance of Brest-Litovsk was very great. At the outset it appeared as if the Supreme Command was on the eve of the realization of its wildest dreams. The psychological effect on the jaded civilian population close to starvation was to refresh its war enthusiasm and to rekindle the *Siegeswille* (will to victory) which had burned low in the dark days of 1917. And indeed the material achievements of the Supreme Command were very alluring. Within their grasp were the occupied provinces of the Baltic, ready to be erected into semi-independent states subject to German domination. Before them stretched the fertile lands of the Ukraine, whence grain and meat would be forthcoming for hungry populations and horses for hard-pressed armies. The puppet government of the *Rada* was completely dependent upon German bayonets for its existence and could be — and ultimately was — overthrown by the pressing of a button to make way for an even more subservient successor. In addition, the treaties made by the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest gave them access to the oil wells of Azerbaijan and Rumania.

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The bulk of the fighting having been done by Germany, the lion's share of the spoils fell to her. Already she was the dominant party in the Quadruple Alliance; now her position was vastly strengthened, for she held nominal sway over the Ukraine and Rumania, while her influence extended through the Trans-Caucasus and to the further boundaries of the Don Basin. The way lay open for an intensification of the anti-British activities then being carried on in Persia and Afghanistan and for the institution of subversive propaganda in British India. But the ambitions of the Supreme Command vaulted still higher. They embraced not only a string of satellite states along the Russian border, but a Russia surrounded by German dependencies and which in time would itself become, for all practical purposes, a German colony.

But neither the possible nor the impossible ideas of the Supreme Command were destined to be fulfilled. The deliveries of food and grain from the Ukraine fell far short of the promised million tons, and of these the greater part went to Austria-Hungary. The same was true of the expected oil and grain to be procured from Rumania. Attempts to obtain foodstuffs by force and against the will of the population failed utterly. Brest-Litovsk proved a will-o'-the-wisp, luring the Supreme Command ever further and further in pursuit. And the Supreme Command was an all-too-willing follower. The paranoia of Ludendorff had now become Napoleonic. The First Quartermaster-General saw himself, bathed in the sunlight of victory, creating and distributing kingdoms as had the Emperor of the French after the Peace of Tilsit. He kept a garrison in the Baltic States, where grand-ducal governments were in process of creation; an army of occupation was maintained in Rumania; an expeditionary force was dispatched to Finland to crush a Bolshevik rising; another expedition penetrated to Baku; a third occupied the Crimean ports, and the German colonies in the Crimea were urged to appeal to the Kaiser for annexation. Ludendorff's conception of *Deutschtum* had become all-embracing. "German prestige demands that we should hold a strong protective hand, not only over German citizens, but over *all* Germans," he was writing at the moment.[1] In addition, the problems of the Polish Regency demanded constant care and supervision, and in the Ukraine the maintenance of a succession of unpopular régimes proved more of a liability than an asset.

[1] Erich Ludendorff, "The General Staff and Its Problems." New York: Dutton, 1920, v. 2, p. 562.

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A victor's peace must be enforced, and in enforcing the terms of Brest-Litovsk the Supreme Command lost sight of the primary object with which it had begun the negotiations. It had sought to free its hands in the East in order to concentrate its reserves of man power in the West. Yet a million men immobilized in the East was the price of German aggrandizement, and half that number might well have turned the scale in the early stages of the German offensive in France. According to both French and British military authorities, only a few cavalry divisions were necessary in March and April 1918 to widen the gap in the Allied line so that a general retreat would have been inevitable. These were not available to the Supreme Command on the Western Front; but at the moment three German cavalry divisions were held virtually idle in the Ukraine. Only in the late summer of 1918, when the German losses had attained fantastic figures, were troops transferred from the East. But they came a few at a time and too late. Ludendorff the Politician had defeated Ludendorff the General.

Nor was this all. The seed sown at Brest-Litovsk brought forth not only Dead Sea Apples but also poisoned fruits. Too late were the Germans to realize that they themselves were not immune to the virus which they had injected into the body politic of Russia. Through different channels the poison of Bolshevik propaganda flowed back into Germany. When Lenin had been sent across Europe in a "sealed coach," it had not been foreseen that a year later a Soviet Ambassador with full diplomatic privileges and immunities would be resident in Berlin, providing a rallying-point and source of monetary support for the revolutionary elements of extreme German Socialism.[2] Though it is very greatly to be doubted that Lenin received any financial assistance from the German Government or Supreme Command on his return to Russia, it is an established fact that members of the *Spartakusbund* and the Independent Socialist Party were provided with money from Joffe for revolutionary purposes, and when in October Joffe was finally expelled for his activities, it was too late.

Apart from this official contact of the Soviet Government with the revolutionary elements in Berlin, there were thousands of un-

[2] Under Article 2 of the Treaty the Bolsheviks had undertaken to refrain from propaganda and subversive activities in the countries of the Central Powers and in the occupied territories. Joffe, however, made a public declaration to the effect that "The Soviet Government as a body, and its accredited representatives in Berlin, have never concealed the fact that they are not going to observe this agreement and have no intention of so doing in the future."

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official emissaries who brought with them the seed of subversive propaganda. German prisoners of war had been subjected to the full force of Bolshevik wiles. They had seen the Russian army crumble away under its influence, and on their return to Germany they brought the new political plague. Added to these were the troops on the Eastern front themselves, who, by the Armistice Agreement of Brest-Litovsk, had been permitted to fraternize with the Russians in No-Man's-Land and had received from them copies of the *Fackel* and other revolutionary material specially prepared for German consumption. Thus each division transferred from East to West brought infection with it. "We reached the point," admitted Hoffmann, "where we did not dare to transfer certain of our Eastern divisions to the West."

Not only did the Peace of Brest-Litovsk save the Revolution in Russia, it also materially contributed to the outbreak of the Revolution in Germany; and such "stabbing-in-the-back" as was done is attributable to the Supreme Command itself for they had supplied the original daggers.

III

To the Allied and Associated Powers the Peace of Brest-Litovsk was of almost as great significance as to the two contracting parties. The disclosure of the naked and brutal policy of annexation as practised by a victorious militarism proved a salutary deterrent to the activities of well-meaning but misguided pacifists in the countries of the Entente. These, discouraged by the dark days of 1917, had been preaching a "peace of understanding." The conduct of the German Supreme Command at Brest-Litovsk showed clearly what might be expected in the way of "understanding" from the adherents of the *Machtpolitik*, and the effect on the peoples of Great Britain, France, Italy and their smaller allies, was a stiffening of the ranks, a locking of shields, a determination to fight on to the end and to destroy the militarist power in Germany. It was this renewed spirit of resistance which enabled the civilian population to remain calm in the face of the early disasters which followed the launching of the great German offensive on March 21, 1918, and to retain their confidence throughout that fearful spring and early summer until the counter-offensive on July 18 wrested the initiative from the German armies for the last time.

In addition to this psychological effect, the Peace of Brest-

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Litovsk had other unforeseen repercussions in the Allied camp. It was responsible for the arrival of Japanese troops for the third time in history upon the mainland of Asia. Terrified by the prospect of German penetration into Asiatic Russia, the British and French Governments, in direct opposition to the views of their advisers in Moscow and despite very great reluctance on the part of the United States, countenanced the dispatch to Siberia of an inter-Allied expeditionary force in which the Japanese contingent was much the largest numerically. Though the Allied and American troops were withdrawn soon after the conclusion of peace with Germany, the Japanese divisions were not evacuated until after the Washington Conference of 1922, and this period of occupation undoubtedly whetted the appetite of Nippon for further territorial acquisition in Asia.

In the United States the effect of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was even more apparent. During the first year of American participation in the war there had seemed to the Allies a certain lukewarmness in President Wilson's pursuit of his policies. "War upon German imperialism, peace with German liberalism" — that had been the essence of his speeches since April 1917. The emphasis had been laid on the profit which the liberal elements in Germany could acquire by divorcing themselves from the domination of the Supreme Command and accepting the terms which the President would persuade the Allies to offer. It was largely in this spirit that Mr. Wilson had enunciated his Fourteen Points. In formulating that program he had hoped on the one hand to encourage the Russians to refrain from making a separate peace, and, on the other, to divide the German people from their rulers.

The unsatisfactory reply of the German Government to the Fourteen Points, followed by the barefaced brutality of the Brest-Litovsk terms and their ratification by the Reichstag almost without protest, convinced the President that there was but one Germany to be conquered, the Germany of the Supreme Command, and that the soundest political strategy was to reiterate again and again the impossibility of peace with the kind of government that had imposed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

This change in policy, a change so vital that to it may be attributed in large measure the final and speedy victory of the Allied cause, was made public in President Wilson's speech at Baltimore on April 16, 1918, in which he frankly admitted his recent change of heart and new resoluteness of purpose: ". . . I

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am ready . . . ," he declared, "to discuss a fair and just and honest peace at any time that it is sincerely purposed — a peace in which the strong and the weak shall fare alike. But the answer, when I proposed such a peace, came from the German commanders in Russia, and I cannot mistake the meaning of the answer. I accept the challenge. . . . Germany has once more said that force, and force alone, shall decide whether Justice and Peace shall reign in the affairs of men. . . . There is, therefore, but one response possible from us: Force, Force to the utmost, Force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant Force which shall make Right the law of the world, and cast every selfish dominion down in the dust."[3]

This amounted to no less than a pledge of the last man and gun and dollar in America to the Allied cause. Unanimity between the United States and the nations of the Entente had at last been achieved and victory was assured, for once the American manpower was made available, there could be no doubt of the outcome. The artificer of this compact was Ludendorff and the background of its forging was Brest-Litovsk. The German Supreme Command by its policy of aggrandizement had contributed to the Allied cause that final and essential degree of coöperation and oneness of purpose necessary for victory.

Indeed they did more, for they had forever deprived themselves of the ability to use the Fourteen Points as a basis of negotiation. When the idea was suggested by Germany in the first Armistice Note of October 4, it was met with a blank refusal on the part of the Allies. ". . . the pronouncements of President Wilson were a statement of attitude made before the Brest-Litovsk Treaty," ran an official British memorandum of that time. " . . . They cannot, therefore, be understood as a full recitation of the conditions of peace."[4] In the interpretation of the Fourteen Points which occurred during the pre-Armistice negotiations, it was made clear that no vestige of Germany's conquests in the East could be retained by her. "In any case the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest must be cancelled as palpably fraudulent," stated the official commentary prepared by Colonel House's commission. "Provision must be made for the withdrawal of all German troops in Russia."[5] And it was in accordance

[3] "Intimate Papers of Colonel House." Boston: Houghton, 1928, v. 3, p. 427.
[4] "War Memoirs of David Lloyd George." Boston: Little, Brown, 1937, v. 6, p. 256.
[5] House Papers. v. 4, p. 196.

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with this view that the treaties were abrogated in the Armistice Agreement of November 11, and formally annulled by the Treaty of Versailles.[6]

IV

Such were the more immediate results of Brest-Litovsk and such was its tremendously important influence on contemporary events. But its political implications are even more significant today, for they have a prominent place in the present ideological trends both in Russia and in Germany.

Though it is almost impossible to extract any clear and undisputed facts from the mystery which surrounds the Moscow treason trials of 1936 and 1937, it does seem possible to detect in the minds and activities of the accused, particularly in the cases of Radek, Sokolnikov and Piatakov, a tendency to return to the tactics of what may be called "primitive Leninism" and to the psychology of the Brest-Litovsk period. The Old Bolsheviks, believing that the principles of Lenin and the ideals of the November Revolution had been betrayed by Stalin, and convinced that the U.S.S.R. could not withstand an attack by both Germany and Japan, appear to have reverted to the pre-revolutionary strategy of sabotage and subversion in order to overthrow the Stalinist régime and to the Leninist policy of defeatism and national immolation in order to placate for the moment the aggressive policies of the two imperialist and Fascist Powers. The crimes of which they were accused, and to which they pleaded guilty, were none other than those very principles of destruction and disintegration on which Lenin based his fight against the Liberal Government of Prince Lvov and the Socialist régime of Kerensky; while the policy of defeatism was exactly that followed by him in regard to Brest-Litovsk.

This latter doctrine had been established by Lenin again and again. "It is impossible to attain this end [the revolution] without wishing for the defeat of one's own Government and without working for such a defeat," he wrote in "Against the Current." Nor was he content merely to preach the doctrine without practice. Against the bitter opposition of the Left Communists, par-

[6] It was this attitude of the Allied and Associated Powers towards the dictated Peace of Brest-Litovsk which strongly influenced the German Social Democrats in finally accepting the dictated Peace of Versailles. They were persuaded that reaction against the harshness of the peace terms would inevitably occur in the Allied countries and that this would result in a revision of the Treaty.

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ticularly Bukharin and Radek within his own Party, he pursued this same policy in regard to Brest-Litovsk.

What, then, would be more natural than for the Old Bolsheviks to fall back on these original principles? Both Radek and Bukharin had publicly declared that in following the doctrine of defeatism Lenin had been right and they wrong. Is it not possible that the psychology of Brest-Litovsk reasserted itself and that in negotiating with Germany and Japan for the cession of the Ukraine and the Maritime Province they were reverting to the principle of the "breathing spell" in order to safeguard themselves from external aggression while setting about the destruction of the Stalin régime which they regarded as having betrayed the Revolution? Presumably it was hoped to regain all territory lost at some later date, either by the extension of the world revolution or by some revolutionary war. The wisdom of such a course is, of course, clearly questionable; but that it was contemplated appears to be the only reasonable clue to the solution of the Moscow mystery.

This consideration, however, is of only academic interest compared with the very practical application of the principles of Brest-Litovsk obtaining in Germany since the advent to power of the National Socialist régime. The Weimar Republic, supported by the majority opinion on the German General Staff represented by General von Seeckt, sought to reach a *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union, and largely succeeded in doing so by the Treaty of Rapallo, the German-Russian Non-Aggression Treaty, and the Military Agreement of April 3, 1922. There remained, however, a minority school of thought which followed in the Hoffmann tradition, regarding Bolshevism as the root of all evil and dreaming of the ultimate realization of those far-reaching plans for German expansion in Eastern Europe which so sadly eluded them after Brest-Litovsk.

Added to this are the very definite views which Adolf Hitler himself holds regarding the Treaty and the legend about it which the National Socialist Party has sedulously fostered, pointing the way to what is described as an attainable ideal. For the ideology which actuated the dictation of the treaty has not been replaced by any other set of ideas and is now accepted by a large part of the German people. The present German generation, the generation of Nazi Germany, regards the principles of Brest-Litovsk and the motives lying behind it as an actual political pro-

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gram.[7] None has been more eloquent in this view than the *Führer* himself, in his comparison of the Treaty with the Peace of Versailles. "I placed the two Treaties side by side, compared them point by point, showed the positively boundless humanity of the one in contrast to the inhuman cruelty of the other," he wrote in "Mein Kampf." "In those days I spoke on this subject before audiences of 2,000 at which I was often exposed to the gaze of 3,600 hostile eyes. And three hours later I had before me a surging mass filled with righteous indignation and boundless wrath."[8] With this as a pointer it is not surprising to find Hitler stating somewhat later in his work: "We [the National Socialists] stop the perpetual German migration towards the South and West of Europe and fix our gaze on the land in the East. . . . When we talk of new lands in Europe, we are bound to think first of Russia and her border states."[9] And again, "We must not forget that the international Jew, who continues to dominate over Russia, does not regard Germany as an ally, but as a state destined to undergo a similar fate. The menace which Russia suffered under is one which perpetually hangs over Germany; Germany is the next great objective of Bolshevism."[10]

Here, then, is combined in one political philosophy the doctrines of prewar Pan-Germanism, all-pervading hatred of the Jew and the ideological opposition to Bolshevism; and the only means by which this philosophy may be given practical application is through a reversion to the German psychology of Brest-Litovsk. It is not unimportant that political writers of 1917 talked as freely of German equality (*Gleichberechtigung*) as do the Nazi pundits today, but they were even more frank in their interpretation of it. "The issue between us and England constitutes not so much isolated problems, as the conflict between England's world domination hitherto and our endeavor to obtain *Gleichberechtigung* in the world. That is why the war is being waged." So wrote Professor Hettner in his book, "Der deutsche Friede und die deutsche Zukunft," and years later Hitler epitomized this statement in a single sentence: "Germany will be a World Power or nothing at all." He admits that England will not tolerate Germany as a World Power, but says that this is not for the

[7] "The Lessons of Brest-Litovsk," by "Pragmaticus." *Slavonic and East European Review*, January 1937, p. 328–343.
[8] Adolf Hitler: "Mein Kampf," v. 1, p. 523–525.
[9] *Ibid.*, v. 2, p. 742.
[10] *Ibid.*, v. 2, p. 750–751.

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moment an urgent question, for Germany is first concerned with uniting the German race and fighting for territory in Europe.[11]

Reverting to the Ludendorff thesis that "German prestige demands that we should hold a strong protecting hand, not only over German citizens, but over *all* Germans," Hitler aims first at the realization of a *Deutschtum* stretching from Jutland to the Brenner and from Strassburg to Riga, and later at securing for Germany enough territory to accommodate 200,000,000 Germans. This expansion, according to the views expressed in "Mein Kampf," undisputed Bible of the Third Reich, is to take place in the East and Southeast of Europe, in those territories to which German colonization during the Middle Ages was directed — "We begin again where we left off six centuries ago."

Considered in this light, the steps taken by Nazi Germany in Austria and its attitude toward Czechoslovakia, the Baltic States, Poland, Hungary and Rumania assume a new significance. The expansion of Germany conceived today in these terms parallels the political system which the Pan-Germans and the Supreme Command planned during the World War: that is to say, German political hegemony over all remotely Germanic states and a meditated acquisition of Russian territory. The skeleton structure of that system was set up under the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. The methods differ in each case. First Austria is absorbed into the Reich, and with it the control of the Danube passes to Germany. Then Czechoslovakia is subjected to threats, terrorism and propaganda calculated to stimulate "spontaneous" internal revolt which may lead to the liberation of the Sudeten Germans. Poland and the Baltic States, as in the days of Brest-Litovsk, are offered compromises and the expectation of security — though it may be recalled that in "Mein Kampf" the Poles are not only dismissed as "inferior," but Polish children are classed on the same low level as Jews, Negroes and Asiatics. Towards Hungary, Jugoslavia and Rumania a policy of blandishment and flattery is adopted in the hope of winning away the first from Italian and the two latter from French influence.

So the *Drang nach Süd-Osten* is well under way again.[12] Simultaneously the first steps are being taken to direct German politi-

[11] *Ibid.*, v. 2, p. 699.

[12] For good accounts of this movement see "Hitler's Drive to the East," by F. Elwyn Jones. New York: Dutton, 1937; and "Hitler Pushes South-east," by Dr. Gerhard Schacher. 1937.

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cal thought towards the advantages of expansion into Russia. German "colonization" in Russia had been proposed by Dr. Schacht at a conference in Rome in November 1932, even before the advent of Hitler to power. The subject was revived in Herr Hugenberg's famous memorandum to the World Economic Conference in June 1933. The *Führer* himself made plain reference to it during his speeches against Communism at the Nürnberg *Parteifest* of 1936: "If the Urals with their incalculable wealth of raw materials, the rich forests of Siberia, and the unending cornfields of the Ukraine lay within Germany, under National Socialist leadership the country would swim in plenty."[13] "We would produce, and every single German would have enough to live on," he told representatives of the *Arbeitsfront* on September 12. No purer example of Brest-Litovsk psychology could be required than this incitement to plunder. The speech might as well have been inspired by the Press Department of the Great General Staff in the early weeks of 1918.

The nearing of the completion of German rearmament brings to a close the first stage of the Nazi development towards *Gleichberechtigung*. The second, which overlaps the first, has already begun, and Germany is well on the way to the establishment of her desired hegemony. With each step forward the burden of the psychology of Brest-Litovsk weighs heavier upon the German mentality and makes more inevitable the ultimate effort to fulfil her destiny. Europe has been treated to one display of the effects of this psychosis, and should Germany succeed in reëstablishing the situation which existed for a brief moment after Brest-Litovsk, the results would be even more threatening than they were then. For an industrialized Russia exploited by the organizing genius of Germany conjures up a vision which no Western European can contemplate with equanimity. But in 1918 the will-o'-the-wisp of ambition lured Germany into a slough of dilemmas from which she could not extricate herself. The rest of Europe remembers what Herr Hitler may have forgotten, that disaster followed in the train of glory.

[13] As reported in the British press of September 14–15, this sentence was variously translated, as follows: "If he could command" (*The Times*), "If we had at our disposal" (*Daily Telegraph*), "If we had" (*Manchester Guardian*). In the official text of the speech, published in the German press on September 14, it was noted that the sentence had been modified and issued in the form printed above.

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GEOGRAPHY AND THE STUDY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

By John K. Wright

Geographical problems often arise in the study of foreign affairs. What are the most useful maps and atlases? How should place names be spelled? What are the best books or articles on the geography of particular regions? The following conspectus is intended to suggest ways in which the more usual questions of this nature may be answered.

I. Bibliographical Aids

BIBLIOGRAPHIE GÉOGRAPHIQUE INTERNATIONALE. Paris: Colin.

An annual published with the coöperation of geographical societies and institutions in the United States, Great Britain and other countries. It succeeds the bibliographies formerly published as supplements to the *Annales de Géographie*. The whole series covers the period since 1891.

GEOGRAPHISCHES JAHRBUCH. Gotha: Perthes.

Published annually since 1866.

RECENT GEOGRAPHICAL LITERATURE, MAPS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS. Supplement to *The Geographical Journal* Containing Additions to the Society's Collections. . . . London: Royal Geographical Society.

Published semi-annually since 1918. Prior to 1918 these lists were printed in *The Geographical Journal*. An alphabetical "Index to Supplements to *The Geographical Journal*" for the years 1918–1932 was published by the Society in 1936.

GUIDE TO REFERENCE BOOKS. By I. G. Mudge. 6th edit. Chicago: American Library Association, 1936, 504 p.

AIDS TO GEOGRAPHICAL RESEARCH: BIBLIOGRAPHIES AND PERIODICALS. By J. K. Wright. New York: American Geographical Society, 1923, 243 p.

A HANDBOOK FOR GEOGRAPHY TEACHERS. By D. M. Forsaith. London: Methuen, 1932, 336 p.

EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE GEOGRAPHISCHEN LITERATUR: EIN WEGWEISER FÜR ANFÄNGER. By Kurt Hassert. Dresden: Zahn und Jaensch, 1932, 89 p. (*Dresdner Geographische Studien*, Heft 3.)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS BIBLIOGRAPHY: A SELECTED AND ANNOTATED LIST OF BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1919–1932. By W. L. Langer and H. F. Armstrong. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1933, 551 p.

THE NEW WORLD: PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY. By Isaiah Bowman. 4th edit. Yonkers-on-Hudson, N. Y.: World Book Co., 1928, 803 p.

"RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY." By Richard Hartshorne. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XXIX, 1935, pp. 758–804, 943–966.

In the annual and semi-annual bibliographies listed above, as well as in the bibliographies contained in the periodicals mentioned in the following section, are to be found classified references not only to books, government documents, maps and atlases, but also to most periodical articles of substantial worth.

Mudge's indispensable "Guide" deals with the whole subject of reference books; in so far as geography is concerned, it gives much information concerning atlases, gazetteers, dictionaries of place names, guidebooks, etc. Wright's volume (now somewhat out of date) contains an annotated list of the principal geographical periodicals and bibliographies, as well as data on general bibliographies and bibliographies of related sciences that may be of assistance in

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geographical studies. Forsaith's "Handbook" includes comprehensive lists of textbooks and other geographical publications of use not only to teachers but to the general reader as well; most of the references are to works in English. Hassert's small volume is particularly helpful as an introduction to German geographical literature: bibliographies, periodicals, dictionaries, and statistical reference books, manuals and textbooks, and general works on the regional geography of the world. It does not, however, cover maps, atlases or works on the geography of particular regions.

The last three items listed above are of particular value for the student of the geographical aspects of political affairs. The book by Langer and Armstrong deals, as the title implies, with a wider field than that of geography, but provides many references to works of geographical interest. Bowman's volume, a survey and analysis of postwar politico-geographical problems, contains comprehensive bibliographies covering periodical literature, books and maps of both the postwar and prewar periods.

The libraries of the American Geographical Society of New York, the Royal Geographical Society of London and some of the larger European geographical societies maintain systematic card catalogues, containing entries for maps, government documents, etc., and including much material not catalogued even in the larger general libraries or entered in geographical bibliographies. The American Geographical Society now issues a monthly (except July and August) list of the materials entered in its catalogue.

II. Geographical Periodicals

United States:

The Geographical Review. New York: American Geographical Society. Since 1916. Quarterly. Successor to the monthly *Bulletin of the American Geographical Society* covering the period 1852–1915 (certain earlier issues were known as *Transactions*, *Proceedings*, and *Journal*). Approximate length per volume, 740 p. An index to the *Bulletin* and other earlier serial publications of the Society was published in 1918, and ten-year indexes to *The Geographical Review* appeared in 1926 and 1936.

This review publishes original articles of scholarly quality not only by professional geographers but by authorities in related fields, both American and foreign. Each number contains critical book reviews, notes on the progress of geographical research, exploration and publication, and distinctive photographs and maps.

The National Geographic Magazine. Washington: National Geographic Society. Since 1888 Monthly. Approximate length per volume, 1600 p. Index for 1899–1936 published in 1937.

This popular magazine is notable for its fine photographs and for occasional maps of continents and other large areas.

The Journal of Geography: A Magazine for Schools. Chicago: Published by A. J. Nystrom & Co. for the National Council of Geography Teachers. Since 1897. Monthly except June, July, and August. Approximate length per volume, 380 p. Index for 1897–1921 published in 1922.

As the title implies, this journal is devoted to geographical education, particularly of secondary-school grade. It contains a few book reviews and occasional lists of books and other materials of value to teachers.

Annals of the Association of American Geographers. Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Since 1911. Quarterly. Approximate length per volume, 240 p. An index, 1911–1934, has recently been published.

This contains important technical articles by American professional geographers. There are no book reviews or current bibliographies.

Economic Geography. Worcester: Clark University. Since 1925. Quarterly. Approximate length per volume, 430 p.

Many of the articles in this periodical are by geographers and deal with particular phases of the economic geography of regions; there are also articles on broader topics and a book-review section.

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Great Britain:

The Geographical Journal. London: Royal Geographical Society. Since 1893. Monthly; 2 volumes a year. Approximate length per volume, 582 p. Successor to earlier periodicals of the Royal Geographical Society covering the period 1830–1892 (*Journal, Proceedings*, etc.). Indexes have been published for these periodicals through 1925.

In general character *The Geographical Journal* is somewhat similar to *The Geographical Review*, containing important original articles, a record section, book reviews, maps, and photographs. Stress is laid upon the progress of exploration, particularly by British explorers.

The Scottish Geographical Magazine. Edinburgh: Royal Scottish Geographical Society. Since 1885. Bimonthly. Approximate length per volume, 440 p. Index, 1885–1934, published in 1935.

Many articles of scholarly quality; also book reviews, maps and photographs.

Geography: The Quarterly Journal of the Geographical Association. Manchester. Since 1901. Quarterly. Called *The Geographical Teacher* until 1927. Approximate length per volume, 340 p.

This publication is devoted primarily to geographical education, although many articles deal with other than strictly pedagogical matters. It contains maps, book reviews and book lists.

France:

La Géographie: Terre, Air, Mer. Paris: Société de Géographie. Since 1900. Monthly. Approximate length per volume, 770 p. Successor to earlier periodical publications of the Paris Geographical Society covering the period 1822–1899 (*Bulletin, Compte Rendu*, etc.). Indexes have been published for the periodicals of the Society through 1899.

This journal has been popularized of late years. An extensive bibliography of current geographical literature was published in connection with *La Géographie* from 1919 to 1931.

Annales de Géographie. Paris: Colin. Since 1891. Bimonthly. Approximate length per volume, 672 p. Four ten-year indexes covering the period 1891–1931 have been published.

The principal repertory of scholarly articles by French professional geographers. It contains critical book reviews.

Italy:

Bollettino della Reale Società Geografica Italiana. Rome. Since 1868. Monthly. Approximate length per volume, 875 p. Indexes covering 1868–1899, 1925–1934.

Although stress is laid upon Italian explorations, colonial enterprises, etc., many of the articles, notes and book reviews deal with other phases of geography, especially historical geography.

Rivista Geografica Italiana. Florence. Società di Studi Geografici e Coloniali. Since 1893. Bimonthly. Approximate length per volume, 125–250 p. Index covering volumes 1–10.

The leading Italian professional geographical periodical. Critical book reviews.

Germany:

Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin. Since 1902. 5 or 6 (nominally 10) numbers a year. Approximate length per volume, 400 p. Successor to earlier periodicals of the Berlin Geographical Society covering the period 1839–1901 (*Monatsberichte, Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Erdkunde, Verhandlungen*, etc.). Indexes have been published for these publications, 1840–1901.

Reports on explorations, scientific papers, book reviews, lists of accessions to the library.

Petermanns Mitteilungen, Gotha: Perthes. Since 1855. Monthly. Approximate length per volume, 475 p. Indexes covering the period through 1934.

In addition to articles and shorter notes, each number contains comprehensive bibliographical data, book reviews, lists of new maps, and news concerning the progress of geographical research, explorations and the geographical profession (more especially in Germany). Large colored maps are an important feature. The *Ergänzungshefte* (supplementary numbers) *zu Petermanns Mitteilungen* form a series of substantial monographs, of which 228 numbers have been published at irregular intervals since 1860.

Geographische Zeitschrift. Leipzig: Teubner. Since 1895. Nominally monthly. Approximate length per volume, 480 p.

Founded by one of Germany's leading geographers, Dr. Alfred Hettner, and edited by him through 1934, when the editorship was assumed by Dr. Heinrich Schmitthenner. Scholarly articles, critical book reviews, lists of new maps, books, and articles in periodicals.

Zeitschrift für Geopolitik. Heidelberg: Vowinckel. Since 1924. Monthly. Approximate length per volume, 870 p.

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Dr. Karl Haushofer is editor of this journal. His definition of "geopolitics" may be rendered: "the science of political forms of life in their regional relationships, both as affected by natural conditions and in terms of their historical development." In addition to articles, this journal contains a record of events of "geopolitical" interest in different parts of the world, book reviews, book lists, and also diagrammatic maps, but few other illustrations.

Zeitschrift für Erdkunde. Frankfurt-am-Main: Diesterweg. Since 1933. Formerly *Geographische Wochenschrift*. Now semi-monthly. Approximate length per volume, 1150 p.

This is the most recent among the outstanding scientific geographical periodicals, the only one published at shorter intervals than one month. It is well illustrated, and contains serious articles, book reviews and lists of current periodical articles.

The foregoing list is of course far from complete. There are at the present time about 100 geographical periodicals of "universal scope" — in other words, periodicals that aim to deal with all parts of the world and all phases of geography. In addition, there are many periodicals devoted primarily to the geography of particular regions or to special phases of geography. The periodicals chosen for listing here are arranged, by countries, according to the date of the establishment of each periodical or the first of its direct predecessors. The data given concerning frequency of issue, length, illustrations, etc., apply to recent volumes. All of the periodicals listed contain illustrations and nearly all of them have book reviews: these are mentioned, therefore, only if they are distinctive. Where reference is made to indexes, cumulative indexes covering more than one year are meant.

As in other fields, it is primarily to the current issues of periodicals that one must look for the latest original contributions to geography and for critical book reviews. The back numbers, moreover, are of more than academic or historical interest. Often they contain detailed information that never finds its way into reference books and atlases.

Geographical periodicals are of several different kinds, with no very sharp lines between them. The oldest ones, such as *The Geographical Review*, *The Geographical Journal*, the *Bollettino della Reale Società Geografica Italiana*, and the *Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin*, are published by the great geographical societies of the world. The varied membership of these societies, including explorers, statesmen, colonial administrators and other men of affairs, as well as professional geographers and students in related fields, has resulted in giving the periodicals which they sponsor a relatively large number of papers dealing with non-academic aspects of geography: narratives of exploring expeditions, semi-popular lectures and travelogues. In the case of the periodicals just listed, and also in *Petermanns Mitteilungen*, high scientific standards have been maintained, even though their editors have not catered exclusively to trained geographers.

As more and more attention has been devoted to geography in the universities during the last fifty years, another type of geographical periodical has come into being, the strictly professional journal. Among those in this class are the *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, the *Annales de Géographie*, the *Rivista Geografica Italiana*, the *Geographische Zeitschrift* and the *Zeitschrift für Erdkunde*. But, it must not be thought that because these are primarily for the professional, they are too technical to be of value to the layman. While this may be true of some parts dealing with physiography, climatology, soils, mathematical geography, etc., many of the papers on human and regional geography can be understood and read with profit by any educated person.

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III. Maps

Maps and charts are the eyes of armies and navies. In most countries, then, the principal organizations that carry on surveying and mapping form parts of the military establishments. The United States is one of the few nations whose basic topographical maps are not produced in this manner.

In a book entitled "The Recollections of a Geographer" (London: Seeley, 1935, 223 p.), E. A. Reeves, for many years Map Curator of the Royal Geographical Society in London, includes two interesting maps of the world. One shows the territories covered in 1878 by accurate maps, "fairly reliable maps," and rough maps, as also the remaining unexplored areas. The other shows the situation in 1933. In the latter year the territories of the two first types comprised almost the whole of Europe, much of the eastern United States and southeastern Canada, large tracts in India, Japan and South Africa, the more densely populated parts of Egypt, Palestine and Syria, and scattered patches elsewhere, more especially in Chile, the Argentine, the coastal margins of Brazil, central and western United States, the East Indies, French Indo-China, Madagascar and Australasia. Within these territories extensive areas have been mapped by government surveys to scales of about an inch to the mile or larger. The fundamental topographical maps are issued in quadrangles or "sheets," and the various surveys that publish them have prepared catalogues and index maps that may be consulted in the larger map collections.

Nevertheless, there are few collections of the official topographical maps of all nations which even approach completeness. To maintain such a collection would be almost impossible and would require an immense amount of space. The British Ordnance Survey has probably issued more than 65,000 separate maps, among them some 51,000 reproduced to the scale of 25 inches to the mile! Important collections in the United States are those of the Geographic Branch of the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department (housed in the Army War College, Washington), the Library of Congress and the American Geographical Society of New York. Some of the larger university libraries also have useful working collections.

A far-reaching plan for the production of a great sectional compiled map of the world on the scale of 1:1,000,000 (about 16 miles to the inch) was first suggested by Professor Albrecht Penck in 1891. Since then, largely as a result of international coöperation among the official surveys of many countries, an immense area has been mapped. The territories covered by the sheets of the International Millionth Map include most of those for which large-scale topographical maps are available, and also extensive tracts in northern and eastern Africa and southwestern Asia and nearly the whole of the Americas south of the United States. Only about one-fiftieth of the area of the United States itself, however, has been mapped in the Millionth series.[1] The 105 sheets of the Millionth Map for the Americas south of the United States, including the West Indies, are being compiled and published by the American Geographical Society. This great undertaking, which has been in progress during the last sixteen years, is now nearly completed.

[1] The published sheets include most of New York state, parts of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, southern New England, the vicinity of San Francisco, Texas, Montana, and North Dakota.

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IV. Atlases

General Atlases

Large, comprehensive, and relatively expensive general atlases:

STIELER: GRAND ATLAS DE GÉOGRAPHIE MODERNE. 10th edit., édition internationale. Gotha: Perthes, 1934 ff. (appearing in installments).

ATLANTE INTERNAZIONALE DEL TOURING CLUB ITALIANO. 5th edit. Milan, 1936.

ANDREES ALLGEMEINER HANDATLAS. 8th edit. Bielefeld and Leipzig: Velhagen und Klasing, 1922, revised to 1936.

HISTOIRE ET GÉOGRAPHIE: ATLAS GÉNÉRAL VIDAL DE LA BLACHE. New edit. Paris: Colin, 1925.

THE TIMES SURVEY ATLAS OF THE WORLD. London: The Times, 1922 (out of print).

RAND McNALLY COMMERCIAL ATLAS. Chicago: Rand McNally, published annually.

THE NEW WORLD LOOSE LEAF ATLAS. New York: Hammond, kept up-to-date.

GREAT SOVIET WORLD ATLAS. Vol. 1, Part 1, WORLD MAPS; Part 2, MAPS OF THE U.S.S.R. (In Russian). Moscow, Scientific Editorial Institute of the Great Soviet World Atlas, 1937.

Vols. 2 and 3, dealing with parts of the Soviet Union and with foreign countries respectively, will soon be forthcoming.

Smaller and less expensive general atlases:

THE CITIZENS ATLAS OF THE WORLD. By John Bartholomew. Edinburgh: Bartholomew, 1935.

MEYERS GEOGRAPHISCHER HANDATLAS. Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1933.

THE HANDY REFERENCE ATLAS OF THE WORLD. By John Bartholomew. Edinburgh: Bartholomew, 1935.

THE OXFORD ADVANCED ATLAS. 5th edit. London: Oxford University Press, 1936 (also published under the title "The Oxford Physical Atlas"). Contains a relatively large number of special maps.

SYDOW-WAGNERS METHODISCHER SCHUL-ATLAS. Gotha: Perthes, 1931.

GOODE'S SCHOOL ATLAS. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1934.

Special Atlases

Physical Geography:

BERGHAUS' PHYSIKALISCHER ATLAS. 3rd edit. Gotha: Perthes, 1892.

A fundamental work in its day and still useful; covers geology, oceanography, meteorology, terrestrial magnetism, the geography of plants and animals, and ethnography.

BARTHOLOMEW'S PHYSICAL ATLAS. Vol. III: Atlas of Meteorology. London: Constable, 1899, 1911; Vol. V: Atlas of Zoögeography, Edinburgh, Bartholomew, 1911.

Economic Geography:

THE CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE ATLAS. London: Philip, 1925. (Also published in an American edition under title "Putnam's Economic Atlas." New York: Putnam.)

Communications, commodities of commerce, commercial development of the principal countries.

WELTLAGERSTÄTTENKARTE. Map of the Mineral Deposits of the World. Berlin: Reimer-Vohsen, 1927.

A map in 8 sheets, 1:15,000,000, accompanied by a volume of statistics.

Historical Geography:

ALLGEMEINER HISTORISCHER HANDATLAS. By G. Droysen. Bielefeld and Leipzig: Velhagen und Klasing, 1886.

HISTORICAL ATLAS. By W. R. Shepherd. 7th edit. New York: Holt, 1929.

Languages:

DIE SPRACHENFAMILIEN UND SPRACHENKREISE DER ERDE. By W. Schmidt. Heidelberg: Winter, 1926 (volume of text with atlas).

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Geopolitik:
GEOPOLITISCHER GESCHICHTSATLAS. By F. Braun and A. Hillen Ziegfeld. Dresden: Ehlermann, 1930.
SCHMIDT-HAACK GEOPOLITISCHER TYPEN-ATLAS. Gotha: Perthes, 1929.

Section III dealt with "loose" maps. "Bottled maps," or atlases, may be variously classified.[2] The territory they cover may range from the whole world down to an individual county or town, and the topics they illustrate may be equally diverse. In the category labelled above as "General Atlases" the maps are mainly of the familiar locational type, showing coast lines, rivers, towns, villages, relief, railways, roads, political divisions and geographical names. The "Special Atlases" are devoted to such subjects as geology, climate, plant or animal geography, agriculture, mineral resources, history, demography, languages, commerce, political geography, etc. In recent years a tendency has been evident to include many more "special" maps in the general world atlases than formerly, and also to produce excellent national and regional atlases containing new and original examples of special maps.

It is impossible to say which of the great world atlases is the "best." There are a number of criteria for judging an atlas — accuracy, clarity, scope and balance being the essential points. The writer has roughly calculated the relative amounts of map space given to different kinds of maps in several well-known world atlases. In "Stieler" about 99 percent of the space is occupied by locational maps. "One does not turn to Stieler for miscellaneous maps illustrating physical geography, population, natural resources, historical events, etc.; but if one wishes to locate even a small village in almost any part of the world, the chances are good that it may be discovered on one of Stieler's accurate, up-to-date and marvelously detailed plates. . . . The map space devoted to different parts of the world is roughly proportionate to population density and 'geographical importance.'"[3] The magnificent "Atlante Internazionale del Touring Club Italiano" resembles Stieler in its balance and emphasis on locational maps; the plates, however, are larger and less crowded. "Andree" combines clear and elegant locational maps with a well-selected group of special maps of the world, of Europe and of central Europe. The "Atlas Général Vidal-Lablache" has 74 percent "special maps;" 34 percent are historical maps. In two of the more elaborate recent American atlases, Rand McNally's "Commercial Atlas" and Hammond's "Loose Leaf Atlas," 84 and 42 percent respectively of the map space is filled by maps of the United States. The larger British atlases give relatively less space to the British Empire than the American atlases give to the United States; they tend to devote more attention to North America than do the continental atlases. The "Times Survey Atlas" is distinguished for clarity and the use of graded tints of color to show elevations. The "Great Soviet World Atlas" is one of the most comprehensive atlases ever published

[2] For bibliographical data see Mudge, *op cit.*; P. L. Phillips, "A List of Geographical Atlases in the Library of Congress," 4 vols., Washington, 1909–1920; W. L. G. Joerg, "Post-War Atlases," *Geographical Review*, Vol. XIII, 1923, pp. 583–598. For critical reviews of certain recent distinctive atlases see *Geographical Review*, Vol. XXVII, 1937, pp. 161–163, and also items indexed under heading "Atlases" in the two ten-year indexes to the *Geographical Review* published in 1926 and 1936.

[3] *Geographical Review*, Vol. XXVII, 1937, p. 161.

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and contains an immense quantity of new material in the form of special maps. No translation is as yet available.

Of the six smaller general atlases listed, the first three are of particular use for general reference and the last three for teaching purposes.

V. Gazetteers and Geographical Dictionaries

NOUVEAU DICTIONNAIRE DE GÉOGRAPHIE UNIVERSELLE. By Louis Vivien de St. Martin. Paris: Hachette, 1879–1895, 7 v.

LEXIKON DER GEOGRAPHIE. By Ewald Banse. Brunswick and Hamburg: Westermann, 1923, 2 v.

LIPPINCOTT'S NEW GAZETTEER. Philadelphia, 1906 (reprinted in 1922), 2105 p.

LONGMANS' GAZETTEER OF THE WORLD. London: Longmans, 1902 (subsequently reprinted), 1174 p.

It is not always easy to track down a specific item of geographical information. Unfortunately, there is no great universal compendium or encyclopedia of modern geography to put the searcher on the right track. Banse's "Lexikon" aims to deal with the entire field of geography, both systematic and regional, and includes lives of geographers and explorers; it is, however, a work of no great magnitude, and much information of importance is necessarily omitted. The world gazetteers of Lippincott (which emphasizes the United States) and Longmans (which stresses more especially the British Empire and English-speaking countries) furnish meager details about many places and are both out of date. Vivien de St. Martin's great "Nouveau Dictionnaire," in which there are more than half as many words as in the last edition of the "Encyclopaedia Britannica," provides a wealth of information but is also too old always to be of practical service. For certain countries there are comprehensive geographical dictionaries and encyclopedias. Nor should the general encyclopedias be overlooked, among them the "Enciclopedia Italiana di Scienze, Lettere, ed Arti," in which a special feature is being made of geography and to which some of Italy's leading geographers are contributing.

VI. The Spelling of Geographical Names

How to spell geographical names is — within limits — a matter of taste. A recent textbook writer is so bound by a system that he writes "Athēnai," "Roma," "Warszawa," etc., in a book for American college students. Colonel Lawrence of Arabia went to the opposite extreme: "I spell my names anyhow, to show what rot the systems are." A genius may be allowed to set such a refreshing if dangerous precedent; but for those who are not geniuses certain sensible guides have been prepared in the form of lists of approved spellings. The two most authoritative sets of lists are those published by the United States Geographic Board (also containing some general recommendations in regard to the spelling of names not in the list), and those published from time to time by the Royal Geographical Society, of London, for the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names for British Official Use. Of course, they contain only a small fraction of the millions of names of geographical features scattered over the earth's surface.

Difficulties arise in countries where the Latin alphabet is not used. These may ordinarily be obviated by following one of the schemes of transliteration for which Lawrence expressed contempt. The Library of Congress and the

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American Library Association have published rules for transliteration. A useful volume in this connection is "Alphabets of Foreign Languages," by Lord Edward Gleichen and J. H. Reynolds (London: Royal Geographical Society, 1933, 76 p.).

VII. Regional Geographies

Single works dealing with the regions of the world as a whole:

NOUVELLE GÉOGRAPHIE UNIVERSELLE. By Elisée Reclus. Paris: Hachette, 1876–1894, 19 v. (English translation, edited by E. G. Ravenstein and A. H. Keane, New York: Appleton, 1882–1895).

This is probably the most ambitious attempt ever made by a single writer to encompass the entire subject of regional geography; a *tour de force* in its day, it is now superseded by works based on more rigorous critical methods.

GENERAL AND REGIONAL GEOGRAPHY FOR STUDENTS. By J. F. Unstead and E. G. R. Taylor, 10th edit. London: Philip, 1927, 517 p.

Notable for the clear and ingenious manner in which natural regions are correlated with political subdivisions; it is carefully thought through, systematic and well-balanced.

A NEW REGIONAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE WORLD. By M. I. Newbigin. London: Christophers; New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1929, 432 p.

"An effort . . . within definite limits of space to survey the world in such a fashion as to bring out the aims and methods of the modern geographer."

DAS ERDBILD DER GEGENWART. By Walter Gerbing. Leipzig: List und von Bressendorf, 1926–1927, 2 v.

LÄNDERKUNDE: EIN HANDBUCH ZUM STIELER. By Hermann Lautensach. Gotha: Perthes, 1926, 844 p.

Series of regional geographies:[1]

STANFORD'S COMPENDIUM OF GEOGRAPHY AND TRAVEL. London: Stanford, 1893–1904, with later editions or reprints. 2 volumes on each continent.

REGIONS OF THE WORLD. Edited by H. J. Mackinder. New York: Appleton, 1902–1905.

Volumes on Britain and the British Seas, Central Europe, India, the Nearer East, the Far East, North America.

METHUEN'S ADVANCED GEOGRAPHIES. London: Methuen.

Recent volumes on North America, South America, Africa, the Polar Regions, Asia, France, Southern Europe, the Baltic Region.

GÉOGRAPHIE UNIVERSELLE. Published under the direction of P. Vidal de la Blache and L. Gallois. Paris: Colin, 1927 ff.

To be completed in 15 "tomes," some of which consist of two parts bound separately. The following regions have been covered: British Isles; Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg; the Scandinavian region; the Arctic; the Antarctic; central Europe; southern Europe; Mediterranean Europe; Russia and the Baltic states; southeastern Asia; central Asia; "monsoon Asia;" North America (Canada and the United States); Mexico and Central America; South America; northern and eastern Africa. Other volumes on Africa and France have not yet appeared.

ENZYKLOPÄDIE DER ERDKUNDE. Edited by O. Kende. Leipzig and Vienna: Deuticke, 1923 ff.

Not an encyclopedia in the ordinary sense of the term but a collection of scientific studies. Volumes cover Europe as a whole, the British Islands, central Europe, northern Europe, the polar regions, the Baltic region, Belgium and Netherlands, North America, and Central America with the West Indies.

ALLEGEMEINE LÄNDERKUNDE. Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut.

This was originated by Wilhelm Sievers in 1891. Certain parts of the series have been published in 4 editions.

[1] Space does not permit the listing of the titles of individual books; the scope of the several series in so far as they contain regional studies is indicated.

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HANDBUCH DER GEOGRAPHISCHEN WISSENSCHAFT. Edited by Fritz Klute. Potsdam: Athenaion, 1930 ff.

Appearing in more than 150 sections. It will include 10 regional volumes, of which 4 will be devoted to Europe and 6 to other parts of the world. The text is by many contributors, with striking illustrations in color.

ALLGEMEINE LÄNDERKUNDE DER ERDTEILE. Edited by Wilhelm Meinardus. Hannover: Hahn, 1928 ff.

Volumes have appeared to date on North America, Africa, Australia, and Oceania; these deal with each area as a whole and not in terms of the regions into which it may be subdivided. The series is conceived as completing the late Hermann Wagner's classic "Lehrbuch der Geographie."

Few of the great political and economic problems confronting the nations of the world are without their geographical aspects. An understanding of the geographical setting would therefore be of much use to those who try to solve them. Everyone knows that the geography of regions is described in a multitude of textbooks for children and college students; but many otherwise well-educated and even learned persons seem oblivious of the fact that regional geographies exist for mature readers.

In most of the nations of continental Europe geography is a more important field of research than it is in Great Britain and the United States. Individual English-speaking geographers have of course produced work of first-rate quality; but the output of such work has been greater on the Continent. In their geographical writings the Germans display the thoroughness, the attention to detail, and the love of abstruse speculation characteristic of their scholarship in other fields. Some Americans find French geographical publications more congenial. To many of us French is an easier language, and the French geographers write lucidly with a keen feeling for balance and the gift of pointed, picturesque style.

Regional geography is not wholly the description of observed "facts." It is not a mere matter of encyclopedic compilation and classification. It involves the correlation of many facts having to do with nature and with man and with the interpretation of their relationships. No more than the historian can the geographer wholly rid his work of the subjective element, and however impartial he may strive to be in dealing with controversial subjects — especially concerning regions where national aspirations conflict — bias is likely to appear. A regional geography is something like a history, in that it reflects the intellectual, social, economic and political climates of the age and country in which the author lives.

In the French universities geography has been more closely allied to historical studies than to geology and the natural sciences. A generation and more ago French geographers occupied themselves largely with antiquarian and historical matters — the history of explorations, old maps, etc. But a change has come about, and today the French stand preëminent as masters of the art of regional exposition. While their books show the life, color and authenticity derived from field work, they have not made the mistake of thinking that field studies give the sole key to geographical truth or of attempting to imitate techniques more appropriate to the physical and biological sciences. Their work remains strongly influenced by the historical attitude, not only in the attention given to history itself as serving in part to explain the present, but in the critical method of evaluating and synthesizing source materials, whether

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these be derived from the examination of documents in libraries and archives or from observations made under the open sky.

The contemporary French school of regional geography owes an immense debt to a great teacher, the late Paul Vidal de la Blache (1845–1918). One of the chief products of Vidal's inspiration is the monumental coöperative work "Géographie Universelle," now nearing completion. Most of the studies in this series have been written by former pupils of Vidal who now occupy important chairs in the French universities. In each study a relatively large part of the earth's surface is discussed, usually an area comprising more than one nation. Throughout the series a consistent scheme of treatment has been followed, though by no means slavishly. The volumes deal with the whole range of geographical elements and forces in the regions considered — physiographic, climatic, biological, demographic, economic, social and political. The interrelationships of these elements are skillfully brought out, without overemphasis on theories of environmental determinism. What is more, the editors and publishers of the "Géographie Universelle" have remembered that maps are the geographer's most distinctive tools, and the volumes are abundantly illustrated with clear and carefully selected maps and photographs.

In the English language there is no great modern series of regional geographies like either the "Géographie Universelle" or the larger German series. "Methuen's Advanced Geographies" and "Harrap's New Geographical Series" are of value for a general orientation. "Stanford's Compendium of Geography and Travel," though now somewhat old-fashioned in method, conception, and arrangement, is still a serviceable work of reference. The "Regions of the World" series includes several books regarded by many as geographical classics, but these are on a less monumental scale then the continental geographies and are prewar. The "Research Series" and "Special Publications" of the American Geographical Society constitute a collection of geographical monographs and studies of high grade, dealing with a wide range of topics; but most of them are not regional geographies in the sense of the term that we have been considering.

There are many indications, however, that geography is acquiring greater vitality and sounder scientific foundations in the British Empire and the United States. Attention is being directed ever more intensively upon the methods and objectives of regional research — or chorography, as some like to call it. The time seems to be approaching when English-speaking geographers will no longer lag behind their Continental colleagues in the fine art of regional exposition.

Correlatively, the geographer is increasingly better able to participate in the study of political and economic problems. As examples, we may in closing note the recently published "Geographic Aspects of International Relations," Charles C. Colby, editor, University of Chicago Press, 1938; and an important volume entitled "Limits of Land Settlement: A Report on Present-day Possibilities," prepared under the direction of Isaiah Bowman and published in 1937 by the Council on Foreign Relations, New York.

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INDO-CHINA IN THE PATH OF JAPANESE EXPANSION

By Alexandre Varenne

THE irrepressible conflict between ideologies is not confined to Europe. The present Sino-Japanese war is as much a part of this world-wide struggle as is the Spanish civil war. Under the guise of a mystic "anti-Communism" the totalitarian Powers are pursuing a policy of ruthless expansion to which only the energetic and concerted action of all of the democratically-inclined nations can put a stop. But before these Powers can make any such determined stand against aggression, certain of them — particularly England and France — must give up the obsolete and dangerous idea that all the nations of Europe are bound together by close ties of family solidarity and that they must therefore stand unitedly against the rest of the world. None of the great nations is any longer exclusively European, Asiatic or American. Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Russia, the United States — and even Portugal — are Far Eastern Powers by virtue of their territorial possessions in that part of the world. Each of these must, therefore, ponder the eventualities of the Sino-Japanese conflict, determine its own position towards the issues at stake and decide what it can contribute to the common task of pacification and reconstruction.

II

France has a number of specific interests in the Pacific: Indo-China (including the leased territory of Kwangchowan); large investments throughout China; and numerous island possessions in the South Pacific. Of these the most valuable is Indo-China, with its vast resources and its key strategic position — commercial, political and military. Its population of twenty-four million, larger than that of any other French colony, comprises many diverse peoples. Some of them — the Annamites, the Cambodians and the Laotians — are of ancient civilization; others represent more primitive races, attracted into the peninsula in relatively recent times by its ready accessibility from both the Asiatic mainland and the Malaysian Archipelagoes.

French penetration into Indo-China began with the occupation of Cochinchina seventy-five years ago. During the ensuing two decades French control was progressively extended to Tonkin, to Annam, then to Laos and Cambodia. In 1898, following the example of the British at Weihaiwei and the Germans at Kiao-chow, France obtained a ninety-nine-year lease on Kwangchowan. But this territory (325 square miles in area) is not located at the mouth of one of China's great rivers — until recently her only highways — and therefore has small commercial or strategic importance. Kwangchowan is not to be compared with Hong Kong, or even Macao. If the French had pushed toward Yünnanfu or occupied a part of Hainan, they would have gained more. But at the time it was rather a question of "doing as the others do" than of pursuing a foresighted policy of expansion. Kwangchowan is today administratively attached to Indo-China.

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French Indo-China is a colony and is administered by a governor-general. It is divided into five parts: Cochinchina, a protectorate, whose governor resides at Saïgon; Tonkin, which is under the direct administration of France; and the three "protected" kingdoms of Annam, Cambodia and Laos, whose kings are assisted by French resident-generals. This ensemble of small states is today perfectly united under that régime of benevolent and well-organized firmness which characterizes French colonial policy.

We in France have for far too long entertained the idea that the personality of our colonies would in time inevitably fuse with our own; that their aspirations, their needs, and the conduct of their foreign affairs could not be separated from ours; that the risks which they had to face could not be other than those we ourselves confronted; in short, that their destiny depended exclusively upon our own. We have, for instance, tended to forget that Indo-China is an integral part of the Far East, separated from the metropolis by ten thousand miles, and that its fate will be determined in very large measure by those moral and material forces which it can generate within itself. Concretely, this means that if Indo-China were to be attacked during a general conflict, it could rely only upon such means of defense as were at its own immediate disposal. France's plain duty is, therefore, to put Indo-China in a state to resist any such attack.

France is anxious to preserve friendly relations with all her neighbors; yet at the same time she is firmly determined not to allow the slightest violation of her territories, or the slightest attack upon her acquired rights. In the Pacific she has, as a result of Indo-China's privileged position at the junction of the Oceanic and Asiatic worlds, special international obligations. For her to protect this privileged position and to discharge these obligations, she must see that Indo-China's economy is on a sound basis. Otherwise there is little hope that her Far Eastern empire can be made ready to defend itself.

Until recently, Indo-China was almost exclusively an agricultural country: its wealth was largely derived from the export of rice to Malaysia, China and Japan via Hong Kong and Canton. However, the simultaneous stabilization of the Indo-Chinese piastre and the collapse of the silver standard in China, added to the world-wide depression, caused such a rise of prices in Indo-China that foreign markets became closed to its products. It has been extremely difficult to counteract this tendency on account of the expansion of rice culture in such countries as Siam, the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies. The consumption of rice in France has meanwhile increased, but this has been merely a palliative. Indo-Chinese economy has had to discover new resources in the cultivation of secondary crops: maize, tea, coffee, and industrial products such as rubber. The first three are largely consumed on the spot. Rubber, on the other hand, must be exported in order to be processed. However, under present circumstances Indo-China's raw rubber cannot be sent to France, manufactured and then sold in the oriental market at a profit.

The question has therefore naturally arisen whether industries should not be set up in Indo-China in order that its resources can be turned into manufactured products on the spot, for both local and foreign consumption. Since there is serious over-population in certain regions of Indo-China, notably in the Tonkin delta, the idea of industrializing the country has the advantage of

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offering a promising remedy for more than one urgent problem. The country is rich in coal and certain other raw materials. Labor is plentiful. And southern China offers a nearby market for Indo-China's manufactures. This is particularly true as regards Yunnan and Kwangsi, which are in direct and easy contact with Tonkin, and which possess mineral deposits complementary to those of the French colony. It is precisely these provinces, far removed from the influence of the central government and long opposed to it, that have in



recent years effected an astonishingly successful program of recovery and reorganization. Here, under the direction of the two principal leaders of Kwangsi — Marshal Li, now in command of the Shantung armies, and General Pei, Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army — tens of thousands of men are at work building highways and railroads, modernizing cities and creating new cultural centers. Some of the latter, the one at Yünnanfu for example, have reached such a stage that several universities have been transferred there from northern Chinese cities now in Japanese hands. Furthermore, it is across

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these two southernmost Chinese provinces that access is had to Szechwan and Kweichow, where progress is going on at an equally rapid rate. For many years to come, the inhabitants of these four provinces, numbering more than one hundred million, will be dependent upon foreign sources for everything that modern industry produces. They are counting on France's more advanced technical civilization to help them modernize their own material culture. It would be folly for us to turn a deaf ear to their appeal.

Obviously this collaboration cannot be fruitful without serious effort on our part. Though some of the roads in Indo-China are excellent, those along the northern border were laid out primarily with strategic objectives in view. They are a reminder of the time, which now seems so far away, when Indo-China was felt to be threatened by a fierce and anarchic China, against which we then dogmatically opposed refined and civilized Japan, the avenger of human wrongs. We must therefore expand our highway system in order to tap the commerce of Yunnan, Kwangsi and the coastal zone of Kwangtung. Such a road network would supplement the existing railroads from Hanoï to Yünnanfu and to Nanning, which can be extended only with great difficulty and expense.

We must also improve our ports. The harbors of Hai Phong and Saïgon might have been adequate fifty years ago, but they do not respond to the needs of today. The entrance to the port of Hai Phong can be navigated by large ships only at high tide, and the channel, which is constantly silting up, must be dredged at an expense quite disproportionate to the results obtained. Saïgon, a river port and the center of rice export, is well equipped but lies inland forty miles from Cap St. Jacques. Its strategic value is thus diminished by the fact that it could be bottled up with relative ease.

The harbor of Cam Ranh, on the other hand, offers a marvelous site for a first-class naval base, as has been universally recognized ever since Admiral Rodjestvensky's fleet of 145 ships sought shelter there on its famous cruise from the Baltic to Far Eastern waters during the Russo-Japanese War. This splendid harbor, completely sheltered from typhoons, lies between two high promontories with a vanguard of islands completing its natural defense. Its ever-calm waters offer hydroplanes and submarines as excellent a refuge as they could wish. Situated at the easternmost point of the Indo-Chinese coast, it is on a direct line from Singapore to the Formosa Strait and less than a thousand miles from Manila. The Trans-Indo-China Railroad runs along the bay and thus provides communications with Saïgon to the south, Hué and Hanoï to the north, and — towards the interior — with Dalat, the climatic capital, and the higher regions of Annam. The French Government has decided to fortify Cam Ranh and make it its principal naval base in the Orient. Work on this project has already been started as part of the large defense program which the French Government is undertaking with a 400,000,000-franc loan recently raised, partly in Indo-China, for that purpose.

Farther north lies the Bay of Along, located in an industrial and coal-mining region near the center of various routes radiating from Tonkin into southern China. It thus has great commercial possibilities. A proposal to establish a free port at Along is being considered; if carried out, such a plan would greatly facilitate the movement of trade across Indo-China to southern China.

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III

These, of course, are merely the preliminary steps in a program of development which would be of wide and general benefit. But before any such program can be undertaken peace must be reëstablished in the Orient. It is futile to make plans for the development of Indo-China until its security has been assured. And this security is something which can be assured only by France.

What are the threats which Indo-China must be prepared to parry? In the past, the principal danger to its safety was the instability of China. Today, the great peril is Japanese expansion. Nor is this danger limited to Indo-China: the immoderate ambitions of those who rule Japan extend to the Philippines, Malaysia and India. Japan's recent attempt to gain a dominating influence over Siam is evidence of these aspirations.

Siam's geographical position, surrounded by French and British territory, could not fail to attract the attention of Japanese imperialists of the Tanaka school. The strategy of the Japanese General Staff doubtless envisages penetrating Laos and Tonkin from Siam as a means of invading the southern provinces of China. Roads and railways, some already built and others being actively pushed to completion, radiate from Bangkok towards Indo-China like the extended fingers of a hand. They were originally conceived with purely economic objects in mind. But it was inevitable that the expansionists should seek to exploit their strategic possibilities.

South of Siam lie the Straits Settlements, with the formidable British fortifications at Singapore. These now command the passage between India and the Pacific; but their strategic domination of the great sea route between Europe and the Far East could be nullified by a canal through Siamese territory, across the Isthmus of Kra. This project is without any commercial value and would be difficult of realization from an engineering point of view. Yet, under German and Japanese inspiration the Siamese Government was for a time apparently giving it favorable consideration. Only after the energetic intervention of the British Government was the project dropped, for how long no one knows.

The last ten years have been a difficult period for Siam. After weathering a series of revolutionary movements King Pradjadhipok finally abdicated in 1935 and a mere child was placed on the throne. Since then two personalities have dominated Siamese politics: Luang Pradist, an extremist of the first water, twice banished to exile; and Luang Bipul, soldier and nationalist, and of the two more open to outside influences. These men wind and unwind the threads of intrigue, delaying the country's return to the stability necessary for its normal development. Berlin and Tokyo have naturally sought to turn this situation to their advantage. But their efforts, at first quite successful, seem to have led to little in the end. Anti-British and anti-French sentiment among Siamese political leaders is on the wane. Perhaps they feel that they have been the dupes of Japanese policy; if so, they show more shrewdness than have the Japanese leaders similarly duped by Hitler.

Nevertheless, certain agreements seem to have been entered into between Siam and Japan, though we can only surmise their exact nature. Anti-French propaganda in Siam has never been so intense as at present — it even flows

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over into Laos, where venomous pamphlets, strongly smelling of Japanese origin, are being distributed. Agents who seek to persuade soldiers to desert from the French forces are allowed to operate from Siam. In recent treaties Siam has suppressed all references to the League of Nations: in doing this, she has been following the style set by the totalitarian governments.

France would like to renew cordial relations with Siam. But this desire must not retard the creation of a defensive system along the frontier between Siam and Indo-China. Indeed, mutual confidence will again characterize those relations only when the Siamese Government — and behind it, Japan — discover that Cambodia and Laos are prepared successfully to resist any attack made on them from the west.

We must not, however, exaggerate this danger from Siam. It is rather on its maritime frontiers that Indo-China may expect an attack. If our precautions in this direction had been more imposing, the demand recently made upon the Governor-General of Indo-China by the Japanese Consul at Hanoï — that the French authorities should prohibit the transport of war material to China over the Yunnan Railroad — might have been presented in a less peremptory form. Though this railroad is the property of a French company, that part of it lying in Chinese territory was threatened with destruction by Japanese aërial bombardment. We need not discuss here the impropriety of this demand, which in any case resulted only in our taking the necessary precautions. After all, is it not true that in the present war — a war without belligerents and therefore without neutrals — third Powers are completely free to trade with both sides? And is not Japan — whose ships load cargoes of coal, ore, salt, sand and cement in Indo-Chinese harbors — profiting greatly from this freedom?

Other occurrences have also aroused our suspicions. Japanese warships have cruised along the Indo-Chinese coasts and Japanese airplanes have flown over Hai Phong. An attempt was even made to occupy the Paracel Islands, which France regards as part of the Kingdom of Annam. These low, tiny islands — without inhabitants or resources, continually worn by the sea, and inaccessible during the northeast monsoon — have no real strategic or commercial value. For a number of years France has claimed them, though this claim has been contested by China. Early last July the French Government sent a small armed force to the islands as a warning that it would not tolerate any Japanese attempt at occupation.

A more important object of Japanese attention is the island of Hainan, whose coasts have recently been bombarded on several occasions. Hainan's position at the entrance of the Gulf of Tonkin is of great strategic value. The port at Hoihow, on the northern shore of the island opposite the Luichow Peninsula, is difficult of approach and cannot be used by ships of heavy tonnage. But at the island's southern tip is the harbor of Yulinkan, which could be made into a naval base of the first order. Furthermore, Hainan's mineral resources would be very useful in the development of war industries. The Chinese authorities, thoroughly aware of the island's value, have taken steps to improve its defenses. In view of Hainan's proximity to Indo-China, France, who considers the maintenance of free navigation in the Gulf of Tonkin of vital importance, would regard a Japanese occupation of the island as an attack

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against French interests. These circumstances explain the categorical warnings which the French Government, with the active support of Great Britain, gave Tokyo in the latter part of June when it was feared that a Japanese landing on Hainan was imminent.

IV

As these lines are written there is no way of knowing what will be the outcome of the present conflict in the Far East. Let us, however, suppose for the moment that the struggle can be kept from widening into a general world war. A localized war could have but one of two possible outcomes: either Japan wins or she loses. Let us consider for a moment the first hypothesis. A Japanese victory could be expected to lead to the following developments: North China would become a second Manchukuo; Shanghai (and probably other ports), the coastal zones and the lower reaches of the great rivers would remain under Japan's authority; Japanese commercial and industrial control would be imposed on all other areas in China where there were important mineral resources; China's armies would be disbanded and her war material would be either confiscated or destroyed.

Yet despite her dismemberment, China would issue from the conflict still vigorous and ripened by experience. No matter how Draconian the conditions imposed upon her by the victor, she would still greatly exceed Japan in population, in territory, and therefore in total potential power. This new China, whether its government were located at Hankow, Chungking, Changsha or elsewhere, would derive its chief strength from the regions south of the Yangtze. There, in such active and modern provinces as Szechwan, Kwangtung and Kwangsi, the Chinese people would carry on the patient work of reconstruction and restoration at which they have always excelled. It is there that the spirit of revenge would ripen. Cut off from Shanghai, and most likely from Canton, this new Southern China would naturally turn towards Indo-China. Such a reorientation in China's communications and interests would inevitably stimulate the economic development of Indo-China.

As for Japan herself, she would be completely ruined by her military triumph. Her people, exalted by victory and blinded with racial pride, would lose all sense of proportion. More than ever would they unquestionably follow those among their leaders who regard the overthrow of China as merely one stage on the road towards the conquest of all of Asia. Consequently, after the necessary recuperative pause the war would begin again. This time it might well be Indo-China that would have to bear the brunt of the first assault, for two reasons: first, this would permit an attack on China in the rear; and second, the conquest of Indo-China would open the way to India, located at the center of the third circle in the famous "Tanaka plan."

So much for the first hypothesis. Let us now suppose that instead of winning the war, Japan loses it. Such a *dénouement* would, it seems certain, bring results not far different from those produced by victory. Japan's crowded and wretched population, disappointed in its hopes, humiliated in its pride, would be driven to seek salvation in new adventures. The desire for vengeance against China would dominate every other emotion. Having once set out to conquer China, Japan would not rest until that end had been accomplished.

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Another Japanese attack would therefore be only a question of time. When it came, the security of Indo-China would almost inevitably be in jeopardy. Supposing — in accordance with our second hypothesis — that the Japanese army had failed in the present war to subdue China on her northern and eastern plains, in that event would not the naval authorities be only too delighted to say: "Ah, if you had only taken our advice!" This would certainly satisfy their ancient grudge against the General Staff which has always opposed the navy's demand that China be attacked from the south. In another Sino-Japanese war the navy's advice might very well be taken; and if it were, Indo-China would be in danger, whether or not Japan were in the end successful in completing the subjugation of China.

We cannot conclude this survey of French interests in the Orient without considering the possibility of a general war in which the democracies would presumably be lined up against the totalitarian states. A union of forces between Germany, Italy and Japan would make the situation of France's empire in the Far East more precarious than ever. Japan might under these circumstances regard Indo-China as easy prey, to be snapped up at once and used as barter when the peace treaties were drawn up after the war. After occupying Indo-China, she might, for instance, turn it over to Germany, who would certainly not disdain so royal a gift in exchange for confirming Japanese sovereignty over the former German islands in the Pacific.

From the considerations that have been advanced above it is clear that France is thoroughly justified in organizing a strong defensive system in Indo-China. Indeed, much more than mere French interests are at stake. Indo-China is a link in a chain of defenses that extends from Singapore to Vladivostok. Our British friends are making methodical and powerful efforts to arm the Straits Settlements and Hong Kong; vigorous steps are also being taken in the Philippines and in the Netherlands East Indies. France must coöperate effectively in this task, not only to guarantee the integrity of her own colonial domain, but to assist in the work of common defense against the disturbers of world peace.

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MEXICAN OIL IN WORLD POLITICS

By William O. Scroggs

THE seizure by Mexico of the properties of American oil companies in that country has done much more than subject the Good Neighbor policy to a strain. It has precipitated a train of unforeseen developments which may drastically alter the position hitherto occupied by the United States in Mexican international relations; and many believe that it may even open wide the doors of Mexico to influences generally regarded as alien to the professed ideals of all American republics. These possibilities appear at the moment to be causing nearly as much concern in some quarters as the expropriation of the oil properties.

The unexpected by-products of Mexican policy are due in part to the economic condition of the country and in part to inexperience and disregard of realities on the part of its leaders. The oil seizures of last March could hardly have been made at a more unpropitious time. The severe crop failure of the previous autumn had made it necessary to import unusually large quantities of foodstuffs. This alone would indicate the need of proceeding cautiously with economic innovations. The situation had been further complicated by a speeding up, during the past two years, of the agrarian reforms and by an ambitious public-works program. Both of these undertakings had been a heavy drain on the Treasury. Irrigation projects had been inaugurated in order to convert arid lands into fertile farms for the peons. Modern highways had been built to stimulate domestic business and attract the tourist trade. Millions of acres from expropriated haciendas had been divided among more than a million peon families, and millions of pesos in government funds had been spent in placing agricultural workers on the soil and equipping their farms. The confiscated farm lands, however, no longer paid taxes, and the Government was badly in need of money. Tariff duties were raised and a progressive sales tax was imposed on the business of certain types of foreign concerns, but these new imposts tended further to restrict business and brought no substantial relief to the Treasury.

Then came the seizure of the oil wells in March 1938. A major depression quickly followed. The third largest source of the Government's revenue had been the taxes obtained from the oil companies, and this was now lost. Furthermore, oil products had constituted about 11 percent of Mexico's exports, and the ensuing curtailment of oil shipments made it difficult to obtain the foreign exchange needed to pay for necessary imports of foodstuffs. As a result, the exchange value of the peso could no longer be pegged at 3.6 to the dollar, and it soon dropped to approximately 5 to the dollar — a depreciation of 28 percent. Domestic prices rose sharply, and as there was no appreciable readjustment of wages the workers felt the pinch of higher living costs. A large part of the public works program was suspended, and unemployment slowly but steadily increased.

Immediately after the expropriation, oil production fell from a monthly average of 600,000 metric tons to an average of about 178,000. The foreign oil properties had been taken over by the Government ostensibly to improve

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conditions among the oil workers, although they were admittedly the best-paid labor group in the country. The expropriation brought none of the promised improvement, but thus far it has not resulted in widespread unemployment in the oil fields. Since about 40 percent of the oil output is consumed at home, it has been possible to keep the industry in motion and most of the workers at their jobs if not at full wages. Workers in the textile industries have also felt the depression. Tourist traffic has diminished. Mexico's export surplus was declining even before the oil expropriations. For the calendar year 1937 it was 278,000,000 pesos, compared with 311,000,000 in 1936. The Government's budget is out of balance, and fiat money is being issued in increasing amounts.

What Mexico has passed through in recent months would have wrought havoc in a country with a more highly developed economic and financial structure. Her status, however, should not be gauged by American standards. Mexico can survive much buffeting because her economy is relatively simple and because through years of revolution and turmoil she has become inured to the shock of sudden changes. A general verdict at this time on the results of the Government's reform programs would be premature, but since they may bring sweeping economic and social changes in a country 60 percent of whose trade is with the United States, they have an obvious interest for peoples on both sides of the Rio Grande. And when, as in this instance, events in Mexico may introduce complications in the international situation which impinge on established policies of the United States, the interest of this country is increased many times over.

The success of Mexico's present program will depend in large measure on her ability to find foreign markets for the expropriated oil. Great Britain would normally be one of the largest purchasers. Before the oil properties were seized about two-thirds of their output was under the control of the British Royal Dutch-Shell interests. Since the seizures the British have not only refused to buy Mexican oil, which they insist has been "stolen," but they have exerted their influence to prevent purchases by other countries friendly to Great Britain. The United States has a surplus domestic production and thus offers a poor market — especially as the chief purchasers of crude oil are companies which have been ousted from Mexico!

The most promising customers, therefore, are Germany, Italy and Japan. These three authoritarian Powers buy large quantities of oil in the world markets, and their purchases evoke no comment. But when they obtain oil from Mexico the case is different, for they buy something claimed by the nationals of other countries, and they pay for it, in large part, with materials which may supplant the goods customarily supplied by other countries.

A short time after the expropriations of last March, William R. Davis, an American oil broker and promoter with numerous international connections, entered into an arrangement with the Mexican Government under which he was to find a market for $10,000,000 worth of oil and oil products by the end of the current year. Mexico is to be paid 40 percent of the value of this oil in cash and 60 percent in credits for materials in foreign markets. Under this agreement a limited amount of oil has begun to move to foreign countries. Shipments have been hampered by the lack of transportation facilities, since

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most of the tankers are under the control of the ousted companies. To date, about thirty cargoes of the expropriated oil have been exported. The bulk has gone to Germany and a small amount to Italy. More recently the Mexican Government has made direct sales of some oil to an independent refiner in Texas and to Japan and has negotiated a further agreement with Germany for the exchange of oil for newsprint.

For obvious reasons these transactions are of special interest to the United States Government. Mexico is selling oil which American companies claim is their property, and she is receiving payment in foreign goods a part of which would otherwise have been bought from the United States. American interests are thus adversely affected in two ways. Germany, it is claimed, is not only paying Mexico for American oil but she is paying with machinery and other equipment, thereby driving similar American materials out of a market in which they have long held a leading position. Italy is also finding it convenient to barter rayon yarns for expropriated oil. Japan is less able to profit from the barter arrangements because of the high cost of transporting oil from the east coast of Mexico through the Panama Canal and across the Pacific, as compared with transportation charges from fields nearer at hand.

Apart from the injuries which it may inflict on various American business interests, the Mexican oil situation is a source of concern to the United States because of the opportunity which it may afford the authoritarian Powers to extend the influence of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis into the Western Hemisphere. Although the present Government of Mexico has been avowedly anti-Fascist, it has suspended diplomatic relations with Great Britain, the leading democracy overseas, and it has been exchanging sharp notes with its democratic northern neighbor. Meanwhile, the Fascist Powers have been doing something to blunt the edge of Mexico's economic depression, and fears are sometimes expressed that they may seek to exploit the situation to their political as well as their economic advantage.

The tardiness of the Mexican Government in publishing trade figures makes it impossible as yet to gauge the commercial effects of the oil program. It may be noted, however, that in 1937 Mexico's imports from the United States had a value nearly four times as great as that of her combined imports from Germany, Italy and Japan. Even if these three Powers were to take all the oil Mexico can supply, about 90 percent of Mexico's foreign trade would not be affected by their purchases. Nevertheless, there is something anomalous in an arrangement which causes a Leftist Mexican régime to become a purveyor of a strategic war material to the leading Fascist Powers. It may be recalled that on New Year's Day of 1937 President Cárdenas of Mexico proudly informed his countrymen that during the preceding four months his Government had supplied the Spanish Loyalists with $1,500,000 worth of guns and ammunition. Today this same Government, under the strain of economic adversity, is selling Germany and Italy oil which, for all it knows, may be used in fighting the very Loyalists in whose hands it has placed guns and shells! And in September, while delegates to a Latin American Labor Congress in Mexico City were urging a boycott of merchandise from Fascist countries, a German freighter arrived at Vera Cruz with 2,300 tons of merchandise received in payment for Mexican oil.

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At present, however, the really strategic material in the relations between the United States and Mexico is not oil but silver, and here Washington holds all the trumps. The United States is the sole purchaser of Mexican silver; and its present purchases are at the average rate of 6,000,000 ounces a month. Sales of the metal to the United States not only maintain the activity of an important industry, but they furnish Mexico with dollar exchange to meet her most pressing needs. Under existing conditions, a suspension of American silver buying would produce an economic upset in Mexico and possibly a political one as well. This would hardly conform with the postulates of the Good Neighbor policy as laid down in Washington. Such action would also cut two ways, for about 70 percent of the capital invested in Mexican mining industries is American.

Prior to the oil expropriations, the United States Government had an arrangement with Mexico under which it purchased 5,000,000 ounces of silver a month at a price slightly above that in the world market. When the oil properties were seized, the Treasury Department announced that it would defer new purchases of Mexican silver until further notice, and for a fortnight there was a lull in the buying. This was as near as Washington came to applying direct pressure on the Cárdenas régime. The agreement to buy silver direct from Mexico in a fixed amount was not renewed, but since April 1938 the United States has been purchasing Mexican silver in large quantities in the world market. While the American taxpayer may grumble at this virtual subsidy to a foreign industry, the purchases enable Mexico to increase her imports of American goods, and they may afford some insurance against the extension of expropriations to American-owned mining properties. More significant, silver rather than oil is the basis of Mexican prosperity. The democratic nation which buys Mexico's silver will presumably hold a more important place in her international connections than the dictator countries which buy her oil.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

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General: Political, Military and Legal

THE COMING VICTORY OF DEMOCRACY. By THOMAS MANN. New York: Knopf, 1938, 70 p. $1.00.

A masterpiece of courageous thinking and clear exposition (originally delivered as a lecture) by the greatest of living novelists, now an exile from his native land. Democracy's danger is, he asserts, the illusion that it can coexist in peace with totalitarian states. He pleads for a strengthening of democracy through the extension of its principles from the political to the social and economic spheres.

REFUGEES: ANARCHY OR ORGANIZATION? By DOROTHY THOMPSON. New York: Random House, 1938, 125 p. $1.00.

A straightforward description of the refugee problem, in all its complexity and horror, with the lessons of past experience and concrete proposals for immediate action. This book carries into fuller detail the story told by Miss Thompson in her article in the April 1938 issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS — an article which stimulated the American Government's convocation of the Evian Conference.

DARE WE LOOK AHEAD? By BERTRAND RUSSELL AND OTHERS. New York: Macmillan, 1938, 190 p. $2.00.

Essays based on lectures delivered before the Fabian Society by Russell, Vernon Bartlett, G. D. H. Cole, Sir Stafford Cripps, Herbert Morrison, Harold Laski. On the whole they agree that we dare look ahead, but not with unlimited optimism.

HERITAGE OF YESTERDAY. By RICHARD VON KÜHLMANN. London: Hodge, 1938, 200 p. 7/6.

A dispassionate review of the foreign policies of the world's major Powers by a former Foreign Minister of Germany.

CO-OPERATION OR COERCION? By L. P. JACKS. New York: Dutton, 1938, 153 p. $2.00.

The mistake of the League was that it attempted to enforce an international system of coercion, avers Dr. Jacks. He therefore proposes the establishment of a sort of international insurance fund to be promoted by coöperation and not by force.

NEO-NEUTRALITET. By GEORG COHN. Copenhagen: Gad, 1937, 463 p. Kr. 11.

An expert study of recent developments in the concept of neutrality.

LOOKING BEHIND THE CENSORSHIPS. By EUGENE J. YOUNG. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1938, 368 p. $3.00.

Interpretations of recent international events based on "inside" information, by a New York cable editor, formerly with the *World* and now with the *Times*.

WELT IN GÄRUNG. EDITED BY KARL HAUSHOFER AND GUSTAV FOCHLER-HAUKE. Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 1937, 236 p. M. 5.80.

World problems interpreted by several German exponents of geopolitics.

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GENEVA AND THE DRIFT TO WAR. By Sir Norman Angell and others. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938, 234 p. $2.75.

Nine lectures delivered at the Geneva Institute of International Relations.

A MIRROR TO GENEVA. By George Slocombe. New York: Holt, 1938, 338 p. $3.00.

A journalist's snapshots of the League's outstanding events and personalities.

THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM. By Douglas Jerrold. New York: Sheed, 1938, 306 p. $2.50.

A vigorous but by no means always logical onslaught on international capitalism, Communism, secularism, peace at any price, etc. Mr. Jerrold apparently favors some sort of Christian Fascism.

MY PILGRIMAGE FOR PEACE. By George Lansbury. New York: Holt, 1938, 274 p. $2.50.

A plaintive cry for peace by the former head of the British Labour Party. Mr. Lansbury refuses to despair: "We pacifists must preserve our faith that love alone will save the world." He accepts the Van Zeeland Report and pleads for a conference representing all governments. "I am confident," he writes, "that Stalin, Mussolini, Hitler, Roosevelt, Blum and Chamberlain meeting together would soon find a way out."

THE CONQUEST OF VIOLENCE. By Bart. de Ligt. New York: Dutton, 1938, 306 p. $2.00.

A Dutch sociologist tells how to obstruct war but not remove its causes.

RÉGRESSION DES PRINCIPES DE LIBERTÉ DANS LES RÉFORMES CONSTITUTIONNELLES DE CERTAINS ÉTATS DÉMOCRATIQUES. Paris: Rivière, 1938, 216 p. Fr. 18.

The report of the conference of the Association Juridique Internationale at Paris in July 1937. Contributions by various delegates illustrate the anti-liberal tendencies in certain of the constitutional reforms and practices of non-totalitarian countries.

POLITICAL BEHAVIOR. By Herbert Tingsten. London: King, 1937, 231 p. 9/.

A comparative study of election statistics by a professor in Stockholm University.

ISLAM IN THE WORLD. By Zaki Ali. Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1938, 428 p. 7/6.

A Moslem intellectual seeks to dispel the widespread misconceptions concerning the history and institutions of Islam.

PŘÍČINY ÚPADKU DEMOKRACIE. By Václav Bouček. Brno: Nezávislá Politika, 1938, 109 p. Kč. 10.

Remarks on the causes of the downfall of democracy.

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN MODERN EDUCATION. By S. H. Bailey. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938, 309 p. $5.00.

An investigation, sponsored by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, into the present state of instruction and research in international relations in several European countries and the United States.

BREATHE FREELY! THE TRUTH ABOUT POISON GAS. By James Kendall. New York: Appleton-Century, 1938, 179 p. $1.50.

An authority on chemical warfare shows that gas is not so terrible as often alleged.

DIE CHEMISCHE WAFFE UND DAS VÖLKERRECHT. By Adolf-Boelling Overweg. Berlin: Mittler, 1937, 130 p. M. 4.50.

A not very successful attempt to reconcile law and military necessity.

LES AVIS CONSULTATIFS DE LA COUR PERMANENTE DE JUSTICE INTERNATIONALE. By E. Remlinger. Paris: Pedone, 1938, 123 p. Fr. 40.

A technical study on the Court's procedure in advisory opinions.

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L'ACTION DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS EN MATIÈRE DE PROTECTION DES MINORITÉS. By Arthur de Balogh. Paris: Éditions Internationales, 1937, 186 p. Fr. 50.

A legal and historical monograph by an Hungarian professor.

TRAITÉ SUR LES FONCTIONS INTERNATIONALES DES CONSULS. By J. Irizarry y Puente. Paris: Pedone, 1937, 484 p. Fr. 100.

Exhaustive scholarship.

LE CONTRÔLE DE L'APPLICATION DES CONVENTIONS INTERNATIONALES DU TRAVAIL. By Jean Zarras. Paris: Sirey, 1937, 386 p. Fr. 70.

A systematic examination of recent law and practice.

JAHRBUCH FÜR AUSWÄRTIGE POLITIK. Edited by Fritz Berber. Berlin: Gross, 1938, 516 p. M. 7.50.

The latest issue of this collection of monographs and statistical information.

WELTGESCHICHTE DER GEGENWART IN DOKUMENTEN. Volumes II and III. Compiled by Michael Freund and Werner Frauendienst. Essen: Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1937.

These most recent additions to this excellent collection of contemporary documents maintain the high standard set in the opening volume. The first part of each *Band* is devoted to documents illustrating the principal diplomatic events of that year; the second part deals with significant constitutional and economic developments in each of the principal nations. There are running commentaries tying the documents together.

THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK. Edited by M. Epstein. New York: Macmillan, 1938, 1497 p. $5.50.

The seventy-fifth edition of this indispensable reference book.

1938 BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR. Edited by Franklin Henry Hooper and Walter Yust. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1938, 749 p. $10.00.

A new venture by the Britannica into the yearbook field which merits praise. The information is sensibly arranged, copiously illustrated and succinct.

General: Economic and Social

THE THEORY OF FORWARD EXCHANGE. By Paul Einzig. New York: Macmillan, 1937, 520 p. $7.50.

In this attempt to reconcile theory with financial practice, Dr. Einzig has made a contribution to economic thought.

L'ÉQUILIBRE DANS LES RELATIONS ÉCONOMIQUES INTERNATIONALES. By Albert Aftalion. Paris: Domat-Montchrétien, 1937, 466 p. Fr. 60.

Economic theory revised to take account of recent trends.

FOREIGN BALANCES. By Paul Einzig. New York: Macmillan, 1938, 186 p. $2.75.

Another timely book by the prolific Dr. Einzig, this one on "hot money."

LA RENAISSANCE DU MERCANTILISME À L'ÉPOQUE CONTEMPORAINE. By Jacques Marchand. Paris: Librairie Technique et Economique, 1937, 221 p. Fr. 25.

A comparison of classic mercantilism with its contemporary imitations.

MERCHANTS OF PEACE. By George L. Ridgeway. New York: Columbia University Press, 1938, 419 p. $3.75.

The undramatic but important achievements in business diplomacy attained by the International Chamber of Commerce since 1919.

ATTITUDES TOWARD HISTORY. By Kenneth Burke. New York: The New Republic, 1937, 2 v. $2.00.

A Marxist's stimulating ideas on literary criticism, philosophy and social science.

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GEOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. Edited by Charles C. Colby. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938, 296 p. $3.00.

The Harris Foundation Lectures for 1937, by seven prominent geographers.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE MODERN STATE. By R. Keith Kelsall and T. Plaut. London: Methuen, 1937, 131 p. 5/.

A comparison of practices in democratic and authoritarian countries.

ESSOR ET DÉCADENCE DU CAPITALISME. By Bernard Lavergne. Paris: Payot, 1938, 254 p. Fr. 25.

The history, theory and operation of capitalism objectively treated.

ANARCHO-SYNDICALISM. By Rudolf Rocker. London: Secker and Warburg, 1938, 158 p. 3/6.

The philosopher of the Anarcho-Syndicalist movement explains its origins, principles and objectives. Rocker opposes the State, whether capitalist, Socialist or Fascist.

The World War

BEFORE THE WAR: STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY. VOLUME II. THE COMING OF THE STORM. By G. P. Gooch. New York: Longmans, 1938, 447 p. $4.00.

This concluding volume of a masterly work by one of England's leading historians discusses the diplomacy of Grey, Poincaré, Bethmann-Hollweg, Sazonov and Berchtold. It is noteworthy that among the ten men portrayed by Professor Gooch in his two volumes there are no Italians, due to the fact that Italy alone among the Great Powers has not published her prewar documents.

BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR. Volume X, Part 2. Edited by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley. London: H.M.S.O., 1938, 921 p. (New York: British Library of Information, $5.25).

Except for a volume of tables and general index yet to come, this concludes the series of British diplomatic documents covering the period from 1899 to the outbreak of the World War. This volume covers the last three years of peace. For a full review of the whole series, see Professor Renouvin's article elsewhere in this issue.

CHRONOLOGIE DE LA GUERRE MONDIALE. By F. Debyser. Paris: Payot, 1938, 263 p. Fr. 40.

Covers all fronts simultaneously. Good index.

CONTRIBUTO A UNA BIBLIOGRAFIA DELLA GUERRA MONDIALE. Rome: Segreteria Generale della Camera dei Deputati, 1937, 627 p.

A list of all the works on the causes, origins, responsibility and significance of the World War in the library of the Italian Chamber of Deputies.

HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR: TRANSPORTATION ON THE WESTERN FRONT, 1914–1918. Compiled by Colonel A. M. Henniker. London: H.M.S.O., 1937, 531 p. and case of 14 maps (New York: British Library of Information, $5.50).

A very detailed account based on official documents.

HISTOIRE DIPLOMATIQUE DE LA FRANCE PENDANT LA GRANDE GUERRE. By Albert Pingaud. Paris: Éditions "Alsatia," 1938, 2 v. Fr. 60.

While containing little that is new, this is a competent narrative by a former director of the archives at the French Foreign Office.

THE MEN I KILLED. By Brigadier General Frank Percy Crozier. Garden City: Doubleday, 1938, 269 p. $2.00.

A British general takes all the glamour out of war.

UNDERGROUND NEWS. By Oscar E. Millard. New York: McBride, 1938, 287 p. $2.75.

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The fascinating story of *La Libre Belgique*, the newspaper published secretly in Belgium during the German occupation.

LA GUERRE EN ARGONNE. By General J. Rouquerol. Paris: Payot, 1937, 198 p. Fr. 20.

Little-known operations that took place during the first year of the war.

GESCHICHTE DES DEUTSCHEN HEERES IM WELTKRIEGE 1914–1918. By Hermann Cron. Berlin: Siegismund, 1937, 407 p. M. 12.

The organization of the German army at home and at the front, painstakingly catalogued by a retired officer.

WIRTSCHAFTSORGANISATION IM KRIEGE. By Eberhard Scherbening. Jena: Fischer, 1938, 258 p. M. 9.

During the World War unheard of strains were put on the economic systems of every belligerent country, and in the next war the strain will be even greater unless adequate preparations are made in time of peace. The economic preparations for both the last and the next world wars are here described in scientific detail.

BREST-LITOWSK: BEGINN UND FOLGEN DES BOLSHEWISTISCHEN WELTBETRUGS. By Theodor Kröger. Berlin: Ullstein, 1937, 322 p. M. 4.

A typical example of how history is being distorted for Nazi ends.

DER ENTSCHLUSS DER OBERSTEN HEERESLEITUNG ZUR OFFENSIVE 1918. By Friedrich Holtmeier. Münster: Coppenrath, 1937, 105 p. M. 3.

A defense of the German Supreme Command.

LA TRIPOLITANIA DALLA FINE DELLA GUERRA MONDIALE ALL'AVVENTO DEL FASCISMO. Volume I. By Ottone Gabelli. Intra: Airoldi, 1937, 401 p. L. 25.

Light on an obscure chapter in Italy's colonial history.

ALS TÜRKISCHER DIVISIONSKOMMANDEUR IN KLEINASIEN UND PALÄSTINA. By Hans Guhr. Berlin: Siwinna, 1937, 312 p. M. 7.50.

War reminiscences of a German general in Armenia and Palestine.

NILI. Volume I. By J. Y. Poleskin. Tel Aviv: Massada, 1937, 207 p.

A history of the Jewish Intelligence Service employed by the British in Palestine.

WASSMUSS. DER DEUTSCHE LAWRENCE. By Dagobert von Mikusch. Leipzig: List, 1937, 332 p. M. 8.20.

The saga of the German consul who organized southern Persia against the British.

The United States

OUR COUNTRY, OUR PEOPLE, AND THEIRS. By M. E. Tracy, New York: Macmillan, 1938, 120 p. $1.75.

The editor of *Current History* has done a job that badly needed doing, and he has done it remarkably well. By employing a large format, parallel columns and various devices for making his facts and figures more graphic, he has succeeded in giving an arresting comparison of the ways in which the peoples of the United States, Russia, Germany and Italy live. It is of course possible to quarrel with some of Mr. Tracy's facts, interpretations and emphases; but his basic conclusions must command general assent.

SAVE AMERICA FIRST. By Jerome Frank. New York: Harper, 1938, 432 p. $3.75.

Mr. Frank, now a member of the Securities and Exchange Commission, thinks we can best create and preserve an enlightened form of capitalist economy in the United States by cutting adrift from Europe, practically and ideologically. We must cease importing our socio-economic and political ideas — such as Marxism and Fascism — from the Old World; we must also reduce our foreign trade to an absolute minimum in order that our own integrated economy be no longer dependent on the rest of the world. Mr. Frank's

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epigrammatic prose is often plausible; yet his major theses seem grounded on dubious historical interpretations and economics. The second half of his volume constitutes a comprehensive blueprint of the New Deal's economic philosophy. There is no index.

ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADE RELATIONS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938, 48 p. 50 cents.

The British case concretely stated by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. A companion volume to Professor Bidwell's recent "Our Trade With Britain."

CONFERENCE ON CANADIAN-AMERICAN AFFAIRS. Edited by Reginald G. Trotter, Albert B. Corey and Walter W. McLaren. Montreal: Ginn, for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1937, 274 p. $2.50.

The proceedings of the conference held at Queens University in June 1937.

ROOSEVELT: A STUDY IN FORTUNE AND POWER. By Emil Ludwig. New York: Viking, 1938, 350 p. $3.00.

Fulsome praise in the customary Ludwig vein, with more errors in fact than usual.

THE HOOVER POLICIES. By Ray Lyman Wilbur and Arthur Mastick Hyde. New York: Scribner, 1937, 667 p. $3.00.

A compendium of quotations dealing with President Hoover's policies, arranged and interpreted by two members of his cabinet.

THE PEOPLE'S FRONT. By Earl Browder. New York: International Publishers, 1938, 354 p. $2.75.

Speeches, broadcasts, reports and articles by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the United States. In domestic policy Mr. Browder advocates the united front to defend democracy, while in the foreign field he upholds collective security.

KLASSY I PARTII V SSHA. OCHERKI PO EKONOMISCHESKOI I POLITICHESKOI ISTORII SSHA. By V. Lan. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1938, 635 p. $1.25.

A Soviet study on American parties and classes.

YOU CAN'T DO THAT. By George Seldes. New York: Modern Age, 1938, 307 p. 50 cents.

Innumerable cases indicating how civil liberties in the United States are being abused under our very noses. Required reading for those who think it can't happen here. There is an extensive and critical bibliography.

OUR SHIPS. By the Editors of *Fortune*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938, 426 p. $2.75.

The decline of the United States merchant marine and the challenge it presents.

THE 168 DAYS. By Joseph Alsop and Turner Catledge. Garden City: Doubleday, 1938, 312 p. $2.75.

The story of President Roosevelt's fight to enlarge the Supreme Court.

THE STORY OF ALASKA. By Clarence L. Andrews. Caldwell (Idaho): Caxton Printers, 1938, 303 p. $4.00.

Scholarly, readable, illustrated.

Western Europe

EUROPEAN HISTORY SINCE 1870. By F. Lee Benns. New York: Crofts, 1938, 925 p. $6.00.

A competent, up-to-the-minute summary.

EUROPA UND DIE WELT. By Erich Brandenburg. Hamburg: Hoffman and Campe, 1937, 254 p. M. 5.

One of Germany's foremost modern historians pleads for the preservation of Europe's common spiritual, economic, social and political foundations.

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LA PAIX DE LA FRANCE. By Edouard Driault. Paris: Sirey, 1937, 565 p. Fr. 25.

Chapters on France's postwar international position, by a leading diplomatic historian.

LA MISSION DE LA FRANCE DANS LE MONDE. By Maurice Thorez. Paris: Éditions Sociales Internationales, 1938, 152 p. Fr. 12.

This book, by the Secretary General of the French Communist Party, clearly indicates how thoroughly that party has now become domesticated, for this is a more patriotic document than many of the manifestoes emanating from the French Right.

KOMPARTIYA FRANTSII V BORBE ZA NARODNYI FRONT. Moscow: Partizdat, 1938, 75 p. 8 cents.

A Soviet account of the rôle of the French Communist Party in the Popular Front.

PHILIPPE BERTHELOT. By Auguste Bréal. Paris: Gallimard, 1937, 245 p. Fr. 15.

As Secretary General of the French Foreign Office and hence chief of its permanent staff, Berthelot was for many years the man who really directed French foreign policy. From Bréal's biography we discover that he was diligent, intensely patriotic, completely sure of himself and his policy. A readable and on the whole reliable book.

LES SCIENCES SOCIALES EN FRANCE: ENSEIGNEMENT ET RECHERCHE. By R. Aron and Others. Paris: Hartmann, for the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, 1937, 379 p. Fr. 45.

The last chapters deal with international relations and allied subjects.

LA CAGOULE CONTRE LA FRANCE. By Fernand Fontenay. Paris: Éditions Sociales Internationales, 1938, 188 p. Fr. 12.

A Leftist exposé of French Fascist conspiracies.

LA BANQUE DE FRANCE. By A. Dauphin-Meunier. Paris: Gallimard, 1937, 254 p. Fr. 18.

A history of the bank by a French banker favorable to the Blum reforms.

LA MARINE DE LA FRANCE. By Gratien Candace. Paris: Payot, 1938, 190 p. Fr. 25.

An ex-minister inquires into the state of France's navy and merchant marine, and indicates what she must do to modernize them if she is to retain her colonial power.

LA FRANCE DANS LE MONDE. By Pierre and Marcel Clerget. Paris: Payot, 1938, 276 p. Fr. 32.

A detailed inventory of the political and economic resources of France and her empire.

HISTOIRE DE LA COLONISATION FRANÇAISE. By Georges Hardy. Paris: Larose, 1938, 348 p. Fr. 50.

French colonial history synthesized by the former director of the École Coloniale.

ESSAI SUR UNE POLITIQUE ÉCONOMIQUE DE L'EMPIRE FRANÇAIS. By Maurice Guernier. Paris: Pedone, 1937, 151 p. Fr. 30.

Suggestions for making the French colonies more valuable to the mother country.

HISTOIRE DES FINANCES COLONIALES DE LA FRANCE. By Albert Duchêne. Paris: Payot, 1938, 319 p. Fr. 40.

A sound treatise in a virgin field. The author was once Director of Political Affairs in the Colonial Ministry and later president of the Banque de l'Afrique Occidentale.

MÉMOIRES POUR SERVIR À L'HISTOIRE CONTEMPORAINE DE LA BELGIQUE. By Comte Woeste. Brussels: Édition Universelle, 1927–1937, 3 v. Fr. 50.

This autobiography of a Catholic leader covers sixty years of Belgian political life.

DE STRATEGISCHE POSITIE VAN NEDERLAND IN EUROPA. By J. Th. Alting van Geusau. Amsterdam: Scheltens en Giltay, 1938, 78 p. Fls. 0.90.

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A superior officer in the Dutch army discusses the international position of the Netherlands and describes the composition and function of its armed forces.

LABOUR RELATIONS IN REPUBLICAN GERMANY. By Nathan Reich. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938, 293 p. $3.00.

A conscientious analysis of an experiment in industrial democracy that failed.

LE FRONT DU TRAVAIL ALLEMAND. By Jacques Doublet. Paris: Hartmann, for the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, 1937, 151 p. Fr. 10.

A factual examination of Nazi labor organizations.

REDEN. By Rudolf Hess. Munich: Eher, 1938, 269 p. M. 4.50.

Speeches by Hitler's deputy.

BLOOD AND STEEL: THE RISE OF THE HOUSE OF KRUPP. By Bernhard Menne. New York: Furman, 1938, 424 p. $3.00.

An authentic history of the rise of the great German munition-making family, by one of its former employees, now in exile. Several passages deleted from the English edition will be found in this American version.

DER AUSSENHANDEL IN DER NATIONALWIRTSCHAFT. By Walter Grävell. Stuttgart: Enke, 1937, 112 p. M. 5.80.

An excellent analysis of the changes wrought in Germany's foreign trade by Nazi planned economy, by an official in the "Statistisches Reichsamt." There are abundant statistics, some of them hitherto unpublished.

GERMANY'S CLAIM TO COLONIES. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938, 75 p. 75 cents.

An objective statement of the claims and how they have been received abroad, prepared for the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

DEUTSCHE KOLONIALPOLITIK IN DOKUMENTEN. Edited by Ernst Gerhard Jacob. Leipzig: Dieterich, 1938, 608 p. M. 5.50.

A handy manual on many phases of Germany's prewar colonial policy.

LA FRANCE ET LES REVENDICATIONS COLONIALES ALLEMANDES. By René Jadfard. Paris: Querelle, 1938, 123 p. Fr. 10.

The demands stated, analyzed, and in part accepted and in part refuted.

DIE RECHTSLAGE DEUTSCHER STAATGEHÖRIGER IM AUSLAND. By H. Emmerich and John Rothschild. Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 1937, 356 p.

A systematic and well-informed study on the legal position of Germans abroad.

VOLK VOR DEN GRENZEN. By Rupert von Schumacher. Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1937, 277 p. M. 5.80.

The historical development of German communities abroad and what they have contributed to their adopted countries and to the German race as a whole.

DEUTSCHE SIEDLUNG. By Joachim H. Schultze. Stuttgart: Enke, 1937, 158 p. M. 6.20.

The possibilities for colonizing Germans elsewhere in Germany and abroad.

MY AUSTRIA. By Kurt Schuschnigg. New York: Knopf, 1938, 308 p. $3.00.

This book was not intended by its author, the former Chancellor of Austria, to be a post mortem on his country's independence; but that in effect is what it is. From Schuschnigg's summary of Austria's postwar history and from his own political philosophy and character as etched in these pages, it is clear that the Austrian state as he and Dollfuss conceived it — essentially Fascist and clerical — was not viable: it did not rest on the consent of a majority of elements in the country and was therefore destined to last only so long as it could secure outside help. Dorothy Thompson contributes a touching introduction, praising Schuschnigg in terms belied by the record.

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THE LAST FIVE HOURS OF AUSTRIA. By Eugene Lennhoff. New York: Stokes, 1938, 269 p. $2.50.

The demise of Austria reported by the former editor of the Vienna *Telegraph*.

KANSKE VI ICKE FÅ KRIG. By K. A. Bratt. Stockholm: Bonniers, 1937, 99 p. Kr. 2.25.

A Swedish military writer examines the international situation with a view to determining the chances of Scandinavia's remaining neutral. He finds that the answer depends on what combinations of Powers are fighting each other.

HOW SWEDEN OVERCAME THE DEPRESSION, 1930–1933. By Arthur Montgomery. New York: Bonnier, 1938, 91 p. $1.00.

A statistical treatment of a subject often discussed loosely.

SOCIAL WORK AND LEGISLATION IN SWEDEN. By the Royal Social Board. New York: Bonnier, 1938, 352 p. $1.00.

An official publication describing Sweden's advanced social legislation.

IL MEDITERRANEO. By Pietro Silva. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1937, 491 p. L. 30.

Probably the best synthesis of the history of the Mediterranean.

ITALY'S FOREIGN AND COLONIAL POLICY, 1914–1937. By Maxwell H. H. Macartney and Paul Cremona. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938, 353 p. $3.00.

The authors have served many years as Rome correspondents for, respectively, the London *Times* and the *Christian Science Monitor*. Cremona was recently expelled from Italy, apparently on the theory that he was of Jewish origin. Their book is the best treatment of its subject, and though it makes no pretensions to thorough scholarship, shows a familiarity with such sources as are available. For the rest, the authors have relied on their own extensive personal knowledge. On the whole they manage to keep a middle course between the pro- and anti-Fascist schools of interpretation.

LA CAMERA DEI FASCI E DELLE CORPORAZIONI. By C. Arena and Others. Florence: Sansoni, 1937, 253 p. L. 18.

Essays by various hands on the old political and the new economic systems of representation in legislative bodies, in particular the Italian.

CARLO AND NELLO ROSSELLI. By Gaetano Salvemini. London: For Intellectual Liberty, 1937, 71 p. 2/.

A tribute to the two anti-Fascist leaders assassinated in France in June 1937.

D'ANNUNZIO. By Tom. Antongini. Boston: Little, Brown, 1938, 583 p. $5.00.

A ponderous source book of intimate information by D'Annunzio's secretary, with chapters on the poet-adventurer's exploits in the war and at Fiume.

ITALIANI FUORI D'ITALIA. By Ugo E. Imperatori. Milan: Zucchi, 1937, 246 p. L. 10.

Brief summaries of the rôle played by Italian immigrants throughout the world.

POPE PIUS XI AND WORLD PEACE. By Lord Clonmore. New York: Dutton, 1938, 306 p. $3.00.

A rather juvenile attempt to evaluate the Pope's international policies.

PIUS XI: APOSTLE OF PEACE. By Lillian Browne-Olf. New York: Macmillan, 1938, 257 p. $2.50.

Not very penetrating sketches on the Pope as man and ruler.

THE TREE OF GERNIKA. By G. L. Steer. London: Hodder, 1938, 400 p. 12/6.

The author, a correspondent of the London *Times*, already known for his epic account of the Ethiopian War, was an eyewitness to the recent conquest of the Basque country. This record is a reportorial masterpiece in its vividness, insight and authenticity. His description of the aërial destruction of Gernika is especially graphic. This is a book that

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should be read by all who regard Franco as a champion of civilization and Christianity. There are numerous telling photographs and useful maps.

LES GRANDS CIMETIÈRES SOUS LA LUNE. By Georges Bernanos. Paris: Plon, 1938, 361 p. Fr. 20.

A French Catholic and Royalist writer tells of the bloody happenings on Majorca, where he was an eyewitness to the first months of Insurgent rule. He is exceedingly harsh on Church policy in Spain. This book is discussed in some detail in Alexander Werth's article elsewhere in this issue.

FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN SPAIN. Volume I. Edited by "Hispanicus." London: United Editorial, 1938, 751 p. 7/6.

A collection of so-called documents concerning German and Italian intervention, mostly taken from pro-government newspapers in Spain.

REVOLUTION AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN SPAIN. By Felix Morrow. New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1938, 202 p. $1.00.

A Trotskyite interpretation, both anti-Loyalist and anti-Franco.

HITLER EN ESPAGNE. By O. K. Simon. Paris: Denoël, 1938, 265 p. Fr. 21.

An exposé of the activities of the Nazi Party's Auslands-Organisation, based on documents seized by the Spanish Government.

RÉVOLUTION ET CONTRE-RÉVOLUTION EN ESPAGNE. By Joaquin Maurin. Paris: Rieder, 1937, 367 p. Fr. 15.

Maurin, a Trotskyite Communist, finished writing this book in April 1935 and has since disappeared after capture by the Rebels. It contains his rather discursive political ideas and an account of the Catalonian and Asturian insurrections in 1934.

HOMAGE TO CATALONIA. By George Orwell. London: Secker and Warburg, 1938, 314 p. 10/6.

Personal experiences of an Englishman who enlisted in the P.O.U.M. (more or less Trotskyite) militia, saw service on the Huesca front and participated in the Barcelona uprising of May 1937.

FRANCISCO FRANCO. By Joaquín Arrarás. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1938, 210 p. $2.50.

The "Caudillo" very sympathetically portrayed by a friend.

L'AVIAZIONE LEGIONARIA IN SPAGNA. By Guido Mattioli. Rome: "L'Aviazione," 1938, 197 p. L. 15.

A surprisingly circumstantial (and illustrated) chronicle of what the Italian aviators have been doing for Franco.

LE PROBLÈME BASQUE. By de Azpilikoeta. Paris: Grasset, 1938, 244 p. Fr. 25.

The Basque Question illustrated by an exchange of letters between President Aguirre and Cardinal Goma of Toledo, together with a speech of the former and commentaries by the compiler, legal adviser to the Basque Government.

THE PORTUGAL OF SALAZAR. By Michael Derrick. London: Sands, 1938, 159 p. 5/.

Salazar's "Estado Novo" — its origins, its objectives and its actual operation — put in a very favorable light.

LE REDRESSEMENT FINANCIER AU PORTUGAL. By P. Gilles. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1938, 229 p. Fr. 35.

In praise of Salazar's financial reforms.

NEUES PORTUGAL. By Friedrich Sieburg. Frankfurt: Societäts-Verlag, 1937, 270 p. M. 5.80.

A correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* visits Portugal and finds it good.

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Eastern Europe

THE ORIGIN OF RUSSIAN COMMUNISM. By Nicolas Berdyaev. New York: Scribner, 1938, 239 p. $3.00.

A Russian philosopher demonstrates that Bolshevism, in spite of its supposed Marxian ancestry, is in reality an essentially Russian phenomenon.

THE UNITED FRONT. By Georgi Dimitroff. New York: International Publishers, 1938, 287 p. $2.50.

Articles and speeches outlining the Communist International's policies on current world issues by its General Secretary, famous for his part in the Reichstag Fire Trial.

BIBLIOGRAFIYA RUSSKOI REVOLIUTSII I GRAZHDANSKOI VOINY (1917–1921). Compiled by S. P. Postnikov, edited by Jana Slavika. Prague: Russian Historical Archives, 1938, 450 p. $2.50.

The titles of some 6,000 books in the Russian Historical Archives at Prague.

U.R.S.S.: TERRAIN D'EXPÉRIENCES ÉCONOMIQUES. By Boris Brutzkus. Paris: Médicis, 1937, 117 p. Fr. 9.

An exiled economist draws up a balance sheet for the Soviet experiment.

SIX ANS À MOSCOU. By Georges Luciani. Paris: Librairie Picart, 1937, 442 p. Fr. 35.

A correspondent of the *Temps* and the *Petit Parisien* records his experiences.

VIE DE LÉNINE. By P. Kerjentsev. Paris: Éditions Sociales Internationales, 1937, 272 p. Fr. 20.

The original Russian edition of this authorized biography was based on an abundant documentation supplied by various Soviet institutions.

VBORBE ZA MIR. By M. M. Litvinov. Moscow: Partizdat, 1938, 195 p. 50 cents.

Speeches and articles by the Soviet Foreign Minister.

WOMEN IN THE SOVIET EAST. By Fannina W. Halle. New York: Dutton, 1938, 363 p. $4.00.

Dr. Halle, in this sequel to her "Women in Soviet Russia," describes the remarkable changes in the status of women among the non-Russian peoples of Soviet Asia.

ISTORIYA SIBIRI. Volume I. By S. F. Miller. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1937, 607 p. $4.00.

The beginning of an authoritative history of Russian expansion across Asia.

FINLYANDIYA I YEYE ARMIYA. By P. Romanov. Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1938, 88 p. 10 cents.

A brief survey of Finland and her army.

ESTONIA: POPULATION, CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC LIFE. Edited by Albert Pullerits. Tallinn, 1937, 278 p.

A government-sponsored source book of descriptive material.

THE MEMEL STATUTE. By Thorsten V. Kalijarvi. London: Hale, 1937, 256 p. 10/6.

A scholarly work on its origin, legal nature and operation.

TOWNS AND PEOPLE OF MODERN POLAND. By Robert Medill McBride. New York: McBride, 1938, 302 p. $3.00.

An admirable introduction to the country and its people.

THE NEW POLAND AND THE JEWS. By Simon Segal. New York: Furman, 1938, 223 p. $2.00.

A sordid story of oppression and degradation.

UNS RIEF POLEN! By Hans R. Wiese. Leipzig: Voigtländer, 1937, 242 p. M. 4.20.

The Germans and Poles can, and should, work together, holds this author.

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POLITICKÉ DĚJINY ČESKOSLOVENSKÉHO NÁRODA OD R. 1848 AŽ DO DNEŠNÍ DOBY. By Zdeněk Tobolka. Prague: Československý Kompas, 1932–37, 4 v. Kč. 300.

The most complete and scholarly political history of the Czechoslovak people during the seventy years immediately prior to their independence (1848–1918).

CZECHS AND GERMANS. By Elizabeth Wiskemann. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938, 299 p. $5.00.

Another of the Royal Institute of International Affairs' objective and timely volumes on Central Europe. After giving the historical background of Czech nationalism prior to the war and its early conflicts with the German element in Bohemia and Moravia, Miss Wiskemann takes up the economic, cultural and political problems that have driven the two peoples apart in the last two decades. There are several maps.

THE UNITY OF THE CZECHS AND SLOVAKS. By Ivan Dérer. Prague: Orbis, 1938, 78 p. Kč. 4.

A Slovak appeals for solidarity with the Czechs.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE SUDETE GERMANS. By Bohemicus. Prague: Orbis, 1938, 102 p.

A Czech view of the current dispute.

DEUTSCHER VOLKSBODEN UND DEUTSCHES VOLKSTUM IN DER TSCHECHOSLOWAKEI. By Gustav Fochler-Hauke. Heidelberg: Vowinckel, 1937, 324 p. M. 7.50.

A geopolitical compendium, full of blood and soil.

I PAESI DANUBIANI E BALCANICI. By Italo Zingarelli. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1938, 383 p. L. 18.

Historical, political and economic data on nine countries.

LE RAPPROCHEMENT ÉCONOMIQUE DES PAYS DANUBIENS. By Douchan Karlikovitch. Paris: Librairie Technique et Economique, 1938, 220 p. Fr. 30.

The necessity for Danubian economic coöperation historically and statistically demonstrated by one who is suspicious of German and Italian designs.

IL DANUBIO: FIUME INTERNAZIONALE. By Carlo Rossetti. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1937, 342 p. L. 20.

A documentary history of the Danube as an internationalized waterway.

BALKAN: KRIEGE, BÜNDNISSE, REVOLUTIONEN. By Egon Heymann. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1938, 440 p. M. 8.50.

A survey of recent Balkan history by a German journalist resident for several years in Belgrade. Notes, illustrations, index and chronology.

BALKANPAKT UND BALKANBUND. By Konstantin J. Peeff. Sofia: Staikoff, 1937, 105 p.

A legal study supplied with documentary appendices and a bibliography.

NIKOLAUS VON HORTHY. By Edgar von Schmidt-Pauli. Berlin: Süd-Ost-Verlag, 1936, 340 p. M. 5.

The life and times of the Hungarian Regent.

ÉSZAK, KELET, DÉL ES NYUGAT. By M. Miklós and Others. Pécs: József Taizs, 1937, 116 p.

Lectures on the Hungarian minorities in Germany and the Little Entente states.

LES MINORITÉS EN TRANSYLVANIE. By Viorica Boteni. Paris: Pedone, 1938, 276 p. Fr. 50.

A critical account, primarily legal in its approach.

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ESSAI SUR LE RÉGIME REPRÉSENTATIF EN ROUMANIE. By Crisan T. Axente. Paris: Sirey, 1937, 564 p. Fr. 65.

A constitutional history that does not touch recent events.

DIE SOZIALÖKONOMISCHE STRUKTUR DER JUGOSLAWISCHEN LANDWIRTSCHAFT. By Otto von Franges. Berlin: Weidmann, 1937, 288 p.

A fundamental and comprehensive study, based on diligent research and supported by copious statistics. Good bibliographies but no index.

ZOGU THE FIRST, KING OF THE ALBANIANS. By Christo A. Dako. Tirana: Kristo Luarasi, 1937, 164 p. Fr. (gold) 3.50.

A laudatory review of Zogu's career before he became king.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN. Volume III. By John Harold Clapham. New York: Macmillan, 1938, 577 p. $7.00.

This concluding volume of Professor Clapham's great historical work carries the story from 1887 to 1914, with an epilogue from 1914 to 1929.

BRITAIN AND THE DICTATORS. By R. W. Seton-Watson. New York: Macmillan, 1938, 460 p. $3.50.

Professor Seton-Watson is Masaryk Professor of Central European History in the University of London and one of Britain's foremost diplomatic historians. In this thoughtful and authoritative work he surveys British foreign policy since the war. His account of those twenty years of increasing chaos cannot but command universal respect; we may, however, be permitted to wonder at some of his interpretations of contemporary events, as for instance his justification of British policy in Spain and his optimism in regard to the future of Anglo-German relations.

THE GRAY DIPLOMATISTS. By Kenneth Edwards. London: Rich, 1938, 328 p. 15/.

A British naval officer finds that the last sixteen years of European history revolve around the activities of Britain's Mediterranean fleet.

THE LOST BRITISH POLICY. By Barbara Wertheim. London: United Editorial, 1938, 127 p. 1/.

A rapid summary of Britain's 200-year-old policy of keeping Spain independent, now — so the author holds — thrown aside by Mr. Chamberlain.

THE NAVY. By Admiral Sir Herbert W. Richmond. London: Hodge, 1938, 128 p. 2/6.

A compact but wise little book on Britain's navy and naval policy. Admiral Richmond points out the dangers of isolation and of abandoning the Mediterranean.

THE ARMY. By Brigadier R. H. Dewing. London: Hodge, 1938, 128 p. 2/6.

The different branches of the British army described in simple language.

REPORT ON THE BRITISH PRESS. London: Political and Economic Planning, 1938, 333 p. 10/6.

This book will be read with close attention by all persons interested in the formation and guidance of public opinion. On the whole it is a candid and well-written critique of all aspects of the British press: financial, political, social and legal. Its authors could, however, have gone a little more diligently into the question of government censorship, formal and informal.

PUBLIC SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN. By Hiram Miller Stout. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1938, 189 p. $2.50.

How Britain's Civil Service and Parliament translate her high ideals of public service into actual political practice.

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BRITISH EXPERIMENTS IN PUBLIC OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL. By Terence H. O'Brien. New York: Norton, 1938, 304 p. $3.00.

The operation of the Central Electricity Board, the British Broadcasting Corporation and the London Transport Board.

THOUGHTS AND TALKS, 1935–37: THE DIARY OF A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT. By Sir Arnold Wilson. London: Longmans, 1938, 392 p. 12/6.

The editor of the *Fortnightly Review* pursues his way, which he finds most pleasant in the dictatorial countries.

MOMENTS OF MEMORY. RECOLLECTIONS AND IMPRESSIONS. By Herbert Asquith. New York: Scribner, 1938, 382 p. $3.50.

Not particularly revealing memoirs by a son of the former Prime Minister.

L'ANGLETERRE ET L'EMPIRE BRITANNIQUE. By Jacques Bainville. Paris: Plon, 1938, 243 p. Fr. 25.

Articles published in various journals between 1914 and 1935 by the late French Royalist historian.

THE CRUCIAL PROBLEM OF IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT. New York: Longmans, 1938, 201 p. $1.00.

The report of the Royal Empire Society's Conference (November 1937) on the relation between consumption and production.

THE DOMINIONS AS SOVEREIGN STATES. By Arthur Berriedale Keith. New York: Macmillan, 1938, 769 p. $6.25.

Another scholarly work from an outstanding authority on the government of the British Empire. In this volume Dr. Keith analyzes the present status of the constitutions and governments of the Dominions.

THE CANADIANS: THE STORY OF A PEOPLE. By George M. Wrong. New York: Macmillan, 1938, 455 p. $3.50.

A popular history for the layman by a professor at the University of Toronto.

CANADA LOOKS ABROAD. By R. A. MacKay and E. B. Rogers. New York: Oxford University Press, 1938, 402 p. $3.50.

Canada's foreign policy is examined in concrete detail in this book, issued under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

LE CANADA ET LA DOCTRINE DE MONROE. By Pierre Sebilleau. Paris: Sirey, 1937, 219 p. Fr. 36.

Dr. Sebilleau's thesis is that American imperialism, as embodied in the Monroe Doctrine, conditioned Canada's political development and therefore the evolution of the present British Empire.

INSIDE INDIA. By Halidé Edib. New York: Macmillan, 1938, 378 p. $3.50.

An intelligent and critical appraisal of Indian problems and leaders — Moslem and Hindu — by a woman who helped create the new Turkey. One of the best books on India, particularly enlightening because it is by a Moslem.

AUSTRALIA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS AND NATIONAL POLICY. By H. L. Harris. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, for the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1938, 155 p. 5/.

A factual essay dealing largely with economic and social questions.

PRESS, RADIO AND WORLD AFFAIRS. Edited by W. Macmahon Ball. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1938, 146 p. 2/.

An increasingly important problem viewed in its Australian manifestations.

AVSTRALIYA OCHERK EKONOMICHESKOY GEOGRAFII. By A. Mileykovsky. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1938, 308 p. 80 cents.

The economic geography of Australia.

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WIRTSCHAFTSLENKUNG: DAS AUSTRALISCHE BEISPIEL. By Albert Prinzing. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1937, 192 p. M. 9.

Australia's experience with economic planning and its part in imperial politics.

The Near East

SOME ASPECTS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY OF NATIONALS IN THE NEAR EAST. Compiled by Helen Clarkson Miller Davis. New York: Harper, 1938, 182 p. $2.00.

Recent documents bearing on a complicated subject.

KAMAL ATATURK. UNTERGANG UND AUFSTIEG DER TÜRKEI. By H. Melzig. Frankfurt: Societäts-Verlag, 1937, 293 p. M. 6.80.

The personality, political ideas and accomplishments of Turkey's strong man.

REDRESSEMENT ÉCONOMIQUE ET INDUSTRIALISATION DE LA NOUVELLE TURQUIE. By Orhan Conker and Emile Witmeur. Paris: Sirey, 1937, 345 p. Fr. 40.

A handy, illustrated compilation of data on the amazing progress Turkey has made towards industrialization since the war.

PODGOTOVKA VOYNY NA ARABSKOM VOSTOKE (MIR I VOYNA). By I. Levin. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1938, 76 p. 6 cents.

A description of Anglo-Italian manœuvres among the Arab peoples.

LA PASSION DE LA CILICIE, 1919–1922. By Paul du Véou. Paris: Geuthner, 1937, 393 p. Fr. 24.

A documented chronicle of a confused and little-known episode in postwar history, especially interesting today in view of the recent Alexandretta affair.

ALERTE EN SYRIE! By Jérôme and Jean Tharaud. Paris: Plon, 1937, 246 p. Fr. 16.50.

Two indefatigable French journalists find Syria to be hopelessly divided.

LA CRISE ÉCONOMIQUE MONDIALE ET SES RÉPERCUSSIONS EN IRAN. By Chams-ed-Dine Djazaeri. Paris: Librairie Technique et Économique, 1938, 314 p. Fr. 35.

Iran's postwar economic history set forth with the aid of statistics.

Africa

LE HAUT COMITÉ MÉDITERRANÉEN ET LES ORGANISMES DE POLITIQUE MUSULMANE. By Louis Chauvot. Paris: Librairie Technique et Économique, 1938, 167 p. Fr. 25.

How France coördinates the government of her Moslem subjects in Africa and Asia.

LA FRANCE D'OUTRE-MER. By Mme. R. and R. Ozouf. Paris: Nathan, 1938, 2 v. Fr. 18.

A useful collection of economic, social and historical information about France's colonies, particularly those in Africa.

LES NOTIONS D'ÉTAT ET DE NATIONALITÉ AU MAROC. By Germain Chauvel. Casablanca: Farairre, 1937, 199 p. Fr. 30.

This study develops the thesis that the Sultan is still sovereign in Morocco and that consequently there is a Moroccan nationality.

INITIATION AU MAROC. Paris: Éditions d'Art et d'Histoire, 1937, 357 p.

Excellent historical, economic and political essays on modern Morocco by members of the Institut des Hautes Études Marocaines.

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L'ÉGYPTE INDÉPENDANTE. Paris: Hartmann, for the Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, 1938, 456 p. Fr. 25.

This coöperative and anonymous work is a first-rate treatise on Egypt's recent history, national economy and press. There are also chapters on the status of foreigners.

MOEURS ET COUTUMES DES FELLAHS. By Henry Habib Ayrout. Paris: Payot, 1938, 189 p. Fr. 25.

The daily life of the world's oldest peasantry graphically described by a professor in the University of Cairo.

YEGIPET. By I. Levin. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1938, 131 p. 20 cents.

A Soviet analysis of recent tendencies in Egypt's development.

THE AFRICANS' LAST STRONGHOLD. By Captain Arnold Wienholt. London: Long, 1938, 94 p. 3/6.

An eyewitness account of the retreat to Addis Ababa, by a Red Cross officer.

LE CONFLIT ITALO-ÉTHIOPIEN DEVANT LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL. By Charles Rousseau. Paris: Pedone, 1938, 280 p. Fr. 60.

Exhaustive and objective scholarship by a professor at the University of Rennes.

LA CAMPAGNE D'ÉTHIOPIE ET LA PENSÉE POLITIQUE FRANÇAISE. By Yves Simon. Brussels: Desclée, 1937, 128 p. Fr. 10.

Rambling thoughts following no clear thesis.

L'AFFAIRE D'ÉTHIOPIE ET LES DIPLOMATES (1934–1937). By Jean Bastin. Brussels: L'Édition Universelle, 1937, 420 p. Fr. 45.

An amateur, though realistic, effort at diplomatic history.

THE NEW ABYSSINIA. By Major E. W. Polson Newman. London: Rich, 1938, 284 p. 15/.

A report on a tour into many parts of Ethiopia where the author found that the Italians have been making marked progress in organizing their new empire.

LE TOGO: PAYS D'INFLUENCE FRANÇAISE. By Général Maroix. Paris: Larose, 1938, 136 p. Fr. 25.

The geography, history and present state of France's West African mandate.

DIE MANDAAT VIR SUIDWEST-AFRIKA. By L. H. Wessels. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1937, 152 p.

The history of the mandate in former German Southwest Africa.

The Far East

JAPAN IN CHINA. By T. A. Bisson. New York: Macmillan, 1938, 417 p. $3.00.

A sober, informed appraisal of the Far Eastern situation by a member of the staff of the Foreign Policy Association, for a number of years resident in China. Mr. Bisson believes that in the end Japan, not China, will lose the war.

JAPAN IN CHINA: HER MOTIVES AND AIMS. By Kiyoshi K. Kawakami. London: Murray, 1938, 188 p. 5/.

A Japanese journalist, in presenting his country's case, distorts facts and logic.

PROPAGANDA FROM CHINA AND JAPAN. By Bruno Lasker and Agnes Roman. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1938, 120 p. $1.50.

A critical study of typical statements made to the press by Japanese and Chinese propaganda agencies. The authors attempt to show us how we can winnow out the truth in such "news."

CHINA FIGHTS BACK. By Agnes Smedley. New York: Vanguard, 1938, 282 p. $2.50.

Fragments from the diary and letters of an American Leftist journalist, written while

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she was following the Chinese Red (Eighth Route) Army in its present guerrilla war on the flanks of the Japanese Army in northwest China.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK: SOLDIER AND STATESMAN. By Hollington K. Tong. London: Hurst, 1938, 2 v. 30/.

An authorized biography of China's Generalissimo by an enthusiastic admirer. Chiang's early revolutionary activities, his leadership in establishing the Nationalist Government and in unifying the country are set forth with many quotations from the leader's speeches and writings.

JOURNEY TO TURKESTAN. By Sir Eric Teichman. London: Hodder, 1937, 221 p. 15/.

In 1935 the British Government sent the author on a political mission from China to Chinese Turkestan. This elaborately illustrated record of that journey, starting from Peiping and ending at Delhi, lifts the veil on an obscure corner of Asia.

OSTTURKISTAN ZWISCHEN DEN GROSSMÄCHTEN. By Fuad Kazak. Königsberg: Ost-Europa-Verlag, 1937, 160 p. M. 7.50.

A description of the economy of Chinese Turkestan (illustrated by many statistics and graphs) and of the efforts by neighboring Powers to gain control of it.

JAPAN IN TRANSITION. By Emil Lederer and Emy Lederer-Seidler. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938, 260 p. $3.00.

A good book on the Japanese people, their country and their culture. The authors, who lived two years in Japan where Dr. Lederer was professor in the University of Tokyo, are especially convincing in their graphic analysis of the impact of the dynamic civilization of the West on Japan's static culture.

PABOCHEYE DVIZHENIE V YAPONII. By U. Hayama. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1937, 159 p. 20 cents.

An account of the labor movement in Japan, by a Japanese Communist.

LES RELATIONS ENTRE L'INDOCHINE FRANÇAISE ET LA CHINE. By W. Y. Wang. Paris: Bossuet, 1937, 200 p. Fr. 40.

A compendium of economic facts and statistics.

OFFICIAL HANDBOOK OF THE TERRITORY OF NEW GUINEA. Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 1937, 551 p. 5/.

Multifarious data on an increasingly important area.

Latin America

LE PANAMÉRICANISME ET LA POLITIQUE DE BON VOISINAGE. By Alfonso Garcia Robles. Paris: Éditions Internationales, 1938, 60 p. Fr. 10.

A brief survey with bibliography.

L'AMÉRIQUE IBÉRIQUE. By Jacques de Lauwe. Paris: Gallimard, 1937, 224 p. Fr. 18.

A sociological bird's-eye view by one who has lived for many years in South America without becoming very optimistic over its future.

DER BALKAN AMERIKAS. By Colin Ross. Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1937, 274 p. M. 4.85.

A Nazi amateur geographer surveys Central America. Many illustrations.

LA RÉPUBLIQUE DE L'ÉQUATEUR. By General Georges Perrier. Paris: Éditions France-Amérique, 1937, 76 p. Fr. 12.

A French general, well acquainted with Ecuador, briefly describes that country, giving especial attention to its relations with France.

POSIBILIDADES AGRO-ECONOMICAS DEL ECUADOR. By Francisco Banda. Quito: Imprenta Nacional, 1937, 416 p.

Ecuador's agricultural potentialities described by her Director General of Commerce.

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AGRICULTURE

INTERNATIONAL Institute of Agriculture. XIVth General Assembly (23–28 May 1938). RESOLUTIONS adopted. Rome, 1938. 7, 7 p. 24 cm. Text in French and English.

ARMAMENT, NAVAL AND OTHER

AGREEMENT between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Polish Government providing for the limitation of naval armament and the exchange of information concerning naval construction [With protocol of signature and exchange of notes]. London, April 27, 1938. London, 1938, 31 p. 24½ cm. (Poland No. 1 (1938), Cmd. 5739.) 6d.

AGREEMENT between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Turkish Republic regarding an Armaments Credit for Turkey, London, May 27, 1938. London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1938, 3 p. 24½ cm. (Turkey No. 1 (1938), Cmd. 5755.) 1d.

ANGLO-TURKISH Guarantee Agreement 27th May, 1938. Agreement with the Government of the Turkish Republic relating to Guarantees in connection with the Export to Turkey of Goods Manufactured in the United Kingdom. London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1938. 11 p. 24½ cm. (Export Credits Guarantee Department, Cmd. 5754.) 2d.

NATIONAL Control of the Manufacture of and Trade in Arms. Information as to Present Position collected by the Secretariat in accordance with the Resolution adopted on May 31, 1937, by the Bureau of the Conference. (League of Nations. Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments.) Geneva, 1938. 241 p. 33 cm.

PROTOCOL modifying the Treaty of the 25th March, 1936, for the Limitation of Naval Armament, London, June 30, 1938. London, 1938. 3 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 43 (1938), Cmd. 5781.) 1d.

ADDITIONAL Protocol to the Convention of June 12, 1934, relating to the Salvage of Torpedoes, Paris, January 12, 1938. London, 1938. 3 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 40 (1938), Cmd. 5774.) 1d.

BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS

BANK for International Settlements. Eighth annual report. 1st April 1937–31st March 1938. Basle, 9th May 1938. 115 p. Annexes VI. 30 cm.

BOUNDARY, HONDURAS — NICARAGUA

LÍMITES entre Honduras y Nicaragua. Replica al alegato de Nicaragua presentada a su Majestad Catolica el Rey de España en calidad de arbitro por los representantes de la Repca. de Honduras. 2. ed. Tegucigalpa, Calderon, 1938. 196, ii p. 21½ cm. At head of title: Publicaciones de la Secretaria de RR. EE.

EL LAUDO de S. M. el Rey de España Don Alfonso XIII, que dirimió la controversia de límites entre Honduras y Nicaragua, no es contradictorio ni ofrece deudas para su ejecución, estudio técnico por José Augusto Padilla . . . Tegucigalpa, Ariston, 1938. 16 p. map. 24 cm. (Publicación de la Secretaría de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores de la República de Honduras.) At head of title: Límites entre Honduras y Nicaragua.

VALIDEZ Y FUERZA obligatoria del Laudo de S. M. El Rey de España, estudio juridico del Jurisconsulto Costarricense Lic. Luis Anderson . . . 1938. 34 p. 26 cm. (Publicacion de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores de la República de Honduras.) At head of title: Límites entre Honduras y Nicaragua.

LÍMITES DEFINITIVOS entre Honduras y Nicaragua, por Antonio Bermúdez M. 112 p. map. 26 cm. (Publicaciones de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores de Honduras.)

BROADCASTING, AMERICAN

INTER-AMERICAN Radio Communications Convention. Message from the President of the United States transmitting an Inter-American Radio Communications Convention between the United States of America, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Chile, the Dominican Republic,

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Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela, signed at Havana on December 13, 1937. [Washington, 1938] 18 p. 23 cm. (Sen. Exec. I, 75th Cong., 3d. sess.)

—— REPORT [to accompany Executive I]. 19 p. 23 cm. (Sen. Exec. Rept. 16, 75th Cong., 3d sess.)

NORTH AMERICAN Regional Broadcasting Agreement. Message from the President of the United States transmitting a North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement between the United Stares, Canada, Cuba, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, signed at Havana on December 13, 1937. [Washington, 1938] 25 p. diagrs. 23 cm. (Sen. Exec. H, 75th Cong., 3d sess.)

—— REPORT [to accompany Executive H]. 27 p. diagrs. 23 cm. (Sen. Exec. Rept. 15, 75th Cong., 3d sess.)

CAPITULATIONS

INTERNATIONAL Convention Regarding the Abolition of the Capitulations in Egypt. Message from the President of the United States transmitting a Convention signed at Montreux, Switzerland, on May 8, 1937, between His Majesty the King of Egypt and the United States and certain other countries, defining the rights of the United States and of the other capitulatory powers in Egypt consequent upon the abolition of the capitulatory régime in that country, and an annex, protocol, and final act relating thereto. [Washington, 1938] 42 p. 23 cm. (Sen. Exec. C, 75th Cong., 3d sess.)

—— REPORT [to accompany Executive C]. 2 p. 23 cm. (Sen. Exec. Rept. No. 4, 75th Cong., 3d sess.)

FRIENDSHIP, Commerce, and Navigation with Siam. Message from the President of the United States transmitting a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Siam, signed at Bangkok on November 13, 1937, with a final protocol and agreement relating thereto. [Washington, 1938.] 15 p. 23 cm. (Sen. Exec. D, 75th Cong., 3d sess.)

—— REPORT [to accompany Executive D]. 4 p. 24 cm. (Sen. Exec. Rept. No. 6, 75th Cong., 3d sess.)

For similar treaty see United Kingdom, Treaty Series Nos. 32 and 33 (1938), cmd. 5730, 5731.

CHILD WELFARE

CHILD Welfare Information Centre. Summary of the Legislative and Administrative Series of Documents of the Child Welfare Information Centre to December 31, 1937. League of Nations, Geneva, 1938. 52 p. 21¼ cm. (C.73.M.28.1938.IV.3.)

CHILD Welfare Information Centre. Summary of Annual Reports received from Governments between the Close of the First Session and the Close of the Second Session of the Advisory Committee on Social Questions (May 1, 1937–May 5, 1938). League of Nations, Geneva, 1938. 160 p. 21¼ cm. (C.81.M.36.1938.IV, C.Q.S./P.E./C.I.39; 1938. IV.5.)

COLONIES, BRITISH

THE COLONIAL Empire in 1937–38. Statement to accompany the Estimates for Colonial and Middle Eastern Services 1938. London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1938. 79 p. 24½ cm. (Cmd. 5760.) 1s. 3d.

DOMINION and Colonial Statistics. Tables relating to the British Dominions and the world's dependencies (colonies, protectorates, and mandates) with special reference to their trade with respective mother countries and with the United States. Washington, 1938. iv, 33 p. 23 cm. (United States Tariff Commission, Report No. 127, Second Series.)

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AMERICAN DELEGATIONS to International Conferences, Congresses and Expositions and American Representation on International Institutions and Commissions with Relevant Data. Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1937. Compiled in the Division of International Conferences. Washington, 1938. vii, 173 p. 23 cm. (Department of State, Publication 1163.) 20 c.

COURTS, INTERNATIONAL

THE BORCHGRAVE case (discontinuance). Order of April 30th, 1938. Leyden, A. W. Sitjhoff, 1938. 5 p. 24 cm. (Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A/B, Judgments, Orders and Advisory Opinions, No. 73.)

THE PANEVEZYS-SALDUTISKIS Railway Case (preliminary objections). Order of June 30th, 1938. 8 double p. 24 cm. (Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A/B, No. 75. Holland, 1938.)

PHOSPHATES in Morocco (preliminary objections). Leyden, 1938. 42, 42 p. 24 cm. (Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A/B, Fasc. No. 74.)

RAPPORT du Conseil Administratif de la Cour Permanente d'Arbitrage sur les travaux de la Cour, sur le fonctionnement des services administratifs et sur les dépenses pendant l'exercice 1937.

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Trente-septième année. La Haye, 1938. 33 p. 34 cm. (Bureau International de la Cour Permanente d'Arbitrage.)

ITALY — UNITED KINGDOM

I. AGREEMENT between the United Kingdom and Italy consisting of a protocol with annexes and exchanges of notes. II. Bon voisinage agreement and exchanges of notes between the United Kingdom, Egypt and Italy. Rome, April 16, 1938. London, 1938. 39 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 31 (1938), Cmd. 5726.) 9d.

Though published in the Treaty Series, the instrument was not in force.

LABOR CONVENTIONS — OPERATION

REPORT of the Governing Body of the International Labour Office upon the Working of the Convention (No. 22) concerning Seamen's Articles of Agreement. Geneva, 1938. 44 p. 24 cm. (International Labor Conference, Twenty-Fourth Session.)

REPORT of the Governing Body of the International Labour Office upon the Working of the Convention (No. 23) concerning the Repatriation of Seamen. Geneva, 1938. 25 p. 33 cm. (International Labor Conference, Twenty-Fourth Session.)

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NEUTRALITY

DÉCLARATION [des Gouvernments de Danemark, de Finlande, d'Islande, de Norvège et de Suède concernant des règles similaires de neutralité Stockholm, le 27 mai 1938] København, J. H. Schultz, 1938. 1 p. 26 cm.

DANEMARK. Règles de neutralité. København, Kungl, Boktr., 1938. 4 p. 24 cm.

OIL EXPROPRIATION, MEXICO

CORRESPONDENCE with the Mexican Government regarding the Expropriation of Oil Properties in Mexico. Mexico, April 8 to May 20, 1938. London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1938. 15 p. 24½ cm. (Mexico No. 1 (1938), Cmd. 5758.) 3d.

PAN AMERICAN CONFERENCES

EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL Conference of American States. Lima, Peru, December 1938. Report of the committee on the relations of the Pan American organs to other entities and on the functions of the Pan American Union to be submitted to the eighth international conference of American states. Approved by the Governing Board of the Pan American Union at the session held on January 5, 1938. Pan American Union, Washington, 1938. 9 p. 27½ cm.

INTER-AMERICAN Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. Proceedings. (Stenographic reports.) Buenos Aires, December 1936. Buenos Aires, 1937. 814 p. 31½ cm.

PROGRAM and Regulations of the Eighth International Conference of American States to assemble at Lima, Peru, December 9, 1938. Washington, 1938. 13 l. 27 cm. (Congress and Conference Series No. 25.)

PROJECT of Program. Submitted to the Governments, members of the Pan American Union, with the request that observations thereon be transmitted to the Pan American Union on or before May 15, 1938. Washington, Pan American Union, 1938. 3 p. l. 44 l. 27½ cm. At head of title: Eighth International Conference of American States, Lima, Peru, December 9, 1938.

PROJECT of treaty on the creation of the association of American nations. Prepared by the Governments of Colombia and the Dominican Republic and submitted to the consideration of the other Governments Members of the Pan American Union pursuant to the resolution of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. Washington, Pan American Union, n.d. 2 p. l., 11 l. 27 cm.

STEPS taken by the Pan American Union in Fulfillment of the Conventions and Resolutions adopted at the Seventh International Conference of American States and the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace. Report submitted to the Members of the Governing Board by the Director General, June 30, 1938. Pan American Union, Washington, D. C., 1938. 48 p. 27½ cm. (Congress and Conference Series No. 26.)

PRISONERS

ENQUIRY into the Number of Prisoners and the Measures taken to Reduce it. Report by the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission, 1938. Report attached to Note by the Secretary-General, A.15.1938.IV. League of Nations, Geneva, 1938. 48 p. 29½ cm.

PUBLIC FINANCE

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Continuations of the series, 1936.II.A.1.
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SEAMEN, EMPLOYMENT

SIX DRAFT Conventions and Two Recommendations concerning employment of seamen, adopted at the International Labor Conference, October 6–24, 1936, and sent to the Senate of the United States on August 19, 1937. Washington, 1937. 103 p. 23 cm. (Sen. Exec. Docs. V to CC, inclusive, 75th Cong., 1st sess.)
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DRAFT CONVENTION (No. 57) concerning hours of work on board ship and manning, adopted by the International Labor Conference at its twenty-first session. . . . Report [to accompany Executive Z]. 35 p. 23 cm. (Sen. Exec. Rept. No. 9, 75th Cong., 3d sess.)

SPAIN — NON-INTERVENTION

THE Text of a proposed Resolution reaffirming and extending the Non-Intervention Agreement, and providing for the withdrawal of foreign volunteers from Spain, for the grant in certain circumstances of belligerent rights to the two parties in Spain, and for the observation of the Spanish frontiers by land and sea adopted by the International Committee for the Application of the Agreement Regarding Non-Intervention in Spain at a plenary session held on Tuesday, July 5, 1938, for transmission to the two Spanish parties for their approval. London, 1938. 80 p. 24½ cm. (Spain No. 1 (1938), Cmd. 5793.) 1s. 3d.

STATISTICS

MONEY AND BANKING, 1937/38. 2 vols. Geneva, 1938. 165 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations, 1938.II.A.3.I and II.)
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STATISTICAL Year-Book of the League of Nations, 1937/38. League of Nations, Geneva, 1938. 336 p. 24½ cm. (1938.II.A.4.) $2.50.

UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT of State. Press Releases. Saturday, July 2, 1938. Vol. XIX: No. 457. Publication 1195. Washington, 1938. 26½ cm.
A new format including additional material and all addresses made by Department officers.
PAPERS Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1922. Washington, 1938. 2 vols. 23½ cm. (Department of State, Publication Nos. 1155, 1156.) $1.75 (cloth) each.
TREATIES, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1923–1937: Vol. IV, continuing Treaties, conventions . . . , 1776–1923, to December 31, 1937. Washington, 1938. 1885 p. (S. doc. 134, 75th Cong., 3d sess.) $2.25 (cloth).

WORLD WAR

BRITISH DOCUMENTS on the origins of the war, 1898–1914. Edited by G. P. Gooch, D.Litt., F.B.A., and Harold Temperley, Litt.D., F.B.A. Vol. X, Part II. The last years of peace. London, 1938. lx, 921 p. 26½ cm. £1.
The final volume of this series.
ALDROVANDI MARESCOTTI L. Guerra Diplomatica. Ricordi e frammenti di diario (1914–1919). Milano, A. Mondadori, 1938. 477 p. illus. 19 cm.
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

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